

W.T. MORREY

ROOM 310

THIRD CONGRESS OF THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL

*Report of Meetings
held at Moscow
June 22nd—July 12th
1921*

(Reprinted from "Moscow," the special organ of the Congress)

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COMMUNIST PARTY OF GREAT BRITAIN
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Report of Moscow Congress

PRELIMINARY E.C. MEETINGS OF COMINTERN

JUNE 10

A meeting of the Executive Committee took place on June 10th for the purpose of preparing the work of the Congress. The following questions were discussed: (1) Meeting of the Executive during the Congress. (2) Mandate commission. (3) Theses. (4) Agenda for the Congress. (5) The language question. (6) Reports. (7) Division of votes and methods of voting, agenda and standing orders. (8) Order of business. (9) Representative of the Executive at the Women's conference. (10) Meetings of the Presidium of the Congress.

Comrade Zinoviev proposed that, during the Congress, the Executive Committee be enlarged so that the Parties having ten votes, have three additional representatives, over seven, two additional representatives, and, under seven, one additional representative. The resolution was accepted.

On the question of the mandate commission, comrade Radek proposed that one French comrade, a representative of the Far East, and an Italian comrade be appointed. The Bulgarian, Serbian and Roumanian delegates desired to have one representative on the commission, while the French and Italian delegates desired to discuss the resolution further.

Comrade Radek dealt with the question of the theses. At the last Congress, the theses were drawn up by the Russian comrades as the theses of the Executive Committee. This time, I propose that the publication of the theses be withheld until all the delegates have arrived. The small bureau will keep in touch with all the delegations in order to have representatives of all the delegations on the commissions. The following commissions will be appointed: (1) A commission which shall draw up the report of the Executive and the thesis; (2) The question of the policy of transitional demands, and struggles, and the tactics of the Communist International during the transitional period to the direct struggle for power. Apart from this, there will be theses on the question of the relation of the Communist International to the Red Trade Union International; (3) Trade Unions commission; (4) Theses on the question of the parties in the various countries and the construction of the executive. In addition, we shall have to elect a commission on the question of the first point on the agenda: "Report on the world economic and political situation."

The commissions will have to do all the preparatory work of the Congress, to receive additions to the theses and to draw up the reports.

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On the report of comrade Radek, it was resolved that each delegation is to appoint one of its members to each commission, and that the other delegates may attend the meetings as listeners.

On the question of the agenda, the small bureau proposed to include the question of the co-operatives and the organisation of red co-operative societies. The Russian party desired also to include the internal position of Soviet Russia as a special question.

The agenda published up till now is only a preliminary one. The Congress itself can draw up another, or make additions to the present one.

The report of the Executive council will be given by comrade Zinoviev. The Report on the economic situation and the tasks of the Communist International will be given by comrade Trotsky. The report on the internal and foreign economic and political situations by comrade Lenin, and, on the question of tactics, by comrade Radek.

On the organisation of the respective parties, the ten largest parties will appoint reporters, with a limited time for speaking from fifteen to twenty minutes. These countries are Germany, France, England, America, Bulgaria, Norway, Italy, Poland, and Czecho-Slovakia. Subsequently, these will be combined in a joint report, upon which comrade Bela Kun will speak on the organisation of the parties in the individual countries and comrade Koenen will speak on the construction of the International.

The question of the trade unions will be taken by comrade Zinoviev, in conjunction with comrade Heckert. The Eastern question will be discussed during the reports of the individual parties, and Comrades Ravestam and Radek will give joint reports on the subject. The question of the co-operative societies will be dealt with by the Russian comrade, Hintchouk, and a German comrade. The women comrades and the young communists will draw up their own reports on the women's and young communists' movement.

The representatives of the C.L.P.G. desired to have their own speakers to give supplementary reports on the question of the trade unions. Comrade Radek opposed this, and, with the approval of those present, pointed out that the C.L.P.G. on all questions affecting the International, expressed sympathetic but independent views. The speaker referred to the pamphlets published by the C.L.P.G., which speak of the collapse of the world revolution and the stupidity of the Executive. Other groups of comrades also represent the same tendencies, and we cannot give any privileges to the C.L.P.G. There will be supplementary reports on all the questions on the agenda of which the C.L.P.G. can take advantage equally with the rest, and they will be able to display to the Congress their wisdom in revolutionary theory.

A French comrade proposed that the question of the commissions be decided within twenty-four hours, but, as doubts arose as to whether the theses could be drawn up in that short time and the amendments to them received, the Executive Committee

was empowered to prolong the period for another twenty-four hours.

On the question of language, comrade Zinoviev proposed that, in view of the scarcity of time, German and French alone be taken as the obligatory languages. In view of other proposals for the Russian and English languages to be included, it was proposed to postpone the decision of this question to the next meeting. Similarly, the question of voting on the order of business was also postponed to the next meeting.

A long discussion took place on the question of the meeting of the Presidium. It was decided to appoint seven comrades from the Russian, German, Bulgarian, Italian, and French parties to the Presidium. The respective delegations should appoint their representatives to the Presidium, and hand in their names to the Presidium.

Comrades Telheimer, Bucharin, and a French comrade, were delegated to the Bureau of the International Women's Conference.

The Bulgarian question was postponed.

As many more delegates will have arrived by the 15th of June, it is anticipated that it will be possible to fix the opening of the Congress for the 16th.

E.C. MEETING, JUNE 12.

The Executive Committee resumed its meeting on June 12th at 8 p.m., and continued the discussion of the agenda begun at the Friday session. Secretary Kobetzky delivered a report on the formation of the commissions. A motion proposed by comrade Zinoviev was carried, postponing final approval of the list submitted by the Hungarian comrades. To-morrow, the small bureau will discuss the differences of opinion that have arisen among the Hungarian delegates. Yesterday, the following commissions were formed: commission for the report of the Executive Committee; commission for the world situation and the world crisis; commission for tactics; commission for the Russian situation; and that for the problem of organisation. Next, the languages question was put to a vote. It was resolved to recognise German, French, English, and Russian as the official languages, and to abbreviate the translations.

The matter of chairmanship and vice-chairmanship was discussed, and it was decided to submit the following names for the approval of the Congress for election, comrade Zinoviev (chairman), comrades Koenen (Germany), Loriot (France), Galovan (Bulgaria), and Gennari (Italy), as vice-chairmen.

A resolution was then adopted, proposed by the Russian fraction on the conviction of comrade Brandler, chairman of the U.C.P. of Germany. Two reports were made concerning the Czecho-Slovakian question, one by the Czech and the other by the German party. The speaker for the Czech party reported on the causes of the unfortunate events in the Czecho-Slovakian party, and proposed affiliation to the Third International. The representative of the German section of

the Communist party of Czecho-Slovakia, delivered an extremely sharp attack upon the opportunist elements in the Czech section, severely criticising the attitude of comrade Smeral during the March revolt, by which the expulsion of the editors, Lev and Kernansky, was prevented. He had nothing to say, however against the affiliation of the Czech party. The attitude of its leaders is a point against such affiliation; in its favour is the excellent communist spirit of large masses of the Czech party.

The discussion was then closed, and the session adjourned until Monday.

E.C. MEETING, JUNE 13

Comrade Popov (Bulgaria) in the name of the Bulgarian delegation expressed his satisfaction that the Czecho-Slovak party wishes to join the Third International. But at the same time the Bulgarian delegation points out that at this important moment, the Czecho-Slovak party allows itself to be led by those leaders who were inclined to opportunism. The same thing occurred in Germany during the Kapp putsch, and a similar case happened in Italy as well. Comrade Tausik has not succeeded in refuting the accusations against Comrade Smeral. We are in possession of facts which point out that the leaders of the party have shown their centralist, even conservative, tendencies in many instances, *e.g.*, in their attitude to the trade unions. The International must make it a condition of admission of the Czecho-Slovak party that it should do away with opportunism and expel its opportunist leaders. It is only then that this party will become a party of the masses, serving the cause of the revolution.

Comrade Bucharin greatly regretted that comrade Smeral had not attended the Congress in person. Perhaps it was possible, none the less, to openly refute his arguments. Smeral has spread the rumour that I am a personal enemy of Lenin, and the Czech and the bourgeois press elaborated this rumour and now declare that I even wanted to proceed against him with armed force. It is incomprehensible to me how this legend could have arisen. If the Czech comrades all share those views of Tausik, which he expressed in his speech here, the cause of revolution in Czecho-Slovakia is in a very bad way. Tausik's apology for Smeral can be approximately reduced to this: Smeral must be a good communist leader, because until now he has not stolen any silver spoons. Smeral came here as a repenting sinner, he professed to be one of our family, but his deeds are directed against this family, against the Communist International.

There are circumstances under which we approve of a policy of watchful waiting, that is when it corresponds with the temper of the masses. But here it is just the other way. The masses are far more revolutionary than the leaders.

The policy followed by the Czecho-Slovak leaders is purely opportunist. The Czecho-Slovak comrades have failed to answer the pointed arguments of comrade Kreibisch. Tausik asserts that it is impossible to conquer power because all the

neighbouring states are bankrupt. Every reasonable man must realise that it is just for that reason that the time has now come to annihilate that bankrupt capitalism. Even though Smeral has committed no breach of discipline like Levi and Serrati, still it is our duty to say what is true. It is our duty to criticise and speak out openly on such occasions, that there should be no misunderstandings and that the Czecho-Slovak party should take up its proper place in the proletarian world movement and co-operate with all its might in the break-down of bankrupt capitalism.

E.C. MEETING, JUNE 14

Before proceeding with the agenda, **Comrade Stutchka** informed the meeting of the atrocity perpetrated by the Lettish counter-revolutionists on Communists in Latvia. The comrades of the central committee shot by the court martial were no terrorists. They were brought before a court martial together with some smugglers who had replied to the shots of the sentries, though the comrades of the central committee were arrested two weeks previously to this occurrence. Comrade Stutchka then asked comrades to inform the comrades in their own countries of these horrors of the Lettish bourgeoisie. And asked those present to rise to honour the memory of the fallen comrades.

The discussion of the Czecho-Slovak question was then resumed.

Comrade Vanek. Comrade Tausik was right in describing as symptomatic the circumstance that some comrades described even the failure to form a united Communist party as a case of natural opportunism. Our party congress has clearly stated in its letter to the Executive that the formation of a single centralised party will be effected in the very near future. The whole Czecho-Slovak delegation declares this to the Executive once more. Though not all the comrades of our delegation can identify themselves with the tactics of Smeral, we all of us fail to see any clear and definite proof that the speech made by Smeral at our party congress was in contradiction to the principles laid down in the 21 conditions.

To place Smeral, Levi and Serrati into one group would be incorrect, for in the case of the former we have to deal with a breach of discipline and not an act of treachery. The small bureau will propose that a letter should be addressed by it to the Czecho-Slovak party. In opposition to that we propose that we draw up a letter which shall serve as a basis for your conclusions. It would be expedient for the small bureau once again to meet the Czecho-Slovak delegation in order to arrive at a conclusion that we could regard as appropriate.

Comrade Kuhn said: "That the conclusions of comrades Burian, Tausik and Vanek were clear and concise expressions of anti-communist views, and appeared to have the concealed aim of hampering the acceptance of the party into the International. But it is precisely for this reason that the party is

not a communist party in the real sense of the word, that I am in favour of accepting them into the Third International. The majority of the members of this party are good Communists—are revolutionaries, and only a coterie of leaders hinders its communistic development.” Comrade Kuhn quoted an extract from an article by a certain J. Berliner in the Independent Weekly, “Der Socialist,” which said Smeral was the leader of the Centre in the Party. What he says could very well be said by a not very revolutionary democrat. In his declarations he doubts whether the tactics hitherto pursued by the party can attract the masses. If they do then they are correct, if they do not, no one will believe that the conclusions of Smeral, based as they are on co-operation with the capitalist state, has anything in common with Communism.

This is what a Czech opportunist says, and therein lies the whole history of Smeral and his associates.

Kuhn referred again to the case of Levi and Kernanski, who, in spite of their having smuggled an article in the “Rudo. Pravo” against the capture of the trade unions, owing to the influence of Smeral were not expelled from the party. Smeral had stated that he regarded federalism in our movement and a complete change in the structure of the party as necessary. I am in favour of accepting the party into the International because I know that the Communist International is so strong that it has nothing to fear. I am in favour of accepting the resolution.

Comrade Zinoviev, in a long speech, explained the resolution.

Comrade Burian said, “The resolution which has been submitted to-day is unsuited to draw from our workers sentiments which would be to the advantage of our movement. It deals with a party which has made tremendous sacrifices and which, besides, is the largest Communist party; we appeal, nevertheless, to your sense of responsibility. Why do we defend Smeral and why do we defend you? I am not in complete agreement with Smeral; we defend Smeral on the point upon which the existence of our party depends. We, so to speak, have become grafted to Smeral, and because we regard you as honest comrades we think it our duty to defend you. We have received the mandate to advocate the affiliation of our party to the Communist International, but not to condemn Smeral here. A number of persons, like Scheidemann and Noske, Serrati and Levi, who have long been in the labour movements, have been condemned for misbehaviour. No misdemeanour; no violation of discipline can be charged against us, although we can approve of criticism, nevertheless we cannot accept the condemnation contained in the resolution.” Comrade Burian then dealt with all the charges that were made against comrade Smeral.

We submit a resolution which neither speaks of centrism nor says anything against Smeral, but which contains all that

is necessary for us, and we seek to eliminate from the resolution the paragraphs we have indicated. I hope that my arguments have convinced those present that a radical alteration of the resolution is possible and necessary.

It was agreed that Kreibisch should conclude the discussion at the next meeting.

E.C. MEETING, JUNE 16

Comrade Radek said We have attempted to reduce the differences between ourselves and the Czecho-Slovakian delegation to a minimum. The resolution of the Czecho-Slovakian comrades asserts what we have already said. We regret, however, that we cannot concede the request that comrade Smeral's name be deleted. The resolution, however, has been amended in some respects, and reads now as follows:—

Resolution to the Conference of the Czecho-Slovak Communist party.

“The Executive of the Communist International welcomes the decision of the Czecho-Slovak Communist workers to constitute themselves as the Czecho-Slovak section of the Communist International, and recognises the Czecho-Slovak C.P. as a member of the C.I. In the building up of a Communist party of the masses in Czecho-Slovakia, the Communist International sees positive proof of the progressive revolutionisation of the Czecho working masses, who, in the short space of 2½ years, overcame the nationalistic and reformistic illusions wherewith the creation of the independent Czecho-Slovakian state had imbued them. The Executive welcomes the decisions of the Czecho-Slovak Communist workers to accept all the conditions laid down by the Second Congress of the Communist International for the admission of the new Communist parties. The Executive is convinced that Czecho-Slovak workers are willing to carry out these conditions, not merely guided by the sense of proletarian discipline, but also by the consciousness that these conditions formulate nothing but the requirement of the Communist movement. With full confidence in the Communist workers of Czecho-Slovakia, the Executive draws the attention of the Czecho-Slovak party to a number of circumstances causing some misgivings, *viz.*, the centrist and semi-centrist tendencies which manifested themselves at the party's Congress.

Along with the acceptance of the 21 conditions, the Congress of the Czecho-Slovak Communist party adopted also the report of comrade Smeral, which primarily differs from the conceptions of the Communist International on the following lines: Comrade Smeral declares that the Communist Party in Czecho-Slovakia is, even to-day, sufficiently strong to seize power. The Executive of the Communist International is of the opinion that comrade Smeral's speech shows that he and his close friends do not conceive the schooling of the proletariat, in the sense of revolutionary inspiration for this struggle nor organisation as a preparation for it. Neither does the E.C. believe that the enemy of the Czecho-Slovak

Communists will allow calm and methodical preparation for taking over the power. As the last struggles of the metal workers have shown, the Czecho-Slovak bourgeoisie has taken the offensive against the workers. To meet this, the Party must invoke mass-preparedness for struggle, to repel the onslaughts of capital, and, as soon as events permit, the counter-offensive. This calls, in the first place, for invigorating revolutionary agitation, for daily intervention by the party in all struggles for maintaining the organisation in readiness for all eventualities. It calls for the ever-present consciousness, that if the world-revolution be a long period, then it represents a long period of struggle. The theory of comrade Smeral, that the Czecho-Slovak workers should wait for the struggle for power until the proletariat in some of the large capitalist countries has won the victory, cannot be taken seriously. Without undertaking to determine just when the Czecho-Slovak proletariat is to enter the fight for the conquest of power, the Executive is of the opinion that the internal struggle of the Czecho-Slovak workers may develop a situation which would call upon them to take up the struggle for power without waiting for the proletarians of other countries to conquer the power of government. We are not engaged in prophesying as to the exact moment of possible victory, ours is a daily contest which must be waged by the party with ever-growing energy and without fearing the possibility of a premature victory.

These warnings of the Communist International by no means exclude the greatest circumspection and foresight in all situations. On the contrary, they make it the duty of every earnest militant Communist party to test and prepare every practical step in the struggle.

In conclusion, the Executive takes cognizance that the Czecho-Slovak party decided at its last Congress to proceed with the creation of a united Communist party. This party, in the light of the demand of the Second Congress of the Communist International, must be unified and centralised, and should not confine itself to mere "reconstruction" nor allow any room for national federalism. The Executive considers a period of three months will suffice for the creation of this party, and on its part appoints a comrade under whom the negotiations as to the mode of this unification shall be conducted.

The Executive of the Communist International is of the opinion that the C.P. of the Czecho-Slovak Republic must take into account the views of the Executive and must re-organise the party and conduct its work on Communist lines."

The delegation of the Czecho-Slovak Communist party stated that it desires to withdraw its resolution, but that it would make a further declaration. I would like to say to our comrades that the sharp criticism that was expressed at the Executive meetings was made for the good of the development of the Czecho-Slovakian party, which is one of the strongest sections of the Communist International. It was necessary, in order to bring our comrades on the proper track.

Comrade Burian, in the name of the Czecho-Slovak Delegation, made a declaration in which he requested that he immediately be permitted to take the resolution to Prague.

"In the resolution of the Executive certain other comrades were described as centrists and semi-centrists. In accordance with our conviction there are no such comrades in our party. Varying opinions which exist or may exist in our party are those of Communists, just as happens in other Communist parties. For that reason we regard the description of our comrades as centrist as incorrect. We are accustomed to discuss decisions made at our Congress inside the party, and, eventually, to amend these decisions at the next Party Conference. Without anticipating the decision of our party as a whole we would desire the same thing for the whole of the International. We declare that we are not in agreement with the resolution, but we are equally opposed to a break with the Third International. We will remain in the Third International, and we will endeavour to make the Communist character of our party clear to the whole world, and at the next International Congress we will demand a revision of the opinion of our party."

Comrade Koenen said: "A number of well-established and tried parties have made serious attacks against the Smeral group, which he considered completely justified. Nevertheless, we do not want to vote against accepting them."

The delegation of the Communist parties of Germany, Bulgaria, Italy, Poland, and Switzerland vote for the acceptance of the Czecho-Slovak Communist party, but make a special reservation against the political influence of comrade Smeral in the party and call on the Communist Czecho-Slovak workers energetically to fight the danger which is lurking in the preservation of opportunist elements like that of Smeral in the rank and file of the party. We expect that this condition of admission to the Communist International will be fulfilled and that party leadership will be entrusted to Communists who have proved their mettle."

Comrade Reichenbach proposed the following motion: Only genuine revolutionary Communist parties must be received in the Communist International. The Communist party of Czecho-Slovakia claims to be admitted. It counts 420,000 members out of a population of 11 millions. It thus forms now the strongest party of the Communist International, being five times stronger than the U.C.P.G. in proportion to the population. A proletarian party, which pretends at all to be Communist, possessing such a strength, must at once start an active struggle against the capitalist state. But the Czecho-Slovak party has so far renounced even the preparation of this struggle. The recognised leaders a few months ago declined to lead a movement that had broken out.

The executive therefore decides to postpone temporarily the question of accepting the Communist party of Czecho-Slovakia.

Only the result of an open active struggle which the Communist party of Czecho-Slovakia has to prepare by means of propaganda and by creating fighting committees, and by creating an illegal organisation, will prove whether the Communist party of Czecho-Slovakia answers the demands which are made on a Communist party.

After a further statement by comrade Kreiblich the resolution was put to the vote. The resolution of the small bureau was passed. The German section of the Communist party of Czecho-Slovakia was immediately accepted in the Communist International.

Comrade Zinoviev. The Third International has grown in strength by accepting a new great international party. I hope that not at the Fourth Congress, but much sooner, the Czecho-Slovak section of the party will also completely merge in the Third Communist International. Long live the United Communist party of Czecho-Slovakia.

E.C. MEETING, JUNE 16 (EVENING SESSION).

Loriot admitted that the French comrades had committed many errors from the point of view of the Third International, but to be able to pardon and comprehend these errors it is requisite to be intimately acquainted with the entire history of the French Labour movement. Loriot then gave a short general outline of this history up to the first important victory of the Communist movement at the Strassburg Congress. From that moment the rise of Communism in France proceeded very rapidly. The rise was favoured by two circumstances: first, the fiasco of the strike on May 1st, which aroused the political instincts of the working class on account of the subsequent arrest of a great number of participants; and, secondly, the journey of Cachin and Frossard to Russia.

Loriot then discussed in great detail the Congress of Tours, which was of such decisive significance for the formation of the Communist party. He told of the laborious struggle of the young party after the split, when it was threatened with the loss of its party funds and official organ. The split caused considerable disorganisation in the party ranks. Whereas, the membership books issued on March 31st, 1920, was 130,000, the total number issued up to May 31st, 1921, was only 121,000. On the day of his departure, however, the former total of 130,000 had again been reached. In view of the fact that he had spent such a long time in prison, and after his release had been occupied in making the preparations for his journey to Moscow, he was not in a position to resume his activities among the labouring masses. He had no doubt, however, that the successful propaganda of the Executive Committee of our party will soon augment our ranks to the former total of 200,000 members.

As for our press, we are at present in possession of five dailies, "L'Humanite," circulating 80,000 copies in Paris, and 200,000 in the provinces. Besides, we issue quite a number of weeklies and propaganda literature.

Loriot next touched upon the question of the relations between the French Communist Party and the French Syndicalists. With extreme thoroughness he submitted evidence to prove that, by unabated effort and diligent propaganda, they were succeeding in gradually drawing into the revolutionary ranks those masses of French trade unionists who harbour traditional opposition to everything savouring of politics. That he considers the main task of the party. The chief problem is to find the proper policy to attain the subordination of the French trade union movement to the Communist party.

Loriot concluded by pointing out that the French Communist party is still confronted by a prodigious organisational task, the successful execution of which will raise the party to the leadership of the revolutionary movement in France.

Comrade Reiland: The Luxembourg Communists are convinced that the policy of the French party is ambiguous and anti-Communist. The attitude of its press and its conduct in the Chamber is open to severe criticism. The article written by Frossard during the mobilisations for the occupation of the Ruhr district was a scandal, it was directly anti-communist and proved that men like Frossard had no honest will to Communism. The attitude of the party towards the trade unions is the same as it was before. It did not raise a single protest against the occupation of Luxembourg by French troops. We are of the opinion that the policy of the leaders must be made clear to the workers, and the best way to do that is for the Committee to secure the expulsion of Frossard.

Comrade Lekan: The French party failed at the critical moment. The Executive must not be satisfied with words, but must demand deeds. One of the gravest errors committed was that no rigid organisation was carried out in France after the Congress. The Communist party of France has a membership of 30,000, when the old Socialist Party had 9,000 members. But with such a loose organisation it is impossible to organise a strong movement, in spite of the fact that the members do not lack a desire for the struggle. If we were to analyse the movement led by Longuet and Renaudel and that of Cachin and Frossard, we would find no difference between them. The present ideology of the whole party must be completely eradicated, and the Executive must clearly and definitely declare that it is not in agreement with the French movement.

Comrade Trotsky: Although I too am dissatisfied with the tactics of the French Communist party, nevertheless I will commence my criticism not against its tactics but against its critics who base their criticism on a wrong point of view. Comrade Laporte charged the party with having at the moment, when the 1919 class were being called to the colours, conducted themselves not only incorrectly, but cowardly. I would ask what should the workman or the peasant have done when, having on the instructions of the party refused to respond to the call to the colours, a gendarme presented himself at his house? He would either have to respond to the call or employ

violence against the police. What possibilities were there for a successful appeal to the '19 class, these 150,000 young men, to resist the calling up by a general strike or a revolutionary action. It would mean calling upon class '19 immediately to make a revolution. In reply to the charges of the comrades from Luxemburg we must first of all ask—What should have been done in order to prevent the military occupation of Luxemburg? In order to do this it would have been necessary to make a revolution against the French state. If, at the moment when the French bourgeoisie were driven into war, at the moment when Germany is defeated and being plundered to this very day, no revolution has been made, it is impossible to make a revolution on the grounds of such a minor incident as the occupation of Luxemburg.

With regard to the tactics of the French party we must say that it has sinned considerably, that its will to revolution and its conceptions are confused, and that it has allowed possibilities for action to slip by. The situation in France is difficult, but on the other hand it is in a high degree favourable for the revolutionary development of the French workers.

The gravest charge that one must make against the French party is its vacillation with regard to the syndicalists. The duty of the party is to attract the syndicates to itself by means of its revolutionary conduct and to clear their ideas and conceptions. We will not demand that the French party promises to make a revolution or a rebellion when the 18 class is called up. The Congress, however, must demand of the French party that it prepares for the revolution, and that it has a clear conception of proletarian revolution. We must openly combat the opportunism of the party, but also warn it against a too Left orientation. For the rest, comrade Lenin completely supported the standpoint of Comrade Trotsky.

E.C. MEETING, JUNE 17

Comrade Lorient: If the Communist party had nothing to teach to the young, then, in France, at any rate, we should merely have to leave the fate of the working class in the hands of the young Communists. We can only reach our goal by a hearty co-operation between the young Communists and the party, not by a split or by the manifesto issued on the occasion of the mobilisation of the '19 class, which incited to revolution.

Lorient then referred to the comrade from Luxemburg. He thought it unnecessary to refute him at length, as he was already brilliantly refuted by comrade Trotsky.

Dealing with the question of Frossard's expulsion from the party, comrade Lorient said: "As regards this decision, which apparently is a sort of trial for us, *vis.*, to exclude comrade Frossard from the Party, I trust that the Executive Committee will not insist on that, as the vote which will have to be taken to carry it into effect will lead to disastrous consequences." Lorient expressed the view that the masses do not regard Frossard as

an opportunist or an enemy of Communism, but on the contrary, the French proletariat regards him as a man who went to Moscow in order to reconstruct, and who is animated by the desire to act as a Communist.

Then Lorient turned against the Hungarian comrade, who reproached the French Communists with their policy, which, he said, did not in any way differ from that of opportunist seceders. Lorient admitted that the organ of the French Communists, "l'Humanité," is not entirely permeated with the spirit of Communism, but this was bound to come in time.

In answer to the reproach of not having taken up a definite line with regard to the Levi affair, Lorient stated that he got Levi's pamphlet only the day before his departure. It is for this reason alone that the central committee of our party has given us no instructions with regard to this question.

Lorient spoke with enthusiasm of Trotsky's criticism, who—in the opinion of Lorient—made a very clever distinction between trade unionism and syndicalism. Yet up to now the Communist party of France was unable to give practical effect to the views of Trotsky for fear of being misunderstood by the workers organised in the trade unions. But Lorient proposed to start this activity and will take the first steps in this direction immediately on his return home.

Comrade Losovsky stated, on the ground of Lorient's speech, that the French Party is suffering mainly from its old traditions and therefore cannot be regarded as a purely Communist party. He believed that the struggle against Renaudel, Longuet and others is not being consistently fought. He considers it most peculiar, that in the French Chamber, the Communist deputies exchange greetings and shake hands with Briand. The Speaker reproached the French comrades with a lack of consistency, a lack of class consciousness and hatred which must be felt by a genuine Communist against the bourgeoisie. He accused them of having altogether neglected an opportunity which was specially favourable to a mass action, *viz.*, the occupation of the Rhine provinces. He concluded with the remark that the most pressing task of the moment facing the French Communists is the revolutionising of the trade unions.

Comrade Laporte discussed in detail the question of the Young Communist movement in France. He demonstrated the absolute necessity of the youth organisations operating independently from the party, as, in his opinion, only the Young Communists of France were really imbued with a true revolutionary Communist spirit, whereas the party, in spite of its acceptance of the theses and the 21 conditions of the Communist International was still far from evincing any active revolutionary Communism. The party in no way, for example, aroused any opposition to the mobilisation of the 1921 class, and it was the Young Communist movement alone which commenced a real revolutionary struggle against the French militarist-imperialist government. It was unpardonable neglect on the part of the

Communist party to permit an excellent moment for revolutionary action to pass, an opportunity that will not soon return. Action of this kind is imperative, as only thereby can we hope to win over the vast French syndicalist masses. So long as the party does not proceed along this path, it will not be a Communist party, and will never be able to exert any influence on the broad masses of the French working class.

Comrade Schwab (C.L.P.G.) : Owing to the short time which I have at my disposal I shall only deal with the question of the syndicalists. Comrade Trotsky has stated that we must criticise the syndicalists in order to obtain clearness and unity in this way. Comrade Losovsky, on the other hand, says that the Communists must obtain a majority through propaganda. Both methods do not give us the solution of the problem.

It is impossible to expect that the revolutionary syndicalists will be persuaded by arguments that it is necessary for them to submit to the leadership of the Communist party. The present Communist party in France as a parliamentary party is not a fit instrument of revolution. So long as the International maintains the view that the Communists must go to parliament the syndicalists and other groups related to them all over the world will not acknowledge that Communists ought to be entrusted with the leadership of trade unions.

Comrade Bela Kun related an episode from the period of the March rising, referring to a discussion he had with a French comrade. The possibility of a very small propaganda in the French army, if the Rhine provinces were to be occupied, was discussed. The French comrade was simply frightened out of his wits, and said "but surely that would be high treason?"

This ejaculation is typical of the spirit which reigns among the French Communist party. If we consider "l'Humanite" we must say that "Freiheit" is a revolutionary paper. As regards the questions of the reparations and sanctions, every pacifist is agitating and writing against the contributions and annexations. What has the French party done? It has done positively nothing during the whole course of the mobilisation and previous to that. Trotsky treated the young Communists rather ironically and declared the youthful comrades had made stupid demands on the leaders of the party. But this is only in consequence of the inactivity and the anti-Communist ideas of the French party leaders. Unfortunately it is not only the privilege of youth to commit follies—the party makes much greater opportunist blunders. In a most critical situation the French party was incapable of acting otherwise, and comrade Frossard wrote an article on "a cool head and discipline." We do not demand of the French party a revolution, we only demand a revolutionary propaganda. I propose that the Executive Committee should send a commission which will thoroughly investigate the French conditions and make various conditions to be fulfilled in the shortest time before the party is definitely accepted.

Comrade Thalheimer. In Germany we were also under the impression that the attitude taken up by the French comrades in parliament and the press on the questions of reparations, did not give adequate expression to the temper of wide circles in the country.

Comrade Schwab has made a proposal that the French party should more or less adopt the tactics of the C.L.P.G. in the question of trade unions. If we observe the influence of the C.L.P.G. in the trade unions, we shall understand at once what this offer means.

Comrade Lenin argued against the left orientation of Comrade Bela Kun. He exposed not only opportunist errors but left errors as well. If we were to follow Bela Kun's advice in the French question we would thereby for a long time destroy the French movement altogether. I don't want to defend the French party. I know that it is by no means thoroughly Communistic, and does not always act as a Communist party. If the party appeals to the coolheadedness and discipline of its members, the lefts should not make any capital out of this fact.

Comrade Zinoviev. The old Executive agreed to accept the French party. Seratti at that time complained that we were making too great concessions to it, but the position in the French party was quite different from that of Italy. In France, for example, we had a party which had not yet experienced its first split. The Communist group was very weak, and its leaders, without exception, were in prison. For these reasons we had to adopt less stringent measures. Of course, in an opportunist party the younger element as the vanguard must not be opportunist. Bela Kun's statement that "Humanite" was worse than "Freiheit" is not true. "Humanite" is progressing, "Freiheit" is regressing, "Humanite" defends Russia, "Freiheit" carries on a campaign against the only proletarian State. The Executive, in a resolution or in a letter, must clearly and definitely say to the party what has to be said. We will assist the party to remain a mass party, and the policy which we have laid down at the Second Congress must be maintained at the Third.

E.C. MEETING, JUNE 18

The meeting was opened by Comrade Zinoviev at 6.30 p.m

Zinoviev : We shall continue our debate on the French question.

Laporte : The preceding orators have chiefly spoken against the so-called "Left" tendency of the young Communists of France. But I do not think your conceptions could be styled "the infantile disease of Communism." A question was raised concerning our relation to the party : we have declared that since the Tours Congress the general line of policy of the Communist party has not changed. The 21 conditions have been accepted, but in practice they were left without application. We have cited as an example the case of class 19 to

show that we were in complete disagreement with the party. If, as comrade Lenin said, we have committed some follies, we must state here that we were not the only ones to do so. If the position which we have adopted was wrong, the management committee of the party had not adopted any at all, and it is precisely that which we reproach it with. It is only after the class was called up that the Communist party produced the manifesto referred to by Bela Kun.

The activity of the parliamentary Communist group since the Congress was essentially anti-Communist. Vaillant Couturier was the only one who fostered a genuine Communist propaganda. On the other hand the activity of Cachin in the Chamber was rather that of government opposition. As regards the exclusion of comrade Frossard, I think that the comrades of Luxemburg are exaggerating. We hold undoubtedly that Frossard is not a Communist. But he is a genuine sincere revolutionary. He cannot be held responsible for the deviations of the party. If Frossard guides this party unsatisfactorily it simply means that the management committee wishes to allow itself to be led by Frossard. They will unanimously rise against the misguided proposal to expel Frossard.

Van Overstraeten (Belgium). Any reformist folly committed in France finds a ready response in Belgium. Comrade Trotsky proved to the comrades of the French Communist party that their most urgent task is to seek a rapprochement with the syndicates. All the orators have stated that the French party was not sufficiently Communist, and it is this circumstance which places it at variance with the traditions of the French revolutionary syndicalism. It is only in the struggle itself that the rapprochement will take place between the Communist party of France and French syndicalism. It is significant that Frossard has not attempted to bring about an understanding between the French Communist party and the syndicates. He feels that it would be dangerous to himself and to all opportunists to bring into the party the enthusiasm and energy of revolutionary syndicalism. The opportunism of the party must be vanquished by such a rapprochement. Unless the party gets new blood in this way, it is bound to decline.

Hechert. Lenin and Trotsky have come down heavily on the so-called opportunism of the left as represented by comrade Laporte and the comrades from Luxemburg. I believe that they do not deserve the irony with which they were met. Their speeches contained some incontestable truths, and we ought to make use of these ideas. We have not come here to make fun of each other or to squabble, we are here to further the proletarian revolution in the whole world. One of the most urgent tasks before our Congress is to help to bring about a union between French Communists and syndicalists. We must supply the French party with guiding principles. We must tell them to be active, and not let important questions go by without taking up a definite attitude with regard to them. You must gain a footing in the trade unions and place yourselves at the head of the syndicalist movement.

Koritzshoner. Every country has its Frossard, a type of trimming opportunist, as well as its Lorient, who, by his revolutionary reputation, covers the opportunist tactics of the former. But the leadership of the party must be entrusted to opportunists. In any case there is a greater danger from the commonsense of the rights than from the follies of the lefts.

Lorient. No new arguments have been brought to bear on the question of the French party. We can endorse nearly all the criticisms to which we have been subjected. However, we cannot accept a few of them. The Executive Committee must not for a moment believe that a delegate of the French management committee could have said, as we are told by Bela Kun, that the party was opposed to the propaganda in the army. The party was accused of not being in a position to control its own activity, and, on the other hand, that the seceding tendencies of the young Communists are being encouraged. Is it natural that the young Communists come before the Executive of Moscow as an autonomous organisation, in order to attack and criticize the French party? Imagine what would have happened had the party, in obedience to the wishes of the young Communists, taken on itself to follow them, and had called on the masses to rise. Thalheimer expresses himself in favour of the abolition of the Committee of the Third International. But it can only disappear through our efforts and then only gradually. We have resolved to do our utmost to bring this about.

If a Communist party is to be absolutely equal to its task, from the moment of its formation, it must from the very beginning, consist exclusively of tried Communists. Now that is impossible. The formation and development of a party cannot escape certain ethnical laws, the influence of a certain collective mentality which is characteristic of the race, and certain historic facts.

Then there is individual responsibility, but it does not rest on the French comrades. When Comrade Lozovsky and other comrades after him were in Germany, they did not give their Communist point of view with sufficient clearness. Their position then was not nearly as definite as their criticism now. If they have not acted as they should, it was because they lacked experience to understand the situation as real Communists do. I go further. The responsibility of the formation of the French party rests on you all, and on the Executive Committee, represented by Zinoviev. Have they not, indeed, accepted the proposals which we submitted to them, and which determined the constitution of the P.C.F. (Parti Communiste Français)? After all, if we were to be guided by comrade Zinoviev, we could have Longuet a member of the Communist party.

If, after our return to France, the Executive expresses itself against the exclusion of Frossard, we will not expel our opportunists, we shall only make them act as Communists. Must we make of "L'Humanité," the tribune of all opinions, or limit ourselves to an internal work, which is ignored by the masses? Such is the dilemma and the Executive must shed some light on

this question. We are offered a commission. We accept it. But it is above all from the Congress that we expect to receive our instructions. It is mainly on these instructions that we rely to make Communists of Cachin, Frossard, and comrades who hold similar views, since we are thoroughly convinced of their honesty and straightforwardness.

Jullien pointed out that the debate should not turn exclusively on the personalities of Cachin and Frossard.

Vaillant Couturier. We accept the responsibility for everything that our party in its collective capacity has done. Our comrades in parliament have been attacked—and rightly so. As regards this I am as much to blame as the others. As long as we continue to take part in the parliamentary activity, we, in France, place ourselves in a rather difficult position with regard to the syndicalists and with regard to the masses. We are thus fostering in the masses democratic illusions. Let us now examine the question of class '19. The Young Communists wanted us to refuse to answer the call. But we advised them not to do so. For, when you refuse to follow the gendarme—you must kill. As regards Fascism, we have conducted a violent campaign against the French Fascism (The League of Chiefs of Sections and the Civic League). We are not yet a Communist party, but we have already taken on ourselves the initiative of creating important secret organisations for the arming of the proletariat. As to our policy with regard to the syndicalists, I wish to hear our syndicalist comrades themselves. In fact, whenever there is a question on direct action, we are always met by the objection that the syndicates will not follow us. We must show the syndicalists that we are on our part also good revolutionaries, and that we can take part in the struggle along with them. The party must take up a definite attitude in order to combat opportunism and the spirit of class co-operation. But, in the meantime, you cannot expect a chicken to crow like a cock.

Delagrangé. Lozovsky said there are two tendencies represented in the syndicates, the reformist and the revolutionary. But the revolutionaries in their turn are sub-divided into Communists, the pure revolutionary syndicalists and the anarchists. If we so much as hint at any subordination of the syndicates to the party, we shall immediately be faced, not only by the opposition of the anarchists, but also of the revolutionary syndicalists. It is for this reason that we must preserve autonomy. But when we go to the trade unions contrary to what was said by comrade Lozovsky, we go there, not as syndicalists, but as Communists. Bela Kun reproached the party with not having issued instructions to the socialist municipalities. Well, apart from a few great cities, which we were able to win, it would be wrong to assert that we possess the majority of municipalities in France. Besides the mobilisation order is transmitted directly through prefects and sub-prefects, so that the municipalities are really unable to do anything in this matter.

Radok. The Communist International must fight against the two tendencies—the right and the left—both of which can be

called opportunist. But the danger from the right is the one by far the more important. What was the attitude of the French party? There is no trace in its press of a really active agitation nor of discussions on the tasks of the French party. The whole of the bourgeois press is excellently informed of all that is taking place, whereas the French Communists have just told us that they are not aware of what is taking place and that is why they cannot take up a definite attitude with regard to this or that question. This proves first that the French party is not a fighting party, and secondly that it evolves very slowly along the lines of Communism. And yet the French Communists work in the midst of a nation which inspired all the revolutions, and which possesses a working class exceedingly susceptible to propaganda.

We want, above all, that the French party realises thoroughly that it forms part of the Communist International. We do not demand of the party anything in a dictatorial fashion, but we must demand of it a definite attitude to problems which will face it to-morrow, and, when these demands will be fulfilled, we shall be able to assert that the French party is in a state to face the final struggle.

Zinoviev proposed to close the debate.

The motion was carried.

The following were elected on a commission of enquiry into the French situation: Lorient, Souvarine, Vaillant Couturier, Thomasi, Zinoviev, Trotsky, Valetzki, Thalheimer, Gennari, and Bela Kun.

Zinoviev. We have received to-day an official telegram announcing that three members of the Italian party are already on their way here. Two days ago, the bureau of the Red International of trade unions received a rather strange telegram from the Italian Trade Union Board. It expressed a wish that the International Trade Union Congress should be postponed until August under the pretext that the Italian Trade Union Commission wished to know the decisions of the Third Congress of the Communist International before taking part in the Trade Union Congress. Moreover, the Italian trade unions demand that the Trade Union Congress takes place, not in Moscow, but in Stockholm, or in Reval. This is Serrati's policy. We have informed the Socialist party of Italy that we agreed to postpone the debate on the Italian question until after the arrival of its delegates.

The meeting closed at midnight.

E.C. MEETING, JUNE 20

The chairman, Zinoviev, opened the session at 7 p.m.

Zinoviev: I announced to you in the course of our last session that we had received a telegram from the Italian Socialist party, and I also told you why it appeared to me we ought not to count too much on the arrival of the three delegates they promised to send. That is the reason why we can commence

the discussion of the Italian question to-day. Comrade Terracini has the floor.

Terracini : I propose to discuss only the congress of Bologna. At that congress almost the entire party was in favour of affiliation to the Third International. Then the split in the Socialist party took place. Our Turin comrades declared themselves in favour of the expulsion of the reformists. The maximalists also approved of illegal action. But in the party organisations and trade unions there were reformists who organised a large group against the maximalists. The Socialist party of Italy sent a mission to the second Congress of the International, which, however, was not a delegation from the party. Bordiga was the only representative of the maximalist view in the delegation, and that delegation even contained people who were not members of the party. Then the metal workers' strike broke out in Italy, and the consequent occupation of the factories. The bourgeoisie expected the revolution at that moment; the proletariat no less thought the time had come. This movement, that in the beginning bore an exclusively economic character, soon assumed a political character, but the majority in the C.G.T. were reformist, and the executive committee of the trade unions opposed the decision of the Socialist party. They declared that the workers ought to confine themselves merely to exercising control over production, but should evacuate the factories they had occupied and return them to the owners. This was a moral defeat for the Italian proletariat, which had expected the Socialist party to be capable of leading the movement, and the workers of Italy lost confidence in the political organisation of the proletariat.

When the delegation had returned from Moscow it was, of course, necessary to re-organise the party on the basis of the 21 conditions. The majority voted for affiliation to the Third International, approving of the acceptance of all the conditions, including that condition demanding the expulsion of the reformists. The minority, led by Serrati, opposed the expulsion of the reformists. Another congress was called at Florence, where the question of Fascism was discussed. An Italian Government, with Serrati as Prime Minister, was suggested as the only way of combating Fascism.

Three fractions were formed. First, the unitarian fraction, which declared its willingness to accept all the 21 conditions, but unable to carry them all out immediately, particularly the condition demanding the expulsion of the reformists. Second, the Communist group, which, on the contrary, accepted all the conditions and demanded the immediate expulsion of all the reformists. And third, the reformist elements.

The representative of the Third International to the congress of Livorno was received with insults. Brentano tried to point out that there was really no difference between the unitarian programme and that of the Communists, but I protested that there was a very great difference between the two programmes, and that if it were possible to unite with the unitarians, it was altogether impossible to unite with the reformists. Borggi,

Magdoni and Lazzari had not only given evidence of reformism, but also of chauvinism. After the discussion, Serrati asserted that the Executive Committee of the Third International had been unjust to the Italian Socialist party, and pointed out that the French Communist party, for example, embraced, not only opportunists and reformists, but even Freemasons. In the end he declared himself in favour of affiliation to the Third International.

It is interesting to note that during his stay in Italy, Levi tried to convince the Communists that it was necessary for their revolutionary movement to seek an alliance with Serrati.

After the Livorno congress, the Italian Socialist party still remained a reformist party. In fact, at the last session of the congress, the head of the reformist fraction gave utterance to the motto of the Socialist party that it is necessary to form an anti-Communist front. We have seen what transpired at the congress of the C.G.T. in February; the Communists remained isolated in their opposition to the chief reformists of the C.G.T.

The Socialist party was daily drifting to the right. Turatti was correct when he stated at the Livorno congress :

“ I see that the Socialist party of Italy is coming to the right with the rapidity of an express train.”

In Italy the political movement is dominated by Fascism. The Italian bourgeoisie, better than the Italian Socialist party, understand that under certain conditions of a revolutionary period, only violence can create a new situation. That is why it has organised Fascism. Fascists are wrecking the labour exchanges and the workers' dwellings, and killing thousands of workers. The government has never undertaken the defence of the labour organisations and the lives of the workers. The proletariat had the right, nay, it was its duty, to organise its defence against Fascism. But the Socialist party of Italy was not a proletarian party, it was a social-democratic party. It always preached peace and goodwill. Even on this occasion, it instructed all its organisations not to meet the Fascist offensive by their own methods. The following is a quotation from one of its manifestoes : “ In certain circumstances cowardice becomes courage, and now we are faced by such an occasion.” The Italian proletariat was left without any guidance through this cowardly propaganda. And this propaganda was only an example typical of the whole activity of the Socialist party, for they were endeavouring to find a way of meeting the bourgeoisie. As regards Fascism, the Socialist party failed, as it failed during the period of the expropriation of the factories.

In Italy, more than anywhere else, the economic crisis is very acute. We lack both financial organisation and raw materials. After the war the industrial crisis came, and with terrible force. Hundreds and thousands of workers were thrown on the streets,

and salaries were reduced. The reformist C.G.T. is doing nothing. More than that, the C.G.T. and the Socialist parties have issued orders to accept all the conditions of the employers. On the other hand, in all the towns where the Communists are at the head of the trade union movement—in Turin, in Rome, and Florence—the employers will be resisted.

Comrade Terracini then spoke on the results of the elections to the Italian Chamber. You see that the elections gave the results expected by the government. The parliamentary group, which represents the Socialist party, is a social democratic and not a socialist group. The elections have clearly demonstrated that the Italian Socialist party is not a revolutionary party. "Avanti" found nothing better to oppose the Fascist revolvers than the ballot box. Workers who voted for the Socialist party thought they were voting for the Third International. We must once and for all be clear as to the situation. To-day it is the reformists who are dominating the Socialist party. Turatti himself speaks in its name. Lazzari has declared that the Italian Socialist party must have nothing to do with the Third International. Bombacci and Alessandro have resigned. At Livorno we have scored 148,000 votes. The Communist party is being subjected to a frenzied persecution. Three times the police ransacked the office of our central committee, and, in spite of the persecutions, the Communist party has grown in three months to such an extent, that its membership will soon equal that of the Socialist party. Moreover, we possess strong organisations in the trade unions. We have gained a foothold in many labour exchanges of Turin, Alexandria, and in Naples we form the majority. We lack men, but the young are on our side, and they will provide us with excellent fighters. Our press has a larger circulation than that of the Socialist party, whereas two months ago we sold only 35,000 copies, in Turin alone 55,000 copies are sold daily. We have now acquired "Novatore" of Trieste. We have just founded in Rome the organ of our Central Committee, "Comunista," which, in the meantime, will be issued as a bi-weekly. In a month or two we shall possess three great dailies, as contrasted with one "Avanti." Moreover, we possess 48 weeklies.

The Italian Communist party possesses a Central Committee consisting of 15 members, who are invested with plenary powers. Excellent discipline prevails in the party, which comprises nearly 100,000 organised workers.

We hope the Third Congress will declare the exclusion of the Socialist party from the Third International, and declare the Communist party the only representative of the Third International in Italy. When this is definitely brought about, many workers and peasants will leave the Socialist party and will be won over to Communism, thus bringing new energy and enthusiasm to the revolutionary movement in Italy.

The meeting closed at 11 p.m.

THE THIRD CONGRESS OF THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL

OPENING OF THE CONGRESS

IN the Great Hall of the former Imperial Court Theatre were gathered the representatives of the revolutionary proletariat of the whole world.

The glamour of a thousand candles reflected on the gold of the front of the boxes, from which the dark red curtains seemed to have been providentially suspended in the Tzarist epoch. The huge interior of one of the greatest theatres in the world did not hold all the delegates, so that even the immense platform was fully occupied. The front row of the platform was occupied by the Presidium, consisting of comrades Zinoviev, Bucharin, Radek, Gennari (Italy), Kolarov (Bulgaria), Loriot and Vaillant-Couturier (France), Köenen and Frölich (Germany).

Comrade Zinoviev opened the sitting and mentioned the dead who had in the last years given their lives for the proletariat, also those who were suffering in the white prisons of the capitalist world for the cause of Communism.

The International was sung repeatedly, and sounded like a vow to continue the class war.

Comrade Zinoviev then reviewed all the struggles of the past years, and his speech was translated by Comrade Radek into German, by comrade Losovsky into French, and by comrade Reinstein into English. Among other things comrade Zinoviev stated that everywhere we observe the world crisis growing more and more acute. Everywhere the proletarian masses are being thrown out into the streets and everywhere the capitalist State displays its inability to solve the crisis and to build up a new world. Therefore the communist ideas are progressing everywhere.

Comrade Zinoviev then in a few sentences reviewed the position of the party in the various countries and our attitude to the Amsterdam Trade Union International. He further stated that our Young Communists' Organisation was the strongest in the world, and it gave us full confidence of supplying us in the future with selfless fighters.

The task of the Congress is to take up a more determined attitude against the centrist and semi-centrist elements who have penetrated into our party and to lay down a policy which shall be adaptable to every situation, i.e., for a period of mass struggle which, apparently, is before us, or for a prolonged struggle.

This is the first real great International Congress. May the Communist Party, as a result of its work, become greater, more powerful and more capable of resistance in order that it may lead the proletariat to victory.

Comrade Kamenev greeted the delegates in the name of the Communist party and expressed his joy and conviction that the

Congress will be protected by the mighty fist of the Moscow proletariat.

Comrade Frölich proposed on behalf of the enlarged E.C. to appoint Comrades Lenin, Trotsky, Brandler (Germany) and Inkpin (Great Britain) as honorary presidents, Zinoviev as president, Lorient, Kolarov, Köenen and Gennari as vice-presidents, which was accepted amidst general applause.

The following spoke as representatives of the respective countries: Frölich (Germany), Vaillant Couturier and Tomasi (France), Burian (Czecho-Slovakia), Tugutschi (Japan), Hewlett (England), Gennari (Italy), Kolarov (Bulgaria), and Artem (Russia). Comrade Montagrano for the Young Communist League and a representative of the Red Trade Unions also spoke.

Three resolutions, one on the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army, another on the White Terror, and a third on the British Miners were unanimously adopted.

At the conclusion of the business, a concert was given at which the best artistic talent like Chaliapin and Nizhdanova placed their services at the disposal of the organisers. The strains of the International concluded the celebration, and tomorrow in the Kremlin the delegates will commence intensive, and what will undoubtedly be fruitful, work of the Congress.

SECOND SESSION

The Second Session of the Congress of the Communist International opened on June 24th in the Andreev Hall, in the Nikolaeff Palace at the Kremlin at 7.45 p.m.

Comrade Zinoviev proposed the election of a Secretariat composed of representatives of fifteen countries. The resolution was accepted unanimously. The question of the agenda was next taken.

Comrade Tomasi (France) proposed, first of all, to examine the question of the Trade Union Movement, in view of the forthcoming Conference of French Trade Unions at Lille. The decision which the Congress adopted on this question would be of considerable importance for the French Trade Unions.

The Congress, however, accepted the agenda as proposed by the Executive Committee.

The Standing Orders were then accepted unanimously, after which **COMRADE TROTSKY** delivered his report on the world situation and our tasks."

Comrade Trotsky said:—

In our manifestos at the First and Second Congresses, we described the then prevailing economic position without, however, making a detailed examination and analysis of economic relations. Since that time a certain change has taken place in the relation of forces, which in no way can be evaded. The question as to whether this change is a radical one or not is

quite superficial. It must be stated, however, that at the present moment the bourgeoisie feels itself, if not stronger than it did a year ago, at any rate stronger than it did in 1919. It is only necessary to examine the most important sections of the capitalist press during the last few months of this year, in order to see to what extent the bourgeois State consciousness has become firmer, how it has become less susceptible to panic in face of the world danger of Communism, in spite of the fact that it realises that the Communists have grown during this period from small isolated groups into a large mass movement.

But we need not go to the bourgeois press. We can find as striking evidences of the great change from quite other sources. Take, for example, the resolutions of the Polish Communist party on the elections to the Seim. This change in political relations found its expression in that the social democrats and the independents entirely left the Government.

In Germany this change took place at first only as a result of pressure from without. A not less striking example is served by the cohabitation of the Amsterdam International with the Second and the Second and a Half Internationals, which ménage à trois, by the by, does not seem to shock these excellent ladies. The years after the war are characterised by an unparalleled rise in the revolutionary movement. In March, 1917, Tzarism was overthrown in Russia. In May, 1917, a strike wave spread over England. In November, 1917, the Russian proletariat seized political power. I will not deny that on seizing power in our country our cause in other countries seemed much riper than it actually was. In November, 1918, the overthrow of the German and Austro-Hungarian monarchists took place. A strike movement spread over a number of European countries. In 1919 the Hungarian Soviet Republic arose. At the end of 1919 a strike wave spread among the metallists, miners and railwaymen of the United States. France achieved its highest state of political tension in May, 1920. In September, 1920, the proletarian movement developed in Italy for the seizure of factories. The Czech proletariat in December, 1920, resorted to mass political strikes. In March, this year, the workers of Central Germany rose, and the British miners commenced their gigantic strike. At the same time, the past year is marked by a number of defeats of the working class. In August, 1920, the Red Army offensive on Warsaw ended in failure. In September, 1920, the movement of the Italian proletariat ended without result. If M. Turatti asserts that this movement failed because the Italian workers were not sufficiently ripe to seize the factories and manage them, it is necessary to assert that the Italian Labour Movement has not yet purified itself from its Turattis. The revolt of the German workers also ended without definite successes in March, 1921. All this leads Herr Otto Bauer to the conclusion that the Communists have failed because it is alleged they entered into a wager with the Second International that the revolution would take place, well, if not in 1918, then in 1919, as if the fixing of dates is the quintessence of Communism in distinction to the reformist and opportunist tendencies.

Nevertheless, the question arises before the Communist International and the whole working class as to what extent the new political relations between the bourgeoisie and the working class correspond to the actual relation of forces. Is there sufficient ground to assume that the place of political shocks and class struggles will be taken by a prolonged period of re-establishment and growth of capitalism? Does it not follow from this, that we should revise the programme and tactics of the Communist International?

In coming to the review and analysis of the economic situation, I want to observe that this is a most complicated task, for the very statistics which should lie at the basis of such an analysis bear traces of the prevailing economic chaos. However inexact these figures may be (I shall have to refer to this more than once in my speech), nevertheless they give us some idea of the character of the world economic position. I will commence with agriculture. If we compare the world harvest of 1920 with the average harvests of the five years before the war, we find that there has been no decrease, but if we take Europe alone, we find that in 1920 there is a reduction of 120,000,000 quintals, and in this connection America has a surplus as compared with a shortage in Europe. The same thing can be applied to cattle breeding. If we take into consideration that the population of Europe in comparison with the period previous to the war has grown by 18,000,000 in spite of the colossal death rate as a consequence of the war, the fact that humanity has become poorer as compared with the period before the war will become strikingly clear. If we take the mining industry, we get a much more striking picture. The world output of coal in 1920 was 76 per cent. of that of 1913, in connection with which, in Europe, there is an under-production of 18 per cent., and in America an increase of output to the extent of 13 per cent. The output of iron and other basic branches of industry presents the same picture. If we analyse the economic position of the world as a whole, and that of individual countries, the poverty caused by the war will stand out in striking relief. The national wealth of the countries participating in the war was valued before the war at 2,400 milliards of German gold marks, and the annual national income was calculated at 300 milliards. According to authoritative economists, the war has destroyed not less than 50 per cent. of the whole of the national wealth. If we take into consideration the fact that the war could only have used up one-third of the annual national income, we are faced by the fact that the national wealth of the belligerent countries up till 1919 has been reduced by not less than one-third valued therefore at not more than 1,600 milliards gold marks. Paper currency, however, has become inflated to an extraordinary degree. From the 28 milliard marks of pre-war times, it has risen to 300 milliards, an increase of over ten times. This latter circumstance is a proof of a decrease in national income, although not to the extent of a decrease of national wealth, as a consequence of the unparalleled sharpening of the contradictions of capitalist society up to that period. This process superficially assumed the form of enrichment. Governments issued loan after loan and

flooded the market with paper money, thus swelling the material loss, which actually existed. Meanwhile machinery and buildings became worn out, and were not renewed. Fictitious capital grew as productive capital deteriorated, and the means of the circulation of commodities, the credit system became a means of mobilising national wealth for the purposes of the war. This process of impoverishment is best of all illustrated by the extreme housing crisis in all the countries which were dragged into the war. The building industry, one of the most important branches of national economy, proved to be completely neglected.

This impoverishment of humanity is distributed equally among individual countries. In one zone there is Russia, in the other the United States. But of Russia, as a non-capitalist country, one must speak separately. Therefore, the first place in our analysis must be taken by Germany. The present economic position of Germany is strikingly described by the facts and figures contained in Richard Calvert's book on State Bankruptcy. In 1907 the number of people employed in producing the material wealth of Germany was 11,300,000, now only 4,800,000 are employed, i.e., only 42 per cent. of pre-war time. In agriculture, instead of a harvest of 15,000,000 tons of the pre-war period we get, in 1919, 6,600,000, and in 1920, 5,200,000. In the building industry also, Calvert points out a worsening of the situation by more than 50 per cent. The State debts of Germany have grown to 250 milliard gold marks. The amount of paper money has increased more than sixteen times, while the actual value of the mark is not more than 7 pfennigs of pre-war time. The national wealth which before the war was valued at 225 milliard gold marks is now valued at 100 milliards. The national revenue yields only 16 instead of 40 milliards, i.e., Germany has become 60 per cent. poorer. Germany, says Calvert, is now poorer than it was in the middle of the nineties, the beginning of the so-called "storm and stress" period of capitalism. The so-called duty of reparation, which is simply a contribution imposed on Germany, amounts yearly to two milliard gold marks. Therefore, it is but natural that Calvert establishes the complete inability for Germany gradually to restore the normal rate of exchange between the gold mark and the State finance, and defines the position of Germany as State Bankruptcy. In Germany they have of late been writing and speaking a great deal of State Bankruptcy, from the economical, political, philosophical, moral and other points of view. However that may be, with the moral or without a moral, these gentry cannot escape bankruptcy.

It is much more difficult to deal with France. The figures there are more often concealed, and when they are given they are often false. The national revenue of France is expressed by the following figures: The amount of cattle has decreased by five million head, the quantity of wheat by 23 million quintals, coal by 16 million tons—but if we count Alsace-Lorraine and the Saar, by six million tons. Steel casting has decreased by more than half. The trade balance of France is most characteristic. It was closed for 1919 and 1920 with the liabilities amounting:

to five milliard francs. It is true that the balance "improved" during the first quarter of 1921. Exports and imports balanced each other, but, as is stated by *Temps*, only because the import of raw material has decreased, not owing to any increase in the export of finished articles. The State debt from 1913 to 1921 increased tenfold. The circulation of paper money has increased seven times. The normal deficit—not counting the so-called reparation expenses, the payment of which on the part of Germany appears to us rather doubtful—amounts to 5½ milliard francs. There is nothing surprising when Mr. Scherrer, on the one hand, speaks of France as having been turned into a huge bureaucratic machine, incapable to do any work, and when Chevons, on the other, states there is only an undisguised bankruptcy which can put an end to the flood of money. France is simply the most parasitical country in Europe and the world. It exists only by robbing Germany and the colonies, and Germany loses twice as much as is being acquired by France. Such is the position of France, which is now undoubtedly playing the leading rôle in Europe.

England was affected by the war less than any other country in Europe. If the agriculture improved somewhat in the course of the war, it was only for a short space of time, and was due to extraordinary subsidies from the State. The coal industry, the mainstay of the British economy, decreased 20 per cent. after the war. The same took place in the steel industry. We leave out of our account the year 1921, during the first quarter of which the output of coal was steadily decreasing—the year which is marked by a gigantic strike. The export of coal, the chief article of foreign exports of England, has decreased during the seven years 76 per cent. The output for the first five months of 1921 totals only one-sixth of the pre-war export. Foreign trade generally has decreased one-third of its pre-war volume. As regards the British State debt, it has increased elevenfold, the British war budget increased for the same period three times, and finally, what is more characteristic for England—which is losing, and perhaps has already lost, its former exceptional world position—is that the pound sterling, the sovereign, which by its very name symbolised the world preponderance of the British currency, has lost all its halo, and is deposed by the American dollar, in comparison with which the pound at the beginning of this month had lost 24 per cent. of its real value.

If three of the most important capitalised States of the pre-war time were ruined by the war, American industry developed tremendously at their expense, and at the cost of the impoverishment of Europe. In America the coal industry increased more than 10 per cent., the production of oil doubled, and now America produces 45 per cent. of all the coal in the world, 30 per cent. of the world tonnage, and possesses 85 per cent. of all the motor-cars in the world. If you take the whole world, the average of one motor-car to every 100,000 persons, in America there is a motor-car to every twelve persons. The American pre-war exports were made up of one-third finished articles and two-thirds food and raw material. But after the war this was

radically changed, and the finished articles formed 60 per cent. of the American exports. America, from being the country of agricultural exports, has evolved into almost the only great country of exports of industrial products, the surplus of exports reaching during the six years (1915-1920) eighteen millions. It is interesting to note that though the United States comprises only 6 per cent. of the total population of the world, and 7 per cent. of its total area, it possesses at the present time 20 per cent. of all the gold, 25 per cent. of all the wheat, 50 per cent. of zinc, 45 per cent. of coal, 60 per cent. of aluminium, copper and cotton, 66 per cent. of oil, 70 per cent. of Indian corn, and 85 per cent. of all the motor-cars. At the same time the indebtedness to the United States amounts to eighteen milliard dollars, and increases daily by ten million dollars. Thus, America is continually striving to obtain gold from the whole world. We have already referred to the world importance of the dollar.

We witness the same growth in Japan. The latter has also utilised the war for the purpose of extending its world market, but her development is incomparably less striking than that of the United States, and is very artificial in a series of industrial enterprises. However, we should note that the output of coal in Asia has increased by 36 per cent. This industrial growth was followed by an immense growth of the labour army, which now numbers about twenty-four millions, of whom some 12 per cent. are organised in Trade Unions.

Passing to other questions, I wish to make a remark concerning Russia, but a special report on Russia will be given by Comrade Lenin. Bourgeois politicians and economists might say that the national economy of Russia has also not improved since the war. Hughes, the Australian Premier, in his letter to the notorious Mr. Gompers, stated in reference to the resumption of trade relations with Russia, that it is doomed to failure, as Russia is a gigantic economic "void," and that the disorganisation of Russian industries is in no way due to the blockade or to the mobilisation caused by civil war—a mobilisation which, he states, was far less extensive than the one before the Bolsheviks seized power. Of course, I cannot now, in the middle of the demobilisation, indicate the precise number of those who took part in civil war. I can only state that both arguments of Mr. Hughes are absolutely false. On one hand, at the moment of the greatest tension the Red Army numbered several million men, of whom about one-fourth were skilled workers, a circumstance which must, of necessity, have affected the industries. On the other hand, my friends kindly supplied me with data on objects which have never been manufactured in Russia, and had always been imported from Germany and England, and without which whole branches of peoples' economy cannot normally exist. This refers to a whole series of necessary tools and appliances for the coal mining, the textile, metallurgical and the paper industries, with which Russian industry could be set going immediately, provided everything was granted in order to surpass

her pre-war production. Hence the blockade had an influence on the condition of Russian industry, and such were the conditions for the resumption of trading relations.

Whilst examining the world situation, we must, of course, confess that the industrial rise and recovery of the spring of 1919 was only an imaginary growth of national prosperity. The end of the four years' war, the demobilisation and the change from war to peace, with its impending crisis as a result of the war, the exhaustion and the chaos, apparently seemed to give way in a few months to an industrial recovery. Industry absorbed almost all the demobilised workers, and although the rate of wages in general lagged behind the rise in the cost of living, nevertheless it increased and resulted in an apparent economic improvement. These satisfactory circumstances of 1919-1920, which eased the difficult period of liquidating the war, served to raise the hopes of the bourgeoisie and brought up the question of a new organic period of capitalist development. Nevertheless, the recovery of 1919 and 1920 was not the beginning of a recovery in capitalist economy, but on the contrary its illusory growth as a result of the war.

The war resulted in an almost unbounded market for the main branches of industry and a complete protection from competition. The production of means of production was replaced by the production of means for destruction. If the recovery of stock exchange activities, the rise in prices, and the unusual growth of speculation, resulted in an apparently satisfactory situation in 1919 and 1920, the state of industry, however, presented a class picture of the illusion of this recovery. In the Middle East, the West and South-East of Europe, there was a fall in production, in France a recovery, due to the plundering of Germany, and in England, a state of stagnation if not regress.

Such is the manner in which we have to regard the absence of a satisfactory state of affairs for production in Europe, but in America this was only partially evident in the rise in prices, the increase in profits, a frenzied circulation and a fall in the European exchange as compared with the American. "That the after war situation is exclusively based on speculation"—said comrade Varga—"can be most clearly seen in Germany. This satisfactory situation is due only to sales. The remnants of her State property are being sent abroad at absurd prices." As a result of this imaginary recovery in the economic situation there was a further flood of paper money and the transfer of the economic centre of gravity to the United States, which resulted in the political safety of the capitalist states. But does this similar situation mean a new organic epoch of capitalism? Many comrades were inclined to believe this, basing themselves on quotations from Engels and Marx, when speaking of the revolution of 1848, as the result of the crisis of 1847 and referring to the reaction of the following years as the result of the economic recovery of 1850 and 1851. Such ideas can only be treated as misconceptions. The main substance of the development of capitalist

economy is that it is not at all exhausted by the alteration of trade booms and slumps or by the rise and fall of its industrial growth. The alteration is merely one of the attributes of economic development, the substance of the matter is explained by the resolvent curve of these fluctuations. The latter are inevitable in any form of economic development, whether it be a recovery, a state of stagnation, or a slump. If the average curve of these fluctuations results in an upward slope, then we have an uninterrupted condition of capitalist recovery in spite of any alterations, and, the root of the matter is this, that in analysing the economic development of the last 50 years we have an upward curve to the beginning of the war, a downward slope after the war, in spite of any temporary booms and slumps, or temporary deviations in one direction or another, before or after the war.

This is why the present epoch must not be looked upon as an era of organic development of capitalism. The growing crisis commenced precisely in these countries where industry had reached its highest point. Japan and America were the first countries affected by it. The fall of the purchasing power of Europe and its complete indebtedness to the United States, were the first external causes of the present crisis. The hothouse development could not continue any longer. The world market became completely disorganised. The question that might present itself then, is whether this crisis will not be succeeded by an epoch of favourable conditions for industrial development, and a beginning of an organic period which might be considered as the postponement of the revolution for many years. There is no essential connection between these years of rise and fall and the revolution. Remember Russia after 1905. Then the years of the defeat of the revolution coincided with the years of an industrial crisis, whilst the years (1908-12) of industrial upheaval were marked by the growth of the labour movement, expressed in open street demonstrations on the very eve of the world war. "Would you say then that the establishment of capitalist equilibrium is impossible?" I may be asked, theoretically. No. The situation has not changed materially since the First and Second Congresses. We then marked our immediate aims and the direct road leading to them. Now that we have travelled a part of the road we see that this road is only a continuation of the previous one, rising and now falling, yet always in the direction which we marked before us. It is not enough to state a theoretical impossibility. But it is very important to take into consideration the actual conditions which make impossible the restoration of capitalist equilibrium. Opportunists love to talk of an automatic restoration of capitalist development, which is very characteristic of them. As though the question is not of two fighting classes, but some automatic process, independent of the will of millions of people and free from the political relations of the two classes. This contempt on the part of the opportunists towards the masses is a striking example of their tactics.

This means their total failure to take into account at what a tremendous rate the clash of class interests is developing side

by side with the industrial crisis. While commodity production has fallen, class differentiation and the intensification of the class struggle are marching ahead with giant strides. The rate of this process is so rapid that we are confronted not with a single working class, but with a whole aggregate of different layers of workers. Along with the elements politically trained in the traditions of the labour movement, we have an immense class of workers brought to life by the war, including a great number of women who have only recently stepped on the stage of the class struggle. Alongside of those sections of the working class who at times show a high degree of tactical circumspection, we have layers caught up by the up-tide of the revolution and eager for aggressive action; but without fully realising all the consequences of such action. On the other hand, there is also an abrupt change in the whole situation within the bourgeoisie. While the forefront of the political struggle and political power in bourgeois countries is manned by the trustified cohorts of the bourgeoisie, the non-trustified elements of the petty bourgeoisie are sinking into relative and absolute poverty, sinking down the social scale and lining up with the open opposition to the trustified bourgeoisie. We do not in the least intend, as do the reformists and independents, to assume the leadership of this non-trustified middle class, but we must state that in proportion as the proletarian forces become consolidated, these middle layers will be neutralized if they are not carried along by the revolutionary tide of the proletariat at the time of its decisive onslaught. This applies to considerable sections of the peasantry, who seem to have made their pile in accumulating an abundant supply of paper money, but practically were the first to suffer ruin caused by the downfall of large industry.

These hopes of restoring social equilibrium perfectly correspond to the hopes of restoring the international balance of power. If the immediate aim of the imperialist war were to replace the numerous national states by one world-wide state, we must say that those responsible for the war failed to achieve full success. The outcome of the war is just in the opposite direction; the formation of a number of small states in Europe was the result, which proved that the giants of imperialism were unable to divide world power among themselves. This has given rise to a series of ceaseless international crises in the political field. France plays the part of the leading state in Europe, clashing at every step with England's policy, which is growing ever more antagonistic to the interests of France, especially as regards Germany. If we may speak of an automatic clash of interests anywhere, it is exclusively in connection with the relations between England and the United States. To begin with, two American workers produce as much as five Englishmen. The United States owns 45 per cent. of the world's coal supply, and above one-third of petroleum. In the case of petroleum matters are not so simple. It is one thing to speak of the geological forecast of the potential oil supply, it is quite a different matter when speaking of actual oil supply. American economists already sound the alarm that in ten years' time the supply of American oil will be exhausted, which will

spell the total stagnation of the colossal motor car traffic, and shipping facilities now amounting to six times the auto-transportation of the globe. We must add to this the indebtedness of Europe to America, the successful attempts on the part or the latter to concentrate in her hands the entire cable system of the globe, the unusual rapid growth of her marine tonnage, which even now amounts to 35 per cent. of the total tonnage of the world. When we take all this into consideration, it will be perfectly easy to understand not only the motives behind the political alliance between England and Japan, but also all the consequences of this alliance. In 1924, the American navy will exceed in tonnage the combined navies of England and Japan. But since "Britannia rules the waves," he will rule the world who rules the ocean—and herein lies the meaning of all England's world politics—one does not need to be a prophet to say that we are nearing an armed clash between the United States and England, and in this case it is almost for the first time in history when the time of a conflict of this kind can be foretold with almost calendar precision.

England is faced with the alternative either finally to abandon her world supremacy or to stake her fate, and all her national wealth, on the fortunes of war. On the other hand, the armies of Europe have increased considerably in comparison with pre-war times, by about 30 per cent. This is explained by the colossal position of European states, by the necessity for every new state to retain its customs, frontier guards, its gendarmes, and the military pacification which commenced after the war. Thus we can without a doubt say that our description of the world situation given at the first and Second Congresses remains valid. No social equilibrium has been established, not even partial equilibrium has been achieved in the international capitalist policy. The international proletarian stands, as it stood, faced by the growing imperialist conflicts on the one hand, the growing social antagonism on the other. The ruin of the productive forces of Europe, the growth of the workers' movement in the East, the growth of social antagonism in America, all leads to the consolidation of the working class, to the continuous gaining of experience in the class struggle, all this speaks of the correctness of our tactics and methods adopted in the struggle. It is necessary for us carefully to examine our tactics and adapt them to the conditions and needs of each country separately, and in this lies the main work of our congress. Our fundamental task is to form out of the communist party, a party of action. It must stand at the head of the struggling masses, it must clearly and precisely formulate fighting slogans of social democracy. It must adopt broadly the strategy of the class struggle, learn to manoeuvre with the various sections of the working class, with the object of teaching them new methods of struggle, striving to create of them, for the moment of the open collision with the opposing forces, an invincible army. Every respite must be used by the party committee to learn the lessons of the struggles of the past, to deepen and widen class contradictions on the national and international scale and to unite the workers in the

openness of aims and action and in this manner to enable them to overcome all obstacles in the road to the dictatorship and the social revolution.

THIRD SESSION.

DEBATE ON TROTSKY'S REPORT.

The third session of the Congress commenced on June 25th at 7 p.m., and opened with a discussion on the report of Comrade Trotsky.

The first speaker to take part in the discussion was **Comrade Braun**, the representative of the Polish Communist Party. He said that all the measures adopted by the capitalist states, all these state compulsory reforms in the sphere of reduction of the working day, housing, food reform, etc., are incompatible with the re-establishment of pre-war conditions. The Brussels financial conference discussed the question of exchange, but as the financial problem is only a symptom of the disease of capitalist society, it was compelled to extend the area of the question. From disarmament it was compelled to extend to the demands for the postponement of reforms. For the capitalists it is not sufficient merely to throw the workers on the streets. They are compelled to intensify the exploitation of the workers in the factories and to attempt to destroy the workers' organisations. Therein lies the social root of the crisis. In the most difficult moments during the last three years the Social Democrats helped the bourgeoisie. "The Moor has done his work, let the Moor go." The task of the bourgeoisie now is not to bribe the workers, but simply to oppress and suppress them. In this work the Social Democrats were compelled to co-operate. At such a moment we Communists must become fighters for the very existence of the working class. For that reason we welcome the fact that the report on the economic situation was made by the leader of the Red Army, Comrade Trotsky. This shows that the Communist International will conduct the struggle not by means of statistics and figures, but with the sword.

Comrade Schwab, the representative of the Communist Party of Germany, said he agreed with the fundamental position laid down in the thesis of Comrades Trotsky and Varga on the periods of the rise and fall of capitalism. It is true that capitalism at the present time is experiencing a rise, but one must take one fact into consideration to which little attention has been devoted in the thesis; this is that modern capitalism is based not on production but on profits. Its reconstruction is possible therefore because it preserves its profits, both in the period of industrial crises and industrial booms. Furthermore the difference has not been pointed out between the unemployment of former times and the unemployment of to-day. Previously the unemployed served as the industrial reserve army, at the present moment it is doomed to complete extinction. The

apparatus of capitalism has been adapted to working behind the scene where it is carefully protecting the employers' profits.

Comrade Reichenbach, representing the same party, analysing the modern unparalleled crisis, asserted that capitalism has assumed new forms and has begun to employ quite new methods. During the last few years it has acquired new possibilities of overcoming difficulties. Of course, for us Marxists and Communists, the inevitability of the growth of large capitalist society is an axiom about which there is no dispute. The question consists in hastening the process and discovering new methods of struggle against aggressive capitalism, and retaining the initiative in the hands of the working class. Modern capitalism represents a complicated mixture of nationalism and internationalism. French capitalism, for instance, is interested in the re-establishment of German capitalism. Stepping across frontiers capitalism is uniting, and its insatiable greed for profits drives it into conflicts with the proletariat, who refuse any longer to live a life of poverty. In conclusion Comrade Reichenbach spoke of the intention of international capitalism to re-establish Russian industry. In his opinion this question in connection with the new forms and methods of aggression of capitalist governments is a serious one. On the one hand the re-establishment of the industry of Russia which for three years experienced a fierce war, is a necessity; on the other hand, it will ease the burden of the capitalists. The question in connection with the report delivered by Comrade Trotsky is one of opposing the new organisational forms of capitalism by new organisational forms and methods of the revolutionary proletariat.

Comrade Poganni, of the Hungarian Communist Party, expressed the opinion that Comrade Trotsky's report contained some contradictions and omissions. On page 4 of his thesis, Comrade Trotsky says that the main reason why the bourgeoisie are maintaining their positions is that an industrial boom arose a few months after the conclusion of the war. On page 14, however, he says, "the proletariat which in the present crisis has suffered defeat will make a new offensive under better conditions." Thus, the thesis asserts that the European proletariat were unable to conquer political power because of the economic boom which developed after the war. And then, the thesis states that the workers failed to capture political power owing to the economic crisis. Comrade Trotsky quoted an example from the history of the Russian labour movement from which it was evident that the proletariat which had suffered a defeat in 1905, rallied again when the industrial boom arrived. I could also quote examples from the history of the Hungarian Labour movement, said Comrade Poganni, where the proletariat was defeated by the white terror, but did the Hungarian proletariat rally during the economic boom? No! On the contrary, we see that it is during the present period of economic crisis in Hungary that the proletarian movement is becoming stronger, but this example is not valid for the present moment. The Russian proletariat suffered defeat in 1905, the Hungarian proletariat in 1919, but the European proletariat has not been

defeated, it is not true that the European proletarian organisations have been destroyed. On the contrary, we see that during the period of industrial boom the workers' organisations of the whole of Europe have grown, have become stronger, and have united in fighting divisions. We see further that during economic crises the proletariat by no means loses heart. On the contrary, it was owing to the commencing industrial crisis that the workers of France, Germany, and Czecho-Slovakia rose and formed Communist parties. It was not an accident that the strong Communist parties were formed not in the period of industrial boom, but in the period of economic crisis. I think that the thesis is based on a future war, and not on the present economic crisis. I think that this crisis will not bring about social peace, because the bourgeoisie will adopt all measures in order to defeat the proletariat. The proletariat will not surrender, because at the present moment the revolutionary movement in all countries is guided by the Communist parties, which, calculating the situation, will lead the proletariat into battle. For that reason it seems to me that it was necessary to deal more widely and deeply in the thesis with the question of civil war. We must assert that force plays the same part at the present moment as it played during the so-called period of accumulation of capital, i.e., that force in the period of the collapse of capital plays the same rôle as it did in the period of its accumulation. I must raise the question as to what the economic crisis will bring to the proletariat in the immediate future and what situation will be created as the result of it by the Communist parties. I do not think that it is necessary to be a prophet, for the crisis itself indicates what this will be. As evidence of this I will quote only the most important facts: the miners' strike in England, and the March rising in Germany were nothing else than resistance to the attempt of the bourgeoisie to reduce wages. In this connection the bourgeoisie directed all the force at its command against the proletariat. As a consequence the Communist party in Germany went more to the Left, became more revolutionary, and in the ranks of the Independents a so-called new left wing has been formed. As a consequence of the miners' strike in England more favourable conditions have been created for the revolution and for a mass Communist party. We mainly assert that the same phenomena reveal themselves both at the beginning and at the end of capitalism. Both at the birth and the decline of capitalism we witness robbery and theft.

I think, comrades, that in examining the present world economic crisis we must take three characteristic features into consideration (1) the economic offensive of the bourgeoisie along the whole front, (2) the resistance of the proletariat to this offensive, which must inevitably lead to a political struggle, and (3) the increasing application by the bourgeoisie of the forces of the state, reorganised during the period of the boom, against the proletariat. From this it is clear that a period of civil war must arrive in all countries. For that reason it seems to me that we must speak here not of world war, or of booms, but on the contrary, the "leit motiv" of our thesis should be civil

war and crisis. I propose, therefore, to insert the following amendment to the point I mentioned on page 14:—

“Owing to the crisis which arose, the proletariat was compelled to take up a defensive position. Here the proletariat will be compelled to conduct a defensive battle, this struggle naturally will lead to a political struggle against which the bourgeoisie will to an increasing extent apply the power of the state. The economic crisis represents a period of intense proletarian struggle—of civil war. If the proletariat will not conduct this defensive struggle with the necessary offensive enthusiasm, the bourgeoisie will reduce the standard of living to that which existed in the period previous to the trade union movement.”

The next speaker was **Comrade Thalheimer** (Germany), who considered that Comrade Trotsky's thesis required some amendment. It is evident from the thesis that a certain equilibrium has been established, and therefore the crisis of capitalism will proceed much more easily. It is necessary to observe, however, that this equilibrium is not at all stable, and the slightest shock will upset it. Comrade Trotsky pointed to the sharpening of relations between America and England, and from that drew the conclusions of a future war. He could have pointed to a similar sharpening of relations between France and Germany, which could also serve as a factor for upsetting the equilibrium. Comrade Thalheimer further remarked that Comrade Trotsky in a masterful manner described the methods by which the bourgeoisie extricated itself out of the difficult position of 1918-1919. But he did not describe sufficiently clearly the social contradiction.

Comrade Bell (England) said that the discussion on Comrade Trotsky's report should be concentrated on two points: The stability of the capitalist system and the tactics of the revolutionary proletariat in the period of the existing stability of capitalism. “I want to draw your attention to the general influence of the moment,” said Comrade Bell. “Previous to the war the inter-dependence of capitalist countries appeared so close that war seemed impossible. The leaders of the Second International were so convinced of this that they based their tactics on the impossibility of war. The war created new groupings in the capitalist world; not only the economic but political. We must closely examine the reasons for the stability of capitalism after the war. The factors in this are: the colossal import of American capital into Europe. Eleven milliards were invested in large European countries and four milliards in the small Balkan States; then there is the concentration of German industry, which finds its expression in such concerns as that of Stinnes and the cheap credit placed at the disposal of small countries by England. Reparations and indemnities also played a large rôle in establishing a stable equilibrium.”

In conclusion, Comrade Bell said that the stability of capitalism observed at the present moment is only temporary.

Comrade Zetkin (Germany) followed. She said :

I will not deal with the details of the report. The fundamental internal tendencies of capitalist development are much more important to us. Comrade Trotsky correctly demonstrated to us the fundamental tendencies of the development and the difference between this and other crises. Comrade Zetkin then dealt with the assertions of Comrade Thalheimer, on the significance of the German-French conflict. In her opinion the German-French agreement had more significance. This agreement not only affected the French and German proletariat, but the proletariat of the whole world. Further on in her speech Comrade Zetkin said : We must not rely on the automatic development of capitalism, we must hasten it with revolutionary proletarian activities. The case of Austria demonstrates how the abasement and the worse enslavement of the working classes does not destroy their passivity. But we must count on the possibilities of improvement. However, we need not guard ourselves against this. The Communist Party must exert all its energies to destroy the passivity of the masses, must make them revolutionary, and lead them along the path towards the seizure of the political power by the proletariat.

Comrade Roy (India) said :

If the capitalist world is experiencing a crisis then the proletariat's immediate task is to make use of this crisis in order to deprive the world bourgeoisie of its chances to re-establish its class rule and the economic equilibrium of the world. I regard the possibilities of war between England and America as exaggerated. There is more likelihood of an alliance between England and America to rule the world. England is the ruler of the old world of Africa and Asia, and America had taken under its control the whole of the new world. We must devote all our energies to prevent the possibility of such an alliance to re-establish the economic equilibrium. The signs of such an alliance have already reached the surface, and England and America are already meeting Germany with the object of such a re-establishment. It is important to deal further with the colonial question. Formerly the colonies were a rich source of raw material, to-day we witness an industrial growth, which on the one hand produces a large proletarian army with all its class contradictions and on the other gives English capital the possibility of transferring its surplus to the colonies and making the colonies a prop for the support of its disturbed rule. This is why it is absolutely essential to include the economic significance of the colonies in the thesis, to review colonial politics in the light of the world situation and to examine the tactical side of the colonial question.

Comrade Koenen, of the United Communist Party of Germany, followed Comrade Roy. He said that he did not intend to denounce or criticise the thesis of Comrades Trotsky and Varga, but merely to analyse it. Some speakers mentioned a struggle between America and England and between Germany and France, and others an alliance between Germany and France. Germany was too weak to do either the one or the other. Comrade Koenen

then dealt with the question of Upper Silesia, the Ruhr Basin and Asia Minor which was never touched upon by the former speakers. The bankruptcy of contemporary capitalist governments was referred to in the thesis. The speaker hoped that Comrade Trotsky would give a clearer explanation of this in his concluding statement. In his opinion the present state of bankruptcy is absolutely different to any that had ever yet existed, as it is to-day equivalent to a revolution. In order to define a clear cut line of action—said Comrade Köenen in conclusion—it is essential that the particular conditions in each country be thoroughly examined.

On the motion of Comrade Trotsky the debate was closed.

Comrade Trotsky spoke in conclusion :

Comrade Braun, he said, declared that we must fight the bourgeoisie not with statistics but with the sword, and he confused me with the report. I must remark that in my work with the Red Army, I had to deal more with statistics than the sword. The very idea of the sword is romantic. I had to devote more time in the Red Army to uniforms, trousers, and pants. Statistics is an adjunct of the sword, and the sword an adjunct of statistics.

Comrade Reichenbach said that we must not only demonstrate the line of tactics to the European proletariat, but we must lead it. We mean by this that we must show the proletariat how to use its strength to bring its hopes into effect. We must not only prove to the proletariat the steps that have to be taken, but we must at the same time stand at the head of its activities.

Comrade Reichenbach over-estimates the importance of the objective element. Our Russian Left Socialist Revolutionists behaved in the same way. They threw out Marxism as useless litter, and relied exclusively on the education and maturing of the revolutionary will of the masses. This is a mistake, a purely subjective method. The supporters of Kautsky go to the other extreme in regard to development as an exclusively automatic process, taking into account only the will of the hostile class, and removing from the field of vision the position of the working class. This separating the subjective from the objective is nothing more nor less than revolutionary adventurism. We Marxists unite the dialectical and practical, subjective and objective. We not only rely on the subjective desire of this or that comrade, but take into consideration that the workers will objectively follow that position and the objective economic conditions are a pledge of this. These real conditions we wish to prove with our statistics, and thus point out the path to the working class. Comrade Schwab said that these do not clearly point out the decline of the capitalist system. I would point out that the economic equilibrium is not an abstract mechanical conception, but the continuous fluctuations of the inter-dependence of conditions, influences of classes. After the war the bourgeoisie was left at the helm. By means of issues of paper money, the cheapening of food, etc., it retained power

in its hands. But every article that Germany throws on to the English market is a piece of the home of a German worker. The unavoidable ruin of industry is brought about in that way. That is the vicious circle of capitalist rule. In that lies the meaning of the thesis.

With regard to the assertion of Comrade Reichenbach that economic connection with Soviet Russia can consolidate European capitalism, so far I do not think there is any danger of such a thing happening. International capitalism unfortunately has not come to that stage yet, where under the pressure of the international proletariat it has to seek refuge in Soviet Russia.

Comrade Poganni is of the opinion that the thesis contradicts itself. At one point, he says, it states that the industrial boom weakened the revolutionary movement. In another place it says that the coming boom will not be able to restrain the revolutionary movement. The boom must be appraised equally in the future as in the past. We examined these booms from a concrete, historical standpoint. The intensified crisis brought the capitalists to attack the proletariat. The latter are now on their defensive. Our task is to deepen that condition, and politically to spread it to such dimensions as to make it possible for the proletariat to capture power. But suppose an improvement in the situation takes place. Comrade Varga has already indicated in his pamphlet the symptoms of that improvement. True, this improvement evidently does not come so fast. It does not depend on us to hasten or to hinder the coming of that improvement. What should be our tactics if that improvement should come? This is what the thesis talks about, the difference between the industrial boom immediately after the war and the present condition lies in that in the after war boom the workers were still full of illusions, they had no clear and definite orientation. Their consciousness was not yet awakened. The bourgeoisie, by making a number of sacrifices, created a state of stability. Now its difficulties are considerably greater. The Communist Parties have taken up a definite attitude. With regard to conditions in the period of the boom, it is unavoidable that the proletariat should recall the deprivation it had to suffer and the sacrifices it had to make.

With regard to the Anglo-American conflict, which several comrades touched upon, Trotsky reminded them that the possibility of such a conflict is not defined in the thesis as something unavoidable and which must come about on a certain defined day, but only as an illustration of the present international situation.

In further replies to Comrade Thalheimer and Bell, Comrade Trotsky quoted the words of the Spanish delegate, who declared that the revolutionary movement in Spain sprung up during the industrial boom.

In analysing the conceptions of balance and stability, Comrade Trotsky said: What makes for revolution is the fact that there is no balance or stability. The trade union bureaucracy contrived to get a firm foothold and feathered its nest against unemployment. But the frenzied pulse of market instability, the leaps and fluctuations in currency and wages disturb the life-balance.

The workers of Germany live under conditions spelling absolute uncertainty as to what the next day may bring. The most peacefully inclined working man feels that there is nothing stable or durable in life as a whole, and its material resources, and this feeling throws him out of balance. And so, it is not the upside of prosperity nor the growing impoverishment, but this lack of stability and balance which is a factor of profound revolutionary import. Revolution, continues Comrade Trotsky, runs in three channels: the first is marked out by the social balance of Europe, primarily of England depending on its relative position in the world concert; the second—by the feverish pulse in the development and rise of American industry to be followed by a great economic crisis and revolution; the third—by the colonies, which developed to a considerable extent during the war and not only gained foothold in the markets, but actual influence on the market itself. India has a backward but revolutionary proletariat. In this country where the peasants are ground down by the heel of feudalism, their only hope lies in the young proletariat of India. The movement ran parallel in these three channels amid constant inter-action.

In conclusion he moved to refer back to the commission the thesis on the economic situation of the world.

After Comrade Trotsky's summing up, the Congress took up the question of voting on the thesis reported on.

Comrade Radek brought in two motions: (1) To approve Comrade Trotsky's thesis in principle, since its fundamentals called out no objections as to principle, and to refer it to the commission for editorial finish to embody the amendments made; (2) that the same commission prepare a manifesto on the question of immediate class warfare in response to the attacks of the bourgeoisie on the working class.

Comrade Trotsky, in seconding Comrade Radek's motion, moved that the work of bringing out this manifesto be handed over to the Commission on Economics and the Commission on Tactics working in conjunction. Here, he said, I must betray a secret. My thesis was attacked on the ground that it contained no suggestions in questions of tactics. As a matter of fact, the original version had such suggestions; but as Comrade Radek is to report here on the question of tactics, I, not being an imperialist, the assertions of the Press to the contrary notwithstanding, struck out of my thesis any matter relating to tactics. That is why I move that the manifesto be prepared by the joint work of both Commissions.

Frölich, in the name of the U.C.P.G., asked the Congress not to vote for the present on Comrade Trotsky's thesis as a basis for the work of the above Commissions, since, in his opinion, this would unnecessarily direct and locate the work of these commissions, whereas Germany's delegation was anxious that the work of these Commissions should be as spontaneous and free as possible. Comrade Frölich's motion was opposed by Comrades Radek and Trotsky.

Comrade Radek pointed out that the German delegation, though taking an active part in the discussions, failed, however, even once to state its opinion on the essentials of Comrade Trotsky's thesis. **Trotsky**, in his turn, pointed out the perfect inconsistency of Comrade Frölich's motion, as if there were no objections to the thesis in point of principle, there was no reason why they should not be voted on, whereas if there were any such objections, there was ten times more reason that the thesis should be voted on.

After the replies of **Comrades Frölich** and **Scheiner**, who seconded the motion of the U.C.P.G., pointing out that in view of the serious nature of the question it was imperative that the Congress take up these theses again after they have been acted on in the Commissions, the Congress proceeded to put the question to a vote. At Comrade Radek's suggestion a trial vote was taken by balloting cards, since the Commission on Credentials had not yet reported.

Practically the whole of the delegates, with the exception of the German and the Swiss, voted in favour of accepting Comrade Trotsky's thesis as a basis.

The second proposal of Comrade Radek on the publication of a manifesto together with amendment by Comrade Trotsky was carried unanimously. So also was the proposal of the Presidium to include in the Theses Commissions representatives of those delegations not already represented.

Comrade Kolarov, from the chair, read the agenda for the next session, to take place on the 26th at 11 a.m. The main item would be the report of the Comintern, which would be made by Comrade Zinoviev.

FOURTH SESSION.

COMRADE ZINOVIEV'S REPORT ON THE COMINTERN.

The session was opened at 12.15 p.m. by **Comrade Könen**, who called upon Comrade Radek to deliver his report on the Mandate Committee.

Comrade Radek said that according to preliminary figures, there were at the Congress 291 delegates with decisive votes, 219 with consultative votes, and over 100 guests, representing 48 countries. Besides these, there were delegates from the Young Communist Movement, the Near and Far Eastern Bureau, the "Polish Bund," and "Paole Zion," the two latter with a consultative vote until their question of affiliating to the Communist International was settled.

Then, Comrade Radek dealt with the distribution of votes throughout the Congress, and stated that in allocating the number of votes to be given to each delegation, one could not be guided by the numerical strength of this party or that party. One must also consider the political importance of a country

and the degree of development of its labour movement. All these factors were considered by the commission, and the following distribution of votes was decided upon :—The first group of countries, which included Germany, France, Italy, Russia, and Czecho-Slovakia, to receive 40 votes each. This group included the Young Communist Movement with its 800,000 members. England, America, Poland, the Ukraine, Norway, Jugo-Slavia, and Bulgaria receive 30 votes each. The third group, which included Finland, Holland, Belgium, Switzerland, Sweden, Latvia, and Austria to receive 20 votes each. The fourth group of Aizerbaidjan, Denmark, Luxembourg, Esthonia, Persia, and Turkey, receive 10 votes each. South Africa, Mexico, Argentine, Australia, Iceland, New Zealand, India, Korea, and Armenia to receive 5 votes each. The representatives of China, Turkestan, Bokhara, Mongola, Khiva, and Palestine, where no parties yet exist, have a consultative vote and can take part in the work of the Congress. A delegate from Japan, who represents Korean-Japanese and American-Japanese organisations, also has a consultative vote.

The news has just been received that a delegate from the Japanese Communist Party is on his way here, he, of course, will be given a decisive vote.

In conclusion, Comrade Radek proposed that the report and proposals of the Mandate Committee should be accepted without discussion.

Comrade Zinoviev then gave his report on the activities of the E.C. of the Comintern, and said :—

The Third Communist International already exists the third year, but its Executive Committee as an institution made up of representatives of a number of parties, is only a year old, dating from the Second Congress. During that congress, some comrades, e.g., of the German delegation, maintained it was entirely unnecessary that foreign delegates constantly attend the sessions of the Executive Committee, and that all its work should be done by the Russian comrades. It was only the insistence on the part of the latter that not less than 10 members of the most important delegations be included in the make up of the Executive Committee for permanent work that this body organised itself in its present form. However, not all parties did their full duty with regard to the Executive Committee, and it is now imperative that we do everything to make the Executive Committee the genuine exponent of the International Communist movement, capable of carrying out the work of organisation on an international scale.

This Congress was convened somewhat earlier than is provided by the constitution of the Comintern. But, in calling this Congress, we were conscious of the tremendous responsibility assumed by the Executive Committee, and also of the great strides that the growth of the Communist movement has made during the period just expired, and of a number of debatable issues arising in large countries.

During the past ten months, since the Second Congress, the Executive Committee held 31 sessions, where 196 questions were

acted upon; of this number 128 were purely political, the rest organisational. As to the countries that came up for discussion at these sessions, Germany took the lead, owing to the better connections with that country. Germany was discussed 21 times at these sessions; Italy 12 times; Czecho-Slovakia 12 times; England 8 times, etc. Besides, there was the work of the Small Bureau of the Executive Committee, made up of seven comrades (in which a Frenchman and a German took part), which met approximately twice as often.

Turning next to the character of the work done by the Executive Committee, Comrade Zinoviev first of all pointed out the resolution on fundamental principles passed by the Second Congress, which formed the basis of the Executive Committee's work during the period just expired. The Second Congress worked out the constitution of the Communist International, its byelaws and tactics. We had first to straighten out the "Left" trend cropping up in Germany, Italy, England, and America. Take, for example, the question of our attitude to the English Labour Party. Some of the English comrades were absolutely opposed to the idea of working within this party owing to its opportunism. We, however, insisted on the necessity of "boring from within" on the ground that in a country like England it was imperative that we utilize the opportunities offered by very large labour organisations to penetrate its ranks, develop within it energetic work with the object of winning over the workers to our camp. At the same Congress we launched our theoretical artillery against the groups opposed to parliamentary action. Comrade Bordiga and his group, who are now our best friends, then came out strongly against parliamentarianism, and were partly seconded by the Belgian and Swiss comrades. But we succeeded in bringing them over to our views.

The second question along whose lines the Communist movement has been crystallising during the period in question dealt with the famous 21 conditions. The opportunists rallied against them all sides, the centrists, as well as the semi-centrists. But while the leftists gave us no foes, and, subsequently, even proved our sincerest friends, the rightist elements became our inveterate enemies.

The objective situation during the Second Congress, owing to the fact that we were bottled in by the blockade and had no adequate information on the Socialist movement, and so forth, within the remoter countries, rendered our conditions at the time quite embarrassing. Every centrist at that time was eager to join the Third International. It became the craze of the moment.

Thus Hilquit, that American Dittmann, sent us his delegates, the Italian reformists with D'Aragona at their head, the modern saboteurs of the proletarian movement—all with common accord declared their affiliation to the Communist International. At first we received the Italians as friends. In Petrograd tens of thousands of workers were literally carrying Seratti and his friends shoulder high—so great was the confidence reposed in

them by the workers. Now we know that D'Aragona and Co. were deceiving us, that their main purpose was to penetrate into the midst of the Communist International in order to sabotage it from within. This deceit, this hypocrisy, was revealed by the 21 conditions. Who turned out to be right in the disputes in which we took part at the Second Congress? The British Labour Party, as is known, decided to exclude all the Communists. The compromisers understood that organised Communists constitute a great danger for them. Compare with this the pretended naive astonishment of Seratti, who expressed surprise at the fact that as regards Italy we demanded the exclusion of Turatti and others, and, as regards England, on the other hand, we make it the duty of Communists to enter the Labour Party. Seratti only pretends to be so naive. Of course he is perfectly aware of the difference. Dwelling on the way in which various parties obeyed the resolutions of the Second Congress, Comrade Zinoviev stated that Communist deputies in parliaments did not act in conformity with party discipline, nor were they following genuine revolutionary tactics, and this was especially so in France, Italy, Germany, and Switzerland. The main task of the present moment consists in establishing a closer connection with the masses. Especially in England and America, where the Communist parties are very weak as yet, but where the masses are sufficiently revolutionary, the task of the Communists consists in agitating among the masses to develop the maximum of organisational work, to ruthlessly unmask the opportunists and centrists, to wrest the masses away from them, to destroy illusions, which were brought by social traitors.

Reviewing the activity of the Executive Committee in a chronological order, Comrade Zinoviev stated that the greatest difficulties were presented not so much by the German as by the Italian question. When the Italian delegates arrived for the Second Congress, we did not know them, and met them as friends. But even if we were only to read the minutes of the sittings of the Second Congress, we should be surprised, how we could be so greatly deceived. Seratti spoke four times at the Congress on questions of principle: on the national question, the agrarian question, on the 21 conditions and on the fundamental tasks of the Communist International. On each question he either opposed or adopted an attitude of "neutrality." Subsequent events unmasked the real Seratti and the Serattist. We have printed and distributed to all the delegates a book in four languages which contains a collection of articles and resolutions by Seratti himself. We greatly regret that his group is not present at the Congress, and that we are thus compelled to discuss the Italian question in their absence. We on our part did everything to secure their presence at the Congress. We informed them three and a-half months before the original opening. We wired them twice, and now that three weeks have elapsed since the original date of the opening of the Congress, still they are not here. Comrade Zinoviev further quoted several passages of above-mentioned book, which characterises the activity of Seratti and his retrograde evolution from Communism to opportunism. In his very first article, which "Avanti"

published immediately after the Congress, Seratti strove by all means to discredit the Congress; he stated the Congress was full of delegates whose credentials were incomplete, and who therefore expressed only their own personal view.

The conditions surrounding the Congress in connection with the blockade, and the absence of the control of the Press, had the effect, it is said, of making the Congress, as it were, a closed one. The lack of proper acquaintance with the conditions in other countries is also said to have adversely affected the Congress. The Congress was conducted under the protection of a strong government, and the votes were not divided in accordance with the numerical strength of the delegations and the importance of the respective capitalist countries. Seratti wrote all this two weeks after the close of the Congress. On arriving in Italy, Seratti for a little while wrapped himself in the mantle of "leftism." He demanded a more firm policy against the elements on the right. He was particularly insistent with regard to the French. For some reason or other, he seemed to have a particular grudge against them. Then he began to speak of the twenty-second condition of the Comintern, about refusing to permit the Freemasons to affiliate. As a matter of fact, the resolution on the Freemasons was moved by Seratti himself, and of course no one raised the slightest protest against it. It was only pointed out that it was superfluous to introduce a special condition with regard to it. To us the thing was so obvious that there was no necessity to make any special mention of it. But Seratti desired to take advantage of this in order to prove to the Italian workers that we tolerate Freemasons in the Comintern.

Subsequently these questions were discussed by the Executive of the Italian Socialist Party, at which two resolutions were put forward, one by Terracini, on the unconditional acceptance of the 21 conditions, and another by Barratono, on accepting the conditions, with the reservation, however, that freedom of action was permitted with regard to Italian circumstances. The majority of the Executive voted for the resolution of Comrade Terracini, upon which Comrade Seratti declared that he would refuse responsibility for the editorship of the "Avanti." Our comrades, instead of welcoming this declaration, pleaded with Seratti not to leave his post. The result was that on the next day Seratti commenced a campaign against the E.C. of the Comintern, unequalled for lies and mud slinging.

A meeting of the "concentraron" fraction, that fraction inspired by Seratti and D'Arragona, took place at Redgo-Emilia. This fraction, submitting to the influence of Seratti, declared that it accepted the 21 conditions on principle, but christened the Italian Communists Syndicalists. They also made speeches about not permitting Freemasons to join the Comintern. But the crowning piece was that part of the resolution that spoke of the dictatorship of the proletariat. They declared that the dictatorship of the proletariat was not a programme demand, but only a temporary measure, need for which was determined by local circumstances. Furthermore, they expressed disagreement with the Soviet System on the Russian model, as it was

violent and destructive. But nobody prevented them from creating their own particular *Italian Soviet System*.

The characteristic feature of Seratti is to refrain from giving direct replies to questions but to raise all sorts of questions of details of second rate importance in order to evade direct replies to the letter addressed to him by Lenin. The latter demanded the expulsion of the reformists. What did Seratti reply? He in his turn raised the question, Who are the reformists? "I," said Seratti, "by no means defend Turatti, Modigliani, and the rest, but since they have spoken out in defence of Soviet Russia, can they really be regarded as reformists?"

In an article of the 24th of October, Seratti writes: "Italian industry is disorganised. Under these circumstances can the Italian proletariat take possession of it?" Evidently Seratti wishes to wait for the moment when capitalism will re-establish itself, and acquire strength for the workers to commence the struggle for power. This is perfectly in keeping with Kautsky. Particular attention should be paid to the unparalleled crime which Seratti and his followers committed last year when a wave of strikes and peasant unrest swept over the country, when the bourgeoisie was completely disorganised and the government lost its head. When, at that time, Giolitti was asked why he did not take measures against the workers who had seized the factories, he replied that he was unable to do so, that for the time being he was compelled to adopt homœopathic means and later on resort to surgery. Seratti actually assisted Giolitti to apply these homœopathic methods in order that later on the bourgeoisie may resort to "surgical" treatment. Now, these "surgical" measures are being applied. The Facisti are completing the work which Seratti commenced.

This was the situation on the eve of the Livorno Conference. The Executive Committee decided to send Comrade Bucharin and myself to Livorno, but this failed. The Italian Socialist Party did not raise a finger in order to facilitate our journey. Subsequently it was decided to send Comrade Kabaktchiev from Bulgaria and Comrade Rakosy from Hungary.

The members of the Italian Party who regard themselves Communists-Unitarians arranged a welcome for these comrades; which was a disgrace to the Italian Party. Comrades Kabaktchiev and Rakosy gave no occasion for this treatment, although the Italians charged them with tactlessness, dictatorial manners, and other sins. The conduct of the Serattists at the Congress is an evidence of the fact that the Italian Party has slipped back into the sphere of the social-democrats.

At the Congress, Seratti proposed to call the party the "Socialist Communist Party," and to accept the 21 conditions, with the reservation that they have a free hand in their application to Italy.

They attributed the subsequent split to the unfortunate 21 conditions, but our comrades pointed out that if we made any concessions to Seratti on the 21 conditions, the Communist International as a revolutionary organisation would have ceased to exist.

Formerly, Seratti posed as a "left," and demanded a stern policy with regard to the Freemasons, now, however, he stands for the theory of equal rights. Now he demands equal rights for France and Italy. "Why," he asks, "are greater concessions made to France than to Italy?" But the duty of the Executive Committee is to estimate the conditions in every country in accordance with the concrete historical conditions of the Labour Movement, and the degree of ripeness of the revolutionary movement. It is impossible to adopt the same measures with regard to France, America, Italy, Latvia and Czecho-Slovakia. This is the essence of the policy of the Executive Committee. It estimates the concrete inter-relations and in accordance with them establishes one or another position. Not a single genuine Communist will agree that if the French party is backward therefore the Italian should go back too.

Seratti's attacks on the Soviet Government are characteristically lacking in a sense of decency. He accuses it of conducting negotiations with the "Daily Herald" and some foreign bourgeois elements. The Soviet Government negotiates with the bourgeois merely because in capitalist countries the working class is weak as yet. This is well known to every Communist, but what have these reproaches on the part of Seratti to do with the International and the International working movement?

Of the French, Serratti stated that 55 deputies went over to the Communists. In reality 12—13 deputies out of 67 went over to the Communists. The remaining 55 deputies follow Longuet, a friend of Serratti. Seratti uses this deliberate lie to deceive the Italian proletariat.

Serratti looks from a Chauvinist standpoint on half the German Independent party joining the Communists. He wishes to persuade the Italian workers that the German workers joined the Communists, not on the platform of Internationalism, but for "national" reasons. From the period of the Livorno Congress, the Italian party was constantly on the decline. This is shown by the latest activity and the articles by Serratti. It is characteristic that a pamphlet issued by the Italian bourgeoisie, entitled "Bolshevism as described by Italian Socialists," abounds with quotations from articles written by Serratti's friends. All thereformists and centrists are raising a hue and cry over "Russian gold." But the fact that the Amsterdam Yellow International, that branch office of the League of Nations, had sent the Italian Trade Unions a present of 50,000 lire, that fact has been dubbed by Serratti as the greatest act of international solidarity of the proletariat.

Just a few words on elections to the Italian Parliament. "Soviet," the organ of Paul Levi, published after the Italian elections an article by Karl Geyer, which stated that Seratti's party scored 1,400,000 votes at the elections as against 450,000 which went to the Communists, hence the deduction was made that a defeat was inflicted on the Italian Communists, i.e., on the whole Communist International. You understand the utter groundlessness of these deductions? 450,000 votes were scored by a new party which for the first time took part in elections,

and they imagine that can be described as a defeat. And when in Germany, after the dastardly murder of Leibknecht and Luxembourg, Scheidemann scored some more million votes at the election, what should be the meaning of that?

The elections are best described by the communication given by Cesare Alessandro, a friend of Serratti. Alessandro gives the following description of the deputies ; 48 he regards as right, 42 as left, 30 as centre. The right are the type of Noske, the left pacifists after the type of Bernstein.

After the elections Serratti writes that it now becomes necessary to steer to the right. Even Lenin, so he says, decided to grant concessions, to make compromises with the petty bourgeoisie. Such arguments are worthy of Serratti. He puts out of sight the fundamental differences of Russia and other countries. Whereas in Russia power is in the hands of the proletariat, such is not the case in other countries, and there to recommend concessions to the right can only mean to compromise with the bourgeoisie, to help intentionally it against the proletariat.

Such is the situation in Italy. We must have no more illusions. We must unmask Serratti's policy before the world, and the sooner we do that the sooner we shall have on our side the working class of Italy.

I have already referred to the fact that immediately after the Second Congress a revolutionary movement was started in Italy, which assumed peculiar forms. The party led by Serratti did everything to sabotage this movement, and to throw the helpless proletariat to the feet of the triumphant bourgeoisie. Such is the lesson of the Italian Party.

Serratti says: We shall wait and suffer till the cathedral doors of the Third International open for us. But as a matter of fact, Serratti is not standing in front of the doors of the Communist Cathedral, but grovels in the dust before the bourgeois clique. (Applause from the entire congress.)

Serratti's party became an ordinary common-place social democratic party. But the working class is for us and to the Italian workers we must turn.

The problem of the Congress is to approach the Italian proletariat and explain to them the treacherous policy and centrism of Serratti, which leads to deception and to the quenching of their revolutionary spirit.

"I have dealt with the Italian question in such detail," said Comrade Zinoviev, "because the history of Serratti is typical of the entire centrist movement. We must say: 'Enough of words.' We must be more cautious. Our most dangerous enemies are the right and centrist elements and with them we must wage a merciless war. The Congress will examine our activities in this direction and will declare its verdict on the accuracy of our tactics."

THE GERMAN QUESTION.

We won our first victory at Halle, where we separated the socialist, reformists, and independents and created a mass Communist Party. It was obvious that the units of the German Communist Parties, which consisted of 100,000 members of the U.C.P. and 100,000 Independents, would contain elements of centralism. Two burning questions faced us after Halle: (1) Whether to allow the Spartacists to exist independently; and (2) the stages of development which the party should take. We agreed upon the complete disbanding of the Spartacists, and as a result were better able to organise. Such was the opinion of the Executive Committee.

Our first conflict arose out of the Italian question.

As I have already pointed out, Levi had an interview with Serratti in Livorno, the latter travelled to Berlin and Stuttgart, and wrote that they had the full support of the German Party. Five members of the Executive Committee resigned as a result of the Italian question. This was a big mistake and a breach of discipline. The Executive Committee considered it its duty to censure such a slip.

I would like to know, said Comrade Zinoviev, what the pre-war German Social Democratic Party would have done if some member of the party had resigned from the Executive Committee with such ease as did the comrades I have just named.

A separate report will be given on the late March rising of the German proletariat. Of course, many mistakes were made during this movement, but it was not a "Putsch," as many are inclined to regard it. It is foolish to call a movement in which over half a million workers participate a "Putsch."

It was a necessary armed fight for the German proletariat. We regard it as such and are not ashamed of it. We are proud of the German workers. This movement was a step forward. The question of our attitude to the C. L. P. G. (K. A. P. D.) was already solved at the Second Congress. In spite of the personnel of the E. C. of the C. L. P., we accepted this party as sympathisers to our movement in consideration of the fact that in its ranks were many really revolutionary workers. True they are few in number, they made and still make mistakes, but they still represent a revolutionary force. During the session which discussed the acceptance of the C.L.P. of G., I said that it would be impossible for a long time to come to have two parallel Communist parties in Germany, and proved that there were only two ways out. If the C. L. P. of G. would become a pure Communist party then its unity with the U.C.P.G. would be quite natural. If this did not happen the C. L. P. of G. would have to leave the International. However, some of the leaders of the C.L.P. of G.—said Zinoviev—became dangerous to our movement and took up the attitude of Crispian, who was for Soviet Russia at Halle, but now is its avowed enemy. We have just received a telegram from the C. L. P. of G., which states that they will

only remain in the Communist International if its programme remains "inviolable." A fine Comintern with "inviolable" parties. Then why not admit Serratti, why not make other parties "inviolable"? The decisions of the Comintern must be law for us. If the C. L. P. of G. leaves us then we still have the Communist Party of Germany, which has proved itself in warfare, and we need not doubt the German proletariat. The better workers of the C.L.P. of G. will follow the Comintern and will leave Gorter and Co., who threw them off the right track.

I will not speak of the scandalous pamphlet of Levi. It is not worth that much respect. Levi is excluded from the Comintern and I am sure the Congress will confirm this act.

THE FRENCH QUESTION

Speaking on the relations between the Comintern and the French Socialist Party, Comrade Zinoviev said it was decided to accept this party and take special consideration of the peculiarity of its position.

As you all know, Seratti complained of our concessions to the French party, as we considered its position different to that of the Italian Party. When Cachin and Frossard were in Moscow, the first split had not yet taken place, and the "Scheidemannists"—Thomas and Renaudel—were still in the party. We must bear in mind that the Communist group in the French party was still small, and most of its leaders were in prison. It was agreed with Renoul that Jean Longuet must be confronted with the question: "Does he accept the 21 points or not?" Longuet, of course, did not agree to the points, and the party was excluded. Those comrades who took part in the Tours Congress will remember that the E. C. of the Comintern addressed a telegram to the Congress at the last minute, which denounced Longuet as a reformist and an agent of capital, and demanded his exclusion.

This telegram was necessary. After the decision of the Tours Congress it was clear to us that the French Party is not Communist yet, it still retains centrist and semi-centrist elements, which spread their views in the party, the Press, and in Parliament. Nevertheless, it is our opinion that our attitude in relation to the French Party had to be different from our attitude towards the Italian Party. The development in France is progressing, whereas in Italy it is retrogressing. We concluded, with the best French comrades, a silent agreement, and gave them a few months to effect a realignment within the party and set the organising work on a firm footing. I think that the Executive acted wisely in displaying care and patience with regard to the French Party. But by no means does this mean that we are not permitted to say what we consider should be said. I am of opinion, said Zinoviev, that the so-called stupidity of the left is not so dangerous for the French Party. A great danger threatens it from the Opportunist Right elements. It is the old traditions existing in the French Party,

and which certain deputies have carried with them that are very dangerous, and we should try to combat them. It was here said that "Humanite" is not a Communistic paper yet, and that it is worse than the organ of the Right Independents, "Freiheit." This does not conform to facts. "Freiheit" is obviously a counter revolutionary newspaper. "Humanite," in the worst case, is not quite Communistic, but progresses whereas "Freiheit" retrogresses, and carries on a sordid propaganda against the only proletarian state. The French Party has not yet taken up a definite line on the question of the trade unions. But, in spite of its weakness, in spite of the bad habits which certain deputies have carried over from the old Party, we have confidence in the Party. We now have a Party with over 100,000 members, with a spirit different from the old one. But we do not close our eyes to its weakness. The opportunist tendencies are our greatest foes. We must defeat them. This is what we must constantly tell the workers.

Comrade Zinoviev then continued with the Czecho-Slovakian question:—Here we have a powerful mass Party, built up from excellent proletarian material. The semi-centrist tendency of Comrade Smeral we should criticise openly. It is not improbable that we shall have to put up with a respite here, as proved the case in Germany. We hope that here the centrist tendency will be overcome as well.

The process of differentiation affected the Scandinavian countries as well during the past year. Norway has not yet thoroughly freed itself of centrism, but there we have a strong and healthy Party. In Sweden the Party is cutting its path from pacifism to Communism.

During this year we have not only accomplished splits, but have effected unions as well. In England we have united the formerly dissenting eight groups into a united British Communist Party. The same in America. The Communist movement there is steadily growing stronger. But it must become more of a mass movement and more legal. Splits in the Social Democratic Party and the unification of the Communist Party took place in Austria, Denmark and Belgium, and are of great importance in principle, particularly in Belgium, where the movement depends mainly on the trade unions, in which the Communists are now penetrating. In Switzerland the Left has quitted the Party and joined with the Young Communist Party. The Communist movement is gaining ground in France as well as in Switzerland; a split has taken place in Roumania; and the negotiations we have conducted with the part that broke off, have been crowned with success, and we hope to have a good Party there. Okh, who stood up for the III. International, has been arrested by the Rumanian Government, a split with the centrists has taken place in Jugo-Slavia. Should there prove to be any centrist survivors there, we shall fight them. "Reformism is a specific poison for the proletarian movement," to use the apt expression of our French author-comrade, Barbusse.

In Finland the Communist Party is working illegally. But in spite of a rampant White Terror, the movement is growing ever wider and stronger.

Describing the revolutionary movement in the Near and Far East, Comrade Zinoviev referred to Japan, and said that the workers' movement there is now in the same position as that of the Russian Movement before 1905. He pointed out that many trade unions are organised, and the publicity department is highly developed. Recently, for instance, they published the works of Marx. It is necessary to turn our particular attention to the Near and Far East.

Reviewing the activities of the Comintern for the past year, Comrade Zinoviev said there is hardly a country where splits, the process of uniting and purifying the Party from the opportunistic elements, has not taken place. He asked all Comrades whose countries he did not mention, or whose countries he did not characterise fully, to excuse him.

Further, Comrade Zinoviev spoke on the results of the Second Conference of Women Communists, and gave information on the forthcoming Congress of the Trade Unions, and the Congress of the International Union of Young Communists, which are to follow the Congress of the Comintern, and will, he predicted, be of great significance as counter-action to Amsterdam, and which will fulfil part of the work of the Third International. It is, therefore, necessary to increase a hundredfold the support of the Young Communists in all countries, and our Congress must give the question its particular attention. The Young Communist Movement did some brilliant work this year, and it is necessary to give them greater support.

The struggle with Amsterdam is the centre of attention.

The chief question is that of the trade unions. Comrade Zinoviev continued :—It is necessary to prepare international action; what is wanted is international co-ordination. Let us, therefore, commence with reserve.

We have suffered, not from over-centralisation, but from lack of it.

"Among the masses, the creation of strong sections, and strong centres, and iron proletarian discipline for the overthrow of the bourgeoisie." Such are the problems.

The report of Comrade Zinoviev covered three years' work, and many times during his speech he was interrupted by applause. This speech ended amid long and continuous applause.

After the report of Comrade Zinoviev, Comrade Radek was permitted to speak on a statement not included in the agenda.

Comrade Radek said, "In Germany yesterday, Comrade Max Höltz was sentenced to lifelong imprisonment. His name is well known to all German workers. He is a member of the Communist Labour Party of Germany. Höltz's tactics were not our tactics. From March, 1920, he went his own way, on his own responsibility, and, at his own risk organised the struggle against the bourgeoisie. To-day, when the German bourgeoisie condemns this unfailing and sincere revolutionary as a common

bandit, it is our duty to mark this act of white terror of the bourgeoisie, in special relation to the proletariat. Höltz is a petty railway official, and previous to the war was not a Socialist. But he was taught by the war the Communist contemplation of the world. He became a hero of the revolutionary class struggle of the German proletariat. Much that he did was not in accordance with our aims, but his hatred for the bourgeoisie—is our hatred.”

The resolution was then proposed and carried unanimously.

FIFTH SESSION.

Comrade Köenen opened the Fifth Session at 7.45 p.m. On the order of the day was the debate on Zinoviev's Report. The first to have the floor was Comrade Hempel, the representative of the Communist Labour Party of Germany.

Comrade Hempel, said Comrade Zinoviev has an old habit of grouping us together with Seratti, Dittman, and other opportunist elements. We protest most energetically against this. All our history and all our actions prove the contrary. It cannot be pointed out concretely in what way we are guilty of opportunism. As to our program and tactics, we shall have an opportunity of speaking upon them on other points of the agenda. Here I will limit myself to a determined protest. Comrade Zinoviev has attacked the pamphlet, “The Path of Dr. Levi—the Way of the United Communist Party of Germany.” We declare that this pamphlet expresses the opinion not of Gorter, but of the Communist Labour Party in general, and we collectively share the responsibility for it. We are by no means preaching, “the struggle without the masses,” as Comrade Zinoviev tries to prove, but with the masses, but not by such methods, however, as were adopted by the Second Congress in its 21 points. Comrade Zinoviev said that the Communist Labour Party of Germany will soon be in the ranks of the enemies of Soviet Russia, and proves this by citing quotations. I can also cite other passages from the same issue. The point is, however, that the masses contained in the Communist parties are good for demonstrations in favour of Soviet Russia, but are not yet fit for revolutionary action. We are fighting for proletarian Russia, and we shall not be beaten from our path, even though we were to quit the Comintern for its opportunist character. In conclusion the speaker read an official declaration on behalf of the Communist Labour Party of Germany.

After Comrade Hempel,

Comrade Frölich, from the United Communist Party of Germany, was granted the floor. He said:

When the Executive decided at the time to accept the Communist Labour Party into the Third International—the United Communist Party protested against it, and considered that there was not sufficient grounds for admitting it into the Third International either on account of its numerical size, or of the degree of its activity. It represents a sectarian tendency

not only on questions of organisation, but on fundamental questions of the Communist movement. This was expressed in relation to the trade unions. For example, it called the tactics of revolutionising the labour masses and of rousing them to action, opportunistic. It is quite incapable of appreciating the political and economic situations, and consequently draws wrong conclusions. Thus it has declared that the question of reparations can only interest the bourgeoisie and not the proletariat. They do not comprehend to what extent these reparations promote the revolutionising of the proletariat. In March it appeared to us possible to work conjointly with this party, but we were cruelly deceived. First of all that party manifested a complete inability to appreciate the March events. This is attested to by Gorter's pamphlet, in which it is stated that the March uprising was a Putsch. (Protests by representatives of the C.L.P.)

In reply to the protests Comrade Freilich asserted that phrase is printed in Gorter's pamphlet. Thus the C.L.P. is of one mind with Paul Levi. Further, in connection with the Red Army's offensive against Warsaw, the C.L.P. declares that it expressed its solidarity with the Red Army by setting up the Soviet system in two cities. Simultaneously, it asserts, the revolutionary action entered upon by the German proletariat on a national scale was nothing else but a Putsch. We know that the failure of the March uprising was due to a considerable degree to the lack of discipline and centralism in the United Communist Party. But the Communist Labour Party asserts the exact opposite, namely, that the failure was chiefly the result of too much centralism and the suppression of the individual will of the members. After the March uprising the Communist Labour Party holds the view of sabotaging capitalism. Naturally, this party will never be able to pursue a really revolutionary policy, it will, on the contrary, counteract the revolutionary action that will be undertaken by the United Communist Party. We should under no circumstances accept this sectarian organisation in the Communist International. We should say to those working men of the Communist Labour Party who have shown in deed their courage and loyalty to the revolution—With the Communist Labour Party or with the Third International.

Comrade Roland Holst was the next to speak.

I wish to speak, said Comrade Holst, about the pamphlet of Gorter from which Zinoviev quoted yesterday in the absence of the author. Comrade Zinoviev has stated the affair in such a manner as to make the impression that Gorter is endeavouring to institute a new teaching on national Marxism. This is incorrect, merely from the fact that Marxism is the teaching of the International Proletariat. I do not think that all Gorter's views are exhaustively expressed in that pamphlet. That probably has been done in his open letter to Lenin. Further, Comrade Holst said: Comrade Zinoviev reproached me yesterday with collaborating in Gorter's pamphlet, and remarked that I supported the point of view of the C.L.P. I must object to this; first of all, no ban has yet been put on collaboration

in Communist publications, and secondly, I agree on many points with the program of the Communist Labour Party, because I respect that party for its revolutionary enthusiasm and inflexible will. I hope to continue to collaborate in the organs of the Communist Labour Party of Germany.

I wish and hope from the bottom of my heart that the two German Communist Parties will be united, for I know from experience that the cause of the revolution suffers when a few dissenting parties exist in one and the same country, even though they both pursue one aim.

Holland is a small country with a small revolutionary mass movement. That is why separate individuals like Gorter or Pannekok play such an important rôle, and that is the reason they are obeyed. But Gorter and Pannekok are the most brilliant heads of the Dutch labour movement, and what has been said here in connection with Gorter's pamphlet is not a tribute to them.

Comrade Neiman, speaking for the United Communist Party of Germany, said in his opinion Comrade Zinoviev's criticism of the C.L.P. was quite just. It completely coincides with that of last year, and it has only to be regretted that after the situation was so clear the Communist Labour Party was accepted into the Comintern as a sympathetic party. If this blunder had not been made the revolutionary part of the C.L.P. would have come over to the United Communist Party. The Communist Labour Party is not only a political party, for it has its own separate trade unions and consequently acts as a trade union organisation. Thus, a party sympathising with the Comintern, to the great satisfaction of the trade union bureaucracy, weakens the influence of the Comintern on the trade unions in Germany.

The Congress must adopt a definite attitude towards the C.L.P. of Germany, and finish with this indefinite state of affairs.

Comrade Ceton (Holland) said that he agreed with the words of Comrade Roland Holst, and considered it necessary to make a statement on behalf of the Dutch Communist Party. Probably one would imagine the Dutch Party agreed with the tactics of the C.L.P. of Germany. It would, however, be difficult to find another such party on the continent which so consciously carried out its work, while using the tactics of the Communist International. Relations between the C.L.P. of Germany and Holland were quite insignificant.

Comrade Mihaliak, of Poland, spoke on the mutual relations of goodwill between the Polish Communist Party and the Executive Council of the Comintern. Up to the last few months it was absolutely impossible for Poland to have communication with the outside world, as the country was nothing but an armed camp. In spite of this the more important questions dealing with our movement, including the problems of mass parties and trade unions, were settled between ourselves and the Comintern. Of course, the illegal position of our party does not give us the possibility of joining a mass party. However, knowing the importance of mass organisations and the value

of influencing the trade unions, we have devoted all our energy to those two tasks. With regard to the other questions touched upon in the report, such as the Italian question, the Tours split, and the attitude towards Clara Zetkin, etc., we are in complete agreement with the Executive Committee. Together with all that has been said, we still have our own specific questions, the chief of which is in connection with the nearness of Poland to Soviet Russia and the Ukraine. We had to face the question of the war between Russia and Poland, and in 1919, when the social patriots raised a hue and cry against the threatened advance of the Red Army in Poland, we declared that we welcomed the entry of the Red Army into Poland. When the Red Army did really advance, all our organisations, without exception, greeted this army as the army of the Polish working class. In conclusion Comrade Mihaliak said that the Polish delegation endorsed the policy of the Executive Committee, and would bring forward a resolution to that effect.

Comrade Zerman, of the C.L.P.G., followed Mihaliak: "The question of the Third Communist International is not so simple to us as many of our comrades here are inclined to think. And I am very sorry that the opposition which can be and must be fruitful, is not altogether taken advantage of by the Comintern." The speaker illustrated his point of view with the activities of the C.L.P.G., and finished his speech stating that he had full confidence in the position which his party had taken up.

Comrade Gennari (Italy) then spoke. "I am in complete agreement with the attitude of the Executive Committee on the Centrist tactics of Seratti. The documents published by the E.C. on this question represent very little of what could be said of the activities of the Italian Party. As the Congress will hear another speech on the Italian Party, I wish to deal with another centrist, namely, Comrade Smeral. We understand the Czecho-Slovakian working class, its revolutionary spirit and its leaders. But we require a guarantee that the Communist Party of Czecho-Slovakia will not be confronted with a situation similar to the Italian. The Executive Committee put too much faith in Smeral, in spite of the fact that he actively supported Austrian imperialism. Smeral came to Moscow after the war, and at a time when the whole of the Czecho-Slovakian proletariat had lost faith in him. This self-same Smeral, who said that to be a Communist one must really be a social democrat with only the ultimate object of being a Communist, i.e., a person similar to Seratti, and of the Czecho-Slovakian Socialist Party, he demanded that the party should remain Socialist. He climbed down when he heard the decision of the Executive Committee on this question. In January, after the December strikes, two of the editors of 'Rude Pravo' wrote against Soviet Russia and the International. The Communists demanded their resignation, but Smeral took them under his protection. We hope that the activities of Smeral will be cut short, as were those of Seratti. Hence we propose that Smeral be no longer

leader of the party, that a manifesto be issued to the Czechoslovakian proletariat explaining the situation, and that an appeal be sent out to the world proletariat urging them to fight against all centrists and opportunists."

Comrade Heckert, of the U.C.P. of Germany, followed **Comrade Gennari**.

"The Italian questions," he said, "created a crisis in the German Communist Party. Seratti promised the Second Congress, which trusted him, that on his return to Italy he would carry on a revolutionary agitation in favour of the Communist International. But the Congress made a mistake. Seratti changed. No sooner did he return than he began to sabotage the decisions of the Comintern. He wrote an article on the 18th of December in the scientific journal of the right independents, 'The Socialist,' edited by Breitscheid, where he declared: 'It is foolish to think that the revolution in Russia was caused by the working masses. Not at all. It was created by a mere handful of Soviet bourgeoisie without the participation of the people.'"

Comrade Heckert considered such a statement a crime against Soviet Russia, done purposely to undermine the Third International and to praise the centrist Turatti, who is both a leader of the masses and a member of Parliament. As regards Levi, who was sent as a fully empowered delegate to Livorno, by the German Party, Heckert said that he conducted himself shamefully. When the question of "the Third International or Turatti," was finally raised, Levi declared that a split in the Executive Committee was necessary, as its policy was divided up into small water-tight compartments. When the Council of the German Party decided that the split in Livorno was necessary, Levi cursed the Soviet and spoke ironically of Moscow.

Speaking of Seratti, Heckert mentions another hero among Italian opportunists, namely, D'Aragona. The latter participated in the Amsterdam Congress, and in working out a manifesto full of hate against Soviet Russia. These are the heroes in the Italian Party, whose expulsion was opposed by Levi. Perhaps the Executive might have committed a grave error, perhaps it was an "unjust expulsion." But listen to the "Avanti" of the 16th June. "Our Comrades Constantino Lazzari, Mardon, and Riboldi, left for the Third Congress of the Communist International, to represent the Italian Socialist Party. Our delegation is not as hopeful as last year, and does not carry the enthusiasm of our party to the leaders of the International movement. In France the Communist movement has gone more to the right than have the Italian Socialists. In Germany, owing to the grave mistakes committed by the Executive of the Comintern, a crisis was brought about in the party, upon which many hopes were pinned. In Russia, if our information is correct, there are no indications of any reaction against lack of understanding and stubbornness. All this will not reflect itself upon the Congress, but in the midst of the International there is a growing dissatisfaction with the personal dictatorship,

which actually is not a dictatorship of the proletariat, but a parody of it. Our comrades, together with Clara Zetkin, Paul Levi, and many others, will express the growing dissatisfaction.

Comrade Heckert said that we must beware of such elements, being fully in agreement with Comrade Gennari, and with regard to Czecho-Slovakia, he approved the policy and tactics of the Executive for the past year, and recommends to Congress the approval of same.

Comrade Malzhan, of Germany, then spoke. He dealt with the March revolt. "We, who are called reformists and opportunists," he said, "foresaw the danger. The Central Executive Committee and the whole party supported the theory of revolutionary demonstrations. It was our duty to fight such a theory. If Comrade Zinoviev was in Germany, he would have our point of view. When the Congress takes up the discussion of tactics, we will speak more of the March revolt. It is the duty of every delegation to speak openly on the results of direct revolutionary action. Comrade Zinoviev stated in his report that half a million workers participated in the March revolt. If, after the revolt, the Executive Committee had come to Germany to get acquainted with the situation and its particulars, and then had stated—"Yes, you acted correctly," then we would have to submit. But the Executive gathered its information from papers and reports of the Central Committee. We have to state, then, that the information you have is unfounded. If we wish to strive in the future toward real revolutionary action, we must take into consideration the obvious mistakes of the March revolt."

Comrade Munzenberg, in the name of the International of Young Communists, declared their complete agreement with the policy and work of the Executive Committee of the Comintern, and declared the readiness of the Young Communists to give their full support.

Reviewing the position of Italy, he pointed out that of the 42,000 organised revolutionary youth of Italy, 40,000 were against Seratti. He spoke of the Communist Labour Party of Germany, and firmly rejected the attempts of the party to represent matters so that it should seem as if the Young Communists are on its side. The International of the Young Communists on that question is decidedly on the side of the Executive Committee of the Comintern. We must loudly proclaim here, that we are not taking any part whatsoever in the so-called struggle against Moscow, and that the Communist International may rely on us as a loyal fighting detachment.

Comrade Radek (E.C.) spoke after Comrade Münzenberg.

As a member of the Executive Committee, I listened very attentively to the debate, and with growing relief, for I thought that when the representatives of Western and Eastern Europe, the Near and Far East, rose to speak they would descend with all their might on the Executive Committee. Instead, the debates centred chiefly round the Communist Labour Party of Germany, the Italian question, and around other very interesting matters, which had nothing to do with the charges against the

Executive Committee. There are present, for instance, the representatives of the opposition of the Communist Labour Party of Germany. Comrade Neiman evidently thought that he came here for the simple object of debating on the Communist Labour Party of Germany, and Comrade Malzhan with the object to establish the right number of workers that took part in the March events in Germany. But this number, comrades, should not be allowed to pass. If you do not intend to say anything in connection with the Executive, then I will put some questions to you: What if 20,000 workers took part in the March events? That, comrades, you can discuss with your neighbours at the table. What happened then? A Bakunist outburst, or proletarian action? You, who have decided on common action with Levi, have trod underfoot the Executive Committee of the Comintern, before the world proletariat, accusing us of wanting to commit excesses all over Europe. You must reply. Do you think that the Executive Committee made a mistake? (Comrade Malzhan, from his place, interrupted: "You cannot say everything.") Your first duty, continued Radek, was to admit that you had committed a political error by acting in common with Levi. Then you could in comradely fashion discuss with us any question you pleased. This was your first duty. I repeat, at present there is not the question of the German Party, but of the Executive Committee. The question of Levi, is not simply a question of Party discipline, but of the tactics of the Comintern. Levi himself says: "This is not a question of violating Party discipline, but essentially of the March events. Either this is not a Bakunist outburst, and then I might be expelled from the Party, or it is a Bakunist outburst, then you, the Central Committee of the Party, ought to be expelled!" The Executive Committee has acted in common with the Central Committee of the Party, and you must decide whether the action of the Executive Committee was correct or otherwise. It is not necessary to talk as Comrade Malzhan did, as if the question dealt with the Party adopting the tactics of a growing offensive. Comrade Zetkin wrote and spoke at the time in the strain as did the Comintern, and it is a thousand pities that you inclined towards Comrades Freilich and Thalheimer, and not towards Comrade Zetkin, your leader, who spoke of your opposition in that direction.

I will now deal with the Italian question. Here it is also essential that a reply be given, whether the Executive acted right in connection with the Seratti group. Here we have the representatives of the Italian Socialist Party. It will be of importance to hear what they have to say, but it is also important that they should hear what we have to tell them, and how we estimate their conduct. Seratti affirmed at Livorno that the Executive Committee wants only small groups, and is against mass organisation. That is not true. We are not against mass organisation, but we demand revolutionary mass organisation, and if we acted wrongly on the Italian question because a large number of workers from the Italian Party followed Seratti, then we have acted doubly wrong in connection with Germany; because a far larger number stayed with the Independents than

did with Seratti. At the same time, five comrades resigned from the Central Committee of the German Party because they did not agree with the conduct of the Executive Committee on the Italian question. Were these comrades right, or was the Executive Committee right? This question must be answered clearly here, and not passed over in silence. The Executive Committee separated the question of Gorter, because theirs is a small country and they have no revolutionary mass movement. If it is a case of finding excuses for them, then you could find one sooner in the fact, that one of them is an astronomer, and for a long time has not met a living proletarian and the other is a semi-philosopher, a semi-poet, and deals more in the "phenomena of the spirit." The trouble, however, is here, that when the proletariat sees here such an honest revolutionary as Hempel, who steps out on the tribune, with all the passion of a limited sect, it only creates disorganisation in their fighting ranks and sets them a bad example of infringement of revolutionary proletarian discipline, in the name of their sectional frame of mind. That is why a categorical decision is demanded on this question, and the categorical opinion of the Congress on the question of all the actions of the E. C. of the Comintern.

After Comrade Radek's speech the sitting closed about midnight.

SIXTH SESSION.

The session opened at 12.30 p.m. Comrade Loriot's proposal to unite the next point on the agenda, viz., the German and the Italian questions, with the discussion on the report of the Executive, in view of the arrival of the delegation from the Italian Socialist Party, was accepted unanimously. Furthermore, it was agreed, in order to avoid unnecessary repetition, to allow only one representative each of the Communist Party of Italy and the Italian Socialist Party to speak on this question, and that other delegates only take part in the discussion in the event of important questions arising.

The representative of the opposition of the U.C.P., Germany :

Comrade Malzhan was allowed to make a statement. He repudiated Comrade Radek's assertion that he evaded the question of the March rising and that he regarded this question as purely one of tactics. He for that reason repeatedly declared in his speech that he will speak about this in detail when the question of tactics is examined. At all events, he said, I must assert that during the March rising we completely carried out our duties and obligations.

Comrade Radek, in reply to Comrade Malzhan, said "The representative of the opposition of the C.P.G. puts words into my mouth that I did not use. I did not accuse Malzhan, Neiman, or Zetkin with having sabotaged the March rising. On the contrary, this accusation was levelled against Frederick Müller and Daumig. Daumig himself declared in writing that his conscience would not permit him to take part in the March rising.

I simply wish to say that neither Malzhan nor Neiman repudiated the declaration of Daumig."

Comrade Leipzig, a visitor representing the Left Wing of the Belgian Party, was then given the floor. He said, "since the Executive Committee of the Comintern sent us the invitation to the Congress, our fraction has split off from the Belgian Party, and we hope that at the next Congress we shall be able to take part as representatives of an independent party." Comrade Leipzig described the difficulties with which his fraction had to contend. He reminded the Congress that the heroes of the Second International, Vandervelde, Huysmans, and De-Brouckere, are fighting the Communists in Belgium. Vandervelde particularly persecutes the Communists, and as Minister of Justice he has the whole apparatus of the State at his service. Huysmans makes hostile speeches in the Chamber against Soviet Russia and the Communist International, and De-Brouckere circulates faked photographs for the purpose of discrediting the Soviet Government. The Communist mass movement in Belgium, continued Comrade Leipzig, is yet young, and it is necessary to establish regular connection with the Comintern, as up till now connection was only maintained through the neighbouring countries. The French and German comrades, in the persons of Valliant Coutourier and Clara Zetkin rendered considerable assistance to the Belgian comrades. All the evidence goes to show that the Communist movement will develop rapidly in Belgium because its industrial base adjoins the industrial centres of Germany. Comrade Leipzig considered it necessary to inform the Congress that the Belgian Communist Party simply does harm to the Communist movement. In the "*Ouvrier Communiste*" an article was published, for example, attacking mass action and advocating the old reformist method. This party also, without taking into consideration the political conditions prevailing in Germany, opposed the participation in Parliament.

The discussion on Comrade Zinoviev's report was then resumed by :—

Comrade Markovitch (Jugo-Slavia), who dealt on two points in the report affecting the Communist Party of Jugo-Slavia. "Comrade Zinoviev," he said, "stated that a considerable right wing existed in our party, which had been lopped off, and that the Executive still fear that this wing may sprout again. But this fear is totally ungrounded. The Communist Party of Jugo-Slavia came from the womb of the Serbian Socialist Party, which for twenty years conducted an unceasing revolutionary struggle. Possibly there is not another party in Europe which so hermetically sealed its ranks against the penetration of reformist elements. When the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy took place, the Serbian bourgeoisie inherited considerable wealth, but the Socialist party inherited the worst Austrian and to a great degree Hungarian opportunism. We conducted a severe struggle against them, and in a short period we conquered them; now there cannot be any suggestion of opportunism in the ranks of the Jugo-Slavian Party. From the very first day of its existence the Communist

Party revealed its loyalty to the revolution, and when the Jugo-Slav bourgeoisie endeavoured to intervene in the affairs of Hungary in order to overthrow the Soviet Government, not a single Jugo-Slav soldier took part, whereas thousands of Jugo-Slav workmen joined the Hungarian Red Army, all as a consequence of our agitation and influence with the masses. We expelled Luptchovitch, who had been conducting revolutionary work both before and during the war, immediately he revealed his intentions of diverting the party from the true Communist path. In spite of what Comrade Zinoviev said, we have kept in touch with the E.C., and during the last five months we have sent three reports, which were subsequently published in the "Communist International." Comrade Markovitch then dealt with the condition under which the party had to work during the last few months.

The bourgeoisie proclaimed its dictatorship. It understood what unfortunately is not everywhere understood by the proletariat, namely, that at the present time there can be only a dictatorship of the proletariat or a dictatorship of the bourgeoisie. There is no third way. The party was forced underground. The same situation obtains in Bulgaria and Roumania, and in future we can expect it in all the other capitalist countries. The fact that the bourgeoisie is adopting new determined modes of struggle was unfortunately not mentioned in the report.

As regards the Italian question, we must say that for us it is quite clear and comprehensible, as we have experienced three splits ourselves, and are near neighbours of Italy. We must say that we started to combat Seratti before the Executive Committee did. The centrists all the time pointed out that they were supported by the Executive of the Comintern, and that we, the Jugo-Slav Communists, were anarchists. The split that took place in the Italian Socialist Party had no moral nor organisational preparation. This was due to the mistake both of the Executive and of the Italian comrades. It was the duty of the Executive to adopt the most determined measures immediately upon the appearance of the centrist tendencies in the Italian party. What took place at the Livorno Congress may then have been avoided. In our opinion that split took place too late.

Passing over to the German party, Comrade Markovitch said that on the one hand there was displayed the incontestable revolutionary spirit of the German proletariat, and on the other hand the weakness of the leaders. The March uprising was undoubtedly a progressive fact, but the leaders of the party were unable to appreciate the situation at the time. As regards Levi, it can be said that if decisive measures had been adopted towards him before the appearance of his articles a crisis would have been avoided.

In concluding, Comrade Markovitch seconded Zinoviev's appeal to the delegates to send their best representatives into the Executive, so that the latter might become a real General Staff of the World Revolution.

Comrade Kolarov (Bulgaria) approved the report in all details. He wished merely to say a few words about the leadership of the international movement. We have always, he said, supported the idea of centralisation, and we continue to support it, however much the bourgeoisie may cry about the Moscow dictators. We therefore justify the determined conduct of the Executive in reference to the Italian, French, Czecho-Slovak, and German questions. Comrade Kolarov considered, however, that the Executive lagged behind on the question of reparations, and that is why the French and German Parties acted without co-ordination, Comrade Kolarov referred to the lack of unanimity in the French Communist Party. We expected, said he, that the French Communists would take up a more clearly-defined and determined position in relation to the Imperialist French Government, whose generals are the masters of the destinies of the Balkans. The party does not seem to have a clear and defined position, particularly on the question of the rôle of the trade unions. It is necessary to improve the organisation of the French Party, and send the best men there.

The floor was then granted to Comrade Clara Zetkin.

Clara Zetkin said, Comrades, it is three days since Zinoviev started to expound his indictment, the reading of which Comrade Radek continued yesterday. Concerning the Italian question, which was the cause of my resigning from the Central Committee, I must say the following: From the speeches of Zinoviev, Radek, Heckert, and others, I received the impression that this question was being too broadly discussed. It should have been considered as a question of the Italian proletariat, which, to our regret, has not taken a firm stand ideologically on the platform of Communism. Much was spoken here about the treacherous conduct of Serratti. As for myself, comrades, personalities do not count. Those masses which, unfortunately, still follow Serratti, were important to me. Of course, the September events proved to us that the Italian Party did not understand the situation fully enough to be able to seize political power.

In my opinion it was for the E.C. to have taken the necessary steps of starting the struggle immediately. Then we could have gauged the revolutionary development of our party. But Serratti was not responsible, he was at that time on his way to Italy from Moscow. Neither can one blame the majority of Serratti's group, as the party we admired and were proud of was not yet prepared as regards organisation and principles. In my opinion, if the Italian masses were revolutionary, they would have found a way out of their vacillating position, and would have entered the political struggle over the heads of their leaders (Heckert interjecting, "That was the excuse of our Scheidemannists for their change in 1914").

Comrades, it is a historic fact that the leaders stand on the same plane as the masses. Of course, the conduct of the leaders may be more decisive, but more often the conscious proletariat replaces its old leaders with new. When the question of seceding from Serratti's group came up, many difficulties cropped up from the fact that he had the support of the wide proletarian

masses, who in the past and during the present honestly sought the path to Communism and the Third International. I supported this not because I was inclined to centrist or semi-centrist politics, but because I know that many of the masses were organised in trade unions and co-operative societies, which could have been made use of in the fight against reformism and opportunism.

That is why I supported the attempt to allow the so-called "Unitarist" group of Serratti to remain in the party, of course excluding Serratti. I was convinced that even if Serratti did remain, he would either have to lead a straight policy in a strong Communist Party or else remove his mask, so that every worker could read his face. That is why I think that the representatives of the E.C. of the Comintern should have gone to Livorno and discussed the situation with our friends of the left wing and the supporters of Serratti. This would have given the Communist party the chance of attracting into its ranks many thousands and tens of thousands of workers. The resolution of the E.C. demanded the immediate exclusion of Serratti. It declared that Serratti had committed a great mistake in not proposing, during the six months after the Second Congress, a method of causing a split and then uniting at Livorno the 14,000 group of Serratti with the Communists and 68,000 workers. The resolution still further declared that there was only one Communist party in Italy, namely, the Italian Communist Party. Comrades, that this resolution was not centrist was proved by the fact that the E.C. of the Comintern unanimously accepted it at one of its sessions. When I returned from Germany, I was told that it would be necessary to re-open the Italian question for two reasons (1) because Paul Levi at one of the party sessions at Berlin spoke of the resolution in the spirit of Serratti; (2) because a representative of the E.C. of the Comintern had arrived at Livorno, and declared that the tactics that had been followed up till then were out of date and must be changed. We had another resolution proposed by Thalheimer and Stoecker, and rejected it by the majority of the E.C. But the old resolution was again adopted by the majority after I had worded it still more definitely, so that it could not be misconstrued in Serratti's sense. We must not forget in this connection the statement made by the representative of the E.C. of the Comintern in Italy to the effect that this resolution was sufficient.

I have no objection to taking the field against him, but not his entire group, as this would hit those workers who wanted to join the Communist Party. Such warfare against the whole group would be a political blunder. I learned in Berlin that Serratti was negotiating with the members of the E. C. to send a special commission to Italy to co-operate with the Italian Communist Party for the immediate expulsion of Turatti and pave the way for a split. I wanted to fix this in writing and send it to the E. C. so that Comrade Kurt Geyer could take it along to Moscow. I told Serratti that if he really wished to come to terms with the Communist party and the Comintern, it would not be sufficient to act through the E. C. of our party.

He should try to get the E. C. of the Italian party to apply to Moscow. Serratti agreed. Serratti, however, did not keep his word. The representative of the E. C. in Italy said that the Italian split should serve as an example for others and a means of cleaning in the French party as well. He thought that what mattered was not a mass party, but to have a small but pure party. He definitely stated that the party should not be made up of raw recruits, but of trained members able to find their bearing in any given situation. The same representative said to me personally afterwards: "Comrade Zetkin, your party, too, has become too bulky, it must be thinned down." I think on the contrary, that our party is still too small. It needs not only numerical growth, but improvement in quality as well. The task before the Communist Party is to convert quantity into quality. And so, on the strength of what the representative of the E. C. of the Comintern said to me, I put the question of the mass party versus a small propaganda sect. It did not occur to me that the above representative could be guilty of such an irresponsible action in face of such a grave and responsible situation as obtained at Livorno and in Berlin.

I must add that I never feared to be left in a minority. This was the case in the question of Parliamentary action when my fellow comrades in the E. C. failed to side with me and I was forced to shoulder unaided the weight of the struggle. I ask whether any one can say I have, during my activity, extending for 40 years, ever shirked any work or duty. That is why in view of the gravity of the situation, I thought it impossible to stay on the E.C. My withdrawal from this committee is looked upon as a breach of discipline. But I would not have withdrawn if this could have weakened the party. I thought that under the given circumstances I was out of place, and instead of being an element of strength, I became a factor of weakness. I admit that Serratti's politics is reformist and opportunist. Does the Communist party mean to fight down the Fascisti white guards by sermons? Force must be met by force. In my opinion it is not enough that the Congress demand that the 21 conditions be carried out. It is imperative to break with Turatti. I think that the case of Levi is not merely a question of discipline, but also one of policy. It can be correctly gauged only in connection with the entire political situation and tactics of the Communist Labour Party of Germany, especially in connection with the March outbreaks. Else we lose track of the entire historical background. I always maintained that I did not share every word in his pamphlet, but I do not accept the verdict passed by some on the merits of his pamphlet. I have nothing against the proposition of the Congress; after sifting the question in connection with the above historical background, we should right now decide one way or another in the Levi case.

At the conclusion of Comrade Zetkin's speech the Congress adjourned.

SEVENTH SESSION.

The Session opened at 6 p.m., and the discussion on the report of Comrade Zinoviev was resumed.

Comrade Friesland (United Communist Party of Germany) devoted his speech to a criticism of the so-called opposition in the German party. "Comrade Zetkin's temperament," he said, "was stronger than her political memory, and her statement here of a number of political questions has no relation to the actual facts in Germany. I, too, know very well that the comrades grouped around Comrade Malzhan had considerable time to collect statistics during the March events, and to tour from factory to factory, not for the purpose of calling the workers to battle, but in order to inform them where strikes are not taking place." "We must understand," he further said, "in what lay the error of the March event. I am by no means inclined to assert that no mistakes have been made. There is no party which would have made no mistakes in a fight like that. Our main error lay in that our old Central Committee was unable to organise a militant party. Instead of organising the fighting power of the party the old Central Committee was absorbed in such questions as to whether Rakosy desired to split the German party, and should one oppose the Asiatic Bolshevik influence in the Comintern by Western European influence. In accordance with this Levi conducted a sort of behind-the-scenes policy. I can assert with confidence that this behind-the-scenes campaign has been conducted from the first day of the Second Congress."

Comrade Overstraaten (Communist Party of Belgium) dealt with the speech of Comrade Leipig, who spoke of the difficulties confronting the Communist Party of Belgium. Comrade Overstraaten said that the difficulties did not consist in the persons of Vandervelde, Huysmans, etc., but in the whole spirit of reformism which has penetrated the mass organisations of the proletariat, the trade unions and the co-operative societies. The bureaucracy holding the reins of these organisations tightly in their hands are crushing the Communist movement. Immediately after the conclusion of peace we concentrated all our efforts in the trade unions. Although at the Second Congress of the Comintern our party opposed Parliamentary action, nevertheless, after the Congress had decided this question, the party unquestionably submitted to the decision. Speaking of the left wing of the Socialist Party, Comrade Overstraaten pointed out that up till now it has not paid the necessary attention to work on a mass scale. Of course, alliance with the left wing is possible and desirable, and he hoped that as a result of the fusion of both parties the Belgian Communist Party will considerably increase in strength.

Comrade Köenen (Germany) said that the rise of the Communist movement in Germany began after the Kapp Putsch, when the workers understood the necessity for a united party.

At that time half-a-million revolutionary proletarians crystallized themselves, as it were, and in their strong will and courage proved that they were real revolutionaries. These workers placed all their hopes on the Central Committee, but they were deceived by the five who subsequently resigned from the Central Committee. Levi not only strove to weaken their confidence in the Communist International, but strove also to deliver a blow at the party. The question of the Italian party was discussed on such a plane, that it simultaneously dealt a blow to the Italian party, to the Young United Communist Party of Germany, and to the Executive Committee of the International. This was not all. When the former leaders left the party and carried confusion among the masses, the new leaders hurriedly attempted to organise the party and prepare the proletariat for the struggle. The party had hardly managed to organise its forces, when suddenly, as a result of the provocation of Hörsing, it was compelled to enter an active struggle. Then these gentlemen began to speak about their conscience and their responsibility. Who, if not they, were responsible for the fact that the party was not sufficiently prepared. After having left the party at the critical moment they began to speak of mistakes, but the party boldly entered the struggle. Even this was not enough for them. With their connivance, Levi's pamphlet was published. This was a blow in the back to the party. However, in spite of their propaganda, they did not succeed in undermining us, and not a single district attached itself to their point of view.

Of course, we do not speak of individual persons. This is the Golgotha of the whole party, and if after thousands of sacrifices, the party held its ground and yet increased its strength, it proved that it has a strong and sound basis.

Comrade Zetkin said that Serratti made certain promises to her upon which she concluded that she must resign from the Central Committee. It would be interesting to know why Comrade Zetkin had more faith in the promises of Serratti made in private conversation than with the German Communist Party Comrade Zetkin says that she would never act against her conscience and never agree to do that for which she cannot bear the responsibility. Of course, if the interests of the party demand it, it is necessary to deviate from one's own conviction. We cannot tolerate vacillation within the party itself. This must be firmly laid down for all Communist parties. We must immediately get rid of people who commence to play such games. Above all we must not let leaders become conceited, otherwise, instead of leading the party they will dominate it. Discipline must be above all.

Comrade Teraccini (Communist Party of Italy) commenced his remarks by correcting some errors expressed in the report of Comrade Zinoviev. He did not tell Comrade Zinoviev that the Italian party was growing so rapidly that it was on the eve of militant action. On the contrary the speaker quite agreed that the chief task of the Italian party at the present moment is to organise a strong proletarian organisation. He proposed

to speak on the Italian question only to the extent it was referred to in the report of the Executive Committee. "It was usual," he said, "to say that we created a split in the Italian Party. We can only regard with surprise such comrades who forget the decisions of the Second Congress and the 21 points, whose main object was to cleanse the ranks of the party of all opportunist elements. Serratti attended the Second Congress and took part in the discussion of this question. The Italian Socialist Party took part in the working out of those points, and hence it should have been submitted to them. But Serratti did not wish to do this, and therefore he had to be excluded, together with all those he attempted to protect. It is necessary to mention the fact that all our numerous enemies are united in one purpose, to attack us. But between themselves there is no unity. Comrade Markovitch, of Jugo-Slavia, says that we created the split too late, whilst Comrade Zetkin says we should have waited a little longer. But is not the Livorno Congress itself the best proof that it was futile to wait longer? The decisions of the Second Congress were received in Italy in October, and soon after this active preparations were made for a conference. As a matter of fact there was nothing left to do at Livorno: everything was so clear and decided before the Congress. The Livorno Conference was not a split of the Communist party, but merely the fulfilment of the decisions of the Second Congress, and merely tested Serratti to see if he accepted or rejected these decisions. He who says we should have waited and carried on our work amongst opportunist elements—shows that he does not understand the Italian situation. Whilst the Right Opportunist Wing was carrying on an open campaign against the Comintern, the Communist Party was deprived of the possibility of being able to work, through having to remain with the opportunists in one organisation.

Comrade Zetkin accuses Comrade Rakosy more than Comrade Kabakchieff. I do not wish to defend him, but Comrade Rakosy did just as much as Comrade Kabakchieff, the Executive Committee and the Second Congress. Hence one must either agree with Comrade Rakosy or else accuse both Comrade Kabakchieff and the Comintern. We are asked why we did not create a split over the question of seizing the factories. Those who ask such a question evidently do not understand that the mention of seizing the factories can only be unpleasant for the opportunist. Both Gennari and myself as well as the whole group of comrades present here to-day were leaders of that Milan Conference, which demanded that the movement directed towards the seizure of the factories should be energetically supported. But the Confederation of Labour, headed by opportunists, was against it, and we could not take on ourselves the responsibility for the machine which at a decisive moment was disowned by its creators."

In conclusion, Comrade Teraccini pointed out the inconsistency shown by the Executive Committee with regard to the various Jewish parties. Thus, the Zionists were admitted to the Congress with a consultative vote, although they do not

carry out the elementary demands of the Communist International on the participation of all the workers, including the Jewish, in a single Communist party in each country. This condition must be presented to the Zionists in a most determined fashion, and not give them any voice at all until they fulfil that condition.

Comrade Djavad Zade (Communist Party of Persia) spoke next. He is in agreement with the report of Comrade Zinoviev. He said great work was done among the Eastern nations in the field of agitation and propaganda. But very little was done in the way of organisation. Comrade Djavad Zade said, "You may think it strange that in many Eastern countries there are several Communist parties. Thus there are three Communist parties in Turkey, two in Persia, two in Korea, etc. This is explained by the fact that every Pasha, every potentate, wishing to utilise the ideas of Communism for his private ends organises his own Communist party."

In conclusion, Comrade Djavad Zade expressed the hope that the Executive Committee of the Comintern would take into consideration the state of affairs in the East, and would henceforth intensify its work there.

After Comrade Djavad Zade, the meeting was addressed by

Comrade Rakosy (Hungary).

"The Executive Committee is usually reproached with possessing bad representatives. I used to be one of them. Let us see how matters stood at the time when I was one of the bad representatives of the Comintern. We invited the French party to send its representatives to the Congress, but the letter did not reach its destination, and the representatives could not come. We invited the representatives of the German party, they were particularly valuable to us. A party which had certain experience, which has purified itself of opportunist elements, ought to have rendered us valuable aid. But what did Levi bring to the Congress? After a two hours' conversation with Seratti, he came to see me and Comrade Kabakchieff and the present representatives of the Italian Communist Party to the Congress, and started to persuade as to the justice of Seratti's views. But this was not all. He showed Seratti a letter from Clara Zetkin, in which she declared her agreement with Seratti, and the latter made clever use of it for his own purpose. When Levi returned to Germany he declared that Seratti was followed by the Communist workers. Such was the valuable aid which we obtained from the representatives of the German party. Certain definite accusations were levelled against me. Something was said about my wishing to cause a split in the German party. I, on my part, only said that the German party had become so large that it could afford to rid itself of undesirable elements. It was said that I proposed to create a split in other countries, similar to the one that took place in Italy. I was not speaking of a split, however, but of how a Communist movement could free itself of Turatti and the like.

As regards the activity of five comrades of the Executive Committee of the German party, how can we describe it otherwise than a downright undermining of the authority of the Italian Communist Party and of the whole Comintern? Comrade Zetkin did right in acknowledging the fallacy of her former estimate of Serratti. But thereby she only atoned for a small part of injury previously done to the Party." In conclusion, the speaker, in the name of the Hungarian Communist Party, expressed approval of the activity of the Executive Committee of the Comintern, although he is not blind to a series of defects of an organisational and technical kind (loose connections, etc.), but the blame with regard to this is shared by the Executive Committee and by its national sections in separate countries. The orator stated in conclusion, that it was necessary to turn our earnest attention to the cleansing of the parties of the Comintern of all centrist and semi-centrist elements and tendencies.

Comrade Smythe (England) took the floor after Comrade Rakosy. She said that the report of the Executive Committee said nothing about the International Women's Movement. In her opinion this was a fundamental defect. She suggested that serious attention should be paid to the question of organising the proletarian women, as this is of great importance to the Communist movement.

Comrade Kclarov rose and announced the list of speakers, declining to take the floor in view of the fact that the debates on the report of the Executive Committee were exhausted, after which the session was declared adjourned.

The next session will be held on June 28th, at 6 p.m.

Order of business: The Italian Question, and the Question of the Communist Labour Party of Germany.

EIGHTH SESSION.

The session opened at 7 p.m., with Comrade Kolarov in the chair.

The chairman stated that the debate on the report of the Executive Committee finished last night, and there remained the Italian and German questions. It was agreed last night to hear the statement of the Italian delegate first, but the latter declares that he is not quite ready, and asks that his statement be postponed. The Presidium has resolved, therefore, to give the word first to the representative of the Communist Labour Party of Germany. In view of the fact that the report of the Executive Committee has been quite adequately discussed, the Presidium proposes to allow only one speaker each from the C.L.P.G., and the Executive Committee to speak for half an hour each.

Comrade Zinoviev proposed the following resolution:

"That the C.L.P.G. call a conference of their party within the next two or three months, to decide whether they will submit

to the discipline of the Communist International or not. In the event of an affirmative reply, the C.L.P.G. will be absorbed into the United Communist Party of Germany, and in the event of the contrary, the C.L.P.G. is to be excluded from the Communist International."

The chairman stated that he had received a declaration from the United Communist Party to the effect that they associated themselves with Comrade Zinoviev's resolution.

Comrade Hempel, of the Communist Labour Party of Germany, then took the floor. He said :

"I have asked to speak because the day before yesterday the Presidium declared that the German and Italian questions would be dealt with. For some reason the Presidium entered into some agreement on this question with the Italians, but did not think it necessary to do the same with the C.L.P.G. The decision of the Congress on this question should be based on principle. It is quite natural, therefore, to demand that no decision be taken before the C.L.P.G. has stated its case. It is absolutely impossible to do that within half an hour. We require at least an hour, and the refusal to extend our time only shows that you wish to shut our mouths."

Comrade Radek rose to a point of order. He said : "The C.L.P.G. knew of the decision of the Executive ; why did they not raise their objection earlier? The demand to extend the time to an hour is, of course, a trifling matter in itself. But if the representatives really desire to explain their position to the Congress, they will have plenty of scope to do this throughout the whole of the proceedings of the Congress, because they can speak on any point on the agenda, and, therefore, there is no ground for suggesting that anybody desires to shut their mouths. Our resolution in no way signifies that they should leave the Congress. But if, for some reason, they do not wish to be present at the Congress, we can learn what their position is from the books that are published by the 'sacred Dutch school.' "

The representative of the C.L.P.G. again declared that the question is of great importance, and for that reason he insisted on obtaining an hour for his speech, and the right to reply.

Comrade Zinoviev said that there were other points on the agenda dealing with the Trade Unions and Tactics, upon which the representatives of the C.L.P.G., by taking part in the discussion, will have complete opportunities of expounding their principles. The only question which we have to decide in connection with the C.L.P.G. is whether the International has the right to retain in its ranks a party which, after a year's experience, contradicts the principles of the Third International. It has been impossible to pin it down. Yesterday morning the question was raised of considering the Italian and German questions jointly. The Italians immediately agreed, and the C.L.P.G. also, and on this the Congress passed a unanimous resolution. The only thing that we can do is for the representative of the Executive Council to speak first, and the final word be given to the representative of the C.L.P.G. I therefore

ask the Congress to decide the question in that sense. If the comrades from the C.L.P.G. do not take advantage of their opportunity to speak here, they will be acting in the same way, if in a more modified manner, as Otto Rühle acted in 1920.

The resolution of the Presidium was accepted.

Speaking on the resolution of Comrade Zinoviev,

Comrade Radek said that the Executive Committee laid it down that the C.L.P.G. decides within the next two or three months whether it will submit to the decisions of the Communist International or not. The differences between the C.L.P.G. and the Executive, which even now have not been overcome, have existed since the beginning of that party. The C.L.P.G. stood not for a mass party, but for a small pure Communist party. It differed from us also on the question of trade unions, and regarded the work within these organisations for gaining the masses over to our side as unnecessary. It desired to organise special organisations which should contain only such workers as stood for proletarian dictatorship. On the question of Parliamentarism, the C.L.P.G. also disagreed with us, and on principle refused to make use of Parliament. Although these contradictions have long ago been clearly expressed, nevertheless the Executive Council sought a means of mutual understanding, assuming that the errors which existed in the C.L.P.G. were to be found in the Communist movements in all countries, and that it was quite natural that the revolutionary sections called to life by the times did not always have a clear political understanding. In so far as we have dealings with revolutionary workers, the Executive regard it as necessary to attract these to our side, and in this connection the Executive Committee did all that was possible in order that the C.L.P.G. took part in the work of the Second Congress. It desired to know what point of view the overwhelming majority of the Communist proletariat of all countries would take on this disputed question of the C.L.P.G. The Executive even went so far as to give the C.L.P.G. a decisive vote, in spite of the fact that it declared that it would not associate itself with its resolutions. After the Second Congress, the C.L.P.G. moved to the left. It associated itself from the Nationalist-Bolshevist wing of Wolfheim and Lauffenberg and of Rühle. When the C.L.P.G. sent its representatives to the Third Congress we again endeavoured to open the path to these misguided proletarians to us, and resolved to regard this party as a member of the Communist International, and accept it into the International as such. We did this against the wish of the Communist Party of Germany. For that reason the Executive said to the C.L.P.G.: Two paths are open before you. Fusion with the United Communist Party of Germany, or no fusion, and consequently withdrawal from the Third International, as there can be only one section of the Third International in each country.

We assert that the C.L.P.G. has proceeded not from a sect to a party, but the opposite, from a sect to clearly expressed adventurist tendencies. The C.L.P.G. is continually criticising the Executive. In Gorter's pamphlet it is stated that if the tactics

of the Russian leaders are applied abroad it will be a crime against the Revolution. In the pamphlet, "Levi and the tactics of the C.L.P.G.," it is asserted that the March battles proved that no mass-party exists, or more correctly speaking, that a Communist Mass-Party cannot exist. In its international policy it went to such lengths that it now acts side by side with the whole Menshevik press against the Communist International, and against Soviet Russia. Gorter's pamphlet, published by the C.L.P.G., contains the following words:—"After the Kronstadt proletariat rose against you, the Communist Party. . . ." All this shows that the development of the C.L.P.G. is the development of a small clique of leaders. It is sufficient to recall that when the United Communist Party called upon all workers to create a united front, the C.L.P.G. refused. The International must say to the workers in the C.L.P.G.:—"You must go either with the leaders, who are confusing the minds of the workers, or with the International. The C.L.P.G. has revealed adventurist tendencies, and has reduced terrorism and illegality to a principle. We ask the Congress to discuss our resolution. We are not afraid that the workers will leave us. Not a single Communist will leave us." Comrade Radek then pointed to the elections in Hamburg, where the United Communist Party of Germany received more votes after the March rising than the majority socialist and independents put together. If the C.L.P.G. will not fuse with the U.C.P.G. it will be a hindrance to the German Communist Movement. Our resolution proposes merely that the Communist Labour Party of Germany unites with the United Communist Party of Germany, and submits to discipline. To-day, we brought up the question as to whether the Italian Party remains with the reformists or with the International, and we put the same question before the C.L.P.G. It must either go with the petty Dutch school, or with the mighty Communist Movement.

Comrade Roland Holst (Minority of the Dutch Delegation) read a declaration to the effect that the limitation of time for the Communist Labour Party of Germany is moral violence over the latter, against which the minority expresses its protest. She said it was impossible to separate the question of discipline from the tactics and principles of the C.L.P. Even one hour would be little for that purpose, but in any case it is not possible in half-an-hour to express all that the C.L.P. has to say in explanation of its point of view. It would be more expedient to discuss the question of the C.L.P. after the current work of the Congress had been completed. They would then be enabled exhaustively to elucidate their position on all points of the agenda. This question, generally speaking, should not be limited by formalities. We cannot agree with the statement of one of the leading comrades on the Executive, that the danger from the Left is immeasurably greater. The Left tendency must be given the possibilities of healthy growth. After all, we have no Left tendency yet; it is only now taking shape. It has not yet fully defined its attitude on the questions of the trade unions, centralism, and so on. The Left can only develop parallel with Communism.

If they are cut off from the Comintern—and that is what the proposal of the Executive has started to do—they will lose the ground beneath their feet, and become more Right than anything. If the C.L.P. is cut adrift, it will result in the formation of small parties in a number of countries. Our aim is to have these parties united in the Comintern, even if they do not at first submit to discipline. Let the International lay in a stock of patience, for our attitude towards the revolutionary elements entering these parties is one of trust and confidence. We know that there are not many good revolutionaries, and perhaps the best of them are those who are great idealists, although it is probable that because of their idealism they do not observe the real politics of to-day. But is it not truly a most difficult art to carry on revolutionary policy while remaining an idealist? Should these small parties, these people with revolutionary temperaments and desires, be left outside the International, it will only augment their sectarian character. I therefore ask the C.L.P. to do what they may, but take part in the work of Congress. We ought not to turn out these elements; we have no desire that these pure idealists leave us. I therefore consider the decision arrived at as abnormal, and hope that the comrades of the C.L.P. will take part in the debates, and try to influence the mind of the Congress.

The Chairman declared the debates at an end, and Zinoviev's proposal, as one of the points of the general resolution on the report of the Executive, would be voted together with the resolution.

Comrade Lazzarri was granted the floor on behalf of the Italian Socialist Party (Serattists).

Comrades, he said, this is not the first time that the Italian Socialists find themselves in an awkward situation as regards their International relations. Many will remember that Vandervelde and Huysmans called us a "small country" and party of no importance. We fought against the Second International all the time; we were always against the bureaucratism practised by the Second International in its International relations.

We now find ourselves facing the Third International, and our situation is incredibly hard. But let us not be judged by our present spirit, but by our glorious past. The forty years' activity of the party, its disinterested service to the ideals of unity and brotherhood, to the ideals of the International movement, deserved a different name than "traitors," which has been thrown at us here.

Our position is explained in the special declaration which we have brought with us, and it will tell you everything that interests you.

Unfortunately, we arrived late, and we could not hear Comrade Zinoviev's report. We had to acquaint ourselves with its contents from the English text, and we see that much attention was devoted to the Italian Party. It is precisely because so much is being spoken about us that I hope the comrades of the Third International are fully acquainted with the Italian movement, and treat it with proper respect. We felt that it was our

duty to come here. Give us then the opportunity to learn our mistakes, and to rectify them as one of the parties of the International.

Besides the report of Comrade Zinoviev, we have read the pamphlet published by the Executive Committee containing a number of collective documents. We are grateful to the Executive Council for its zeal in collecting so much material in connection with the Italian Party. We must say, however, that not all the documents have been collected in this pamphlet. Unfortunately, we have not brought these documents with us. We in general write very little, we are more occupied with fighting the bourgeoisie. I must observe that in the supplement to the brochure there are documents which have no connection with our party. The article of Paccini on Soviet Russia does not belong to our party. Of course, this article grieves us, but the party in no way bears any responsibility for it.

The representative of the Italian Communist Party said here that Communists did not aim at a split. Did not the Communist Faction at Emilia decide to leave the Italian Party if it did not receive a majority? The same thing applies to the question of the seizure of the factories. The Turin workers and Communists themselves asserted that it was impossible longer to hold the factories in their hands.

As soon as we received the March manifesto in 1919 we enthusiastically joined the Third International. We saw in it our salvation. We wanted to copy the Russian Revolution and learn its lessons. We did this not merely out of international solidarity, but we needed the International, and also because of the economic conditions of our country. We came to the defence of Soviet Russia, and honourably carried out our duty with regard to her. We conducted a campaign for a trading agreement between Italy and Russia, and we regarded Comrade Vorovsky as the actual Ambassador of Soviet Russia. We always carried out our obligations to Socialism, both in war and peace, and always held aloft the Red Banner of the International.

We, Italian Socialists, could not promise much; we could only fulfil our duties. And it is extremely painful to hear reproaches after such a powerful movement had been set on its feet in such a small and poor country, a movement which makes the bourgeoisie take account of it, and which is capable of uniting the workers and the peasants into one mighty invincible whole. It is for this reason that we strive to introduce unity within our ranks, in order to oppose our unity to the single front of the bourgeoisie. It is for this reason that the split at Livorno caused by the Executive Committee was a perfect surprise to us. This split naturally weakened us, for had it not taken place, the victory which we obtained at elections would have been much more effective, and would have allowed us to assume power by means of parliamentary struggle.

We are reproached with opportunism and reformism. The pamphlet of the Executive Committee contains a manifesto of our party, published after the Livorno Congress. We stated there our shortcomings and failings. We assert that we have always been purifying our party; we have been expelling opportunists

since 1915, and we shall continue this purifying process in the future, whenever we think it necessary, i.e., when circumstances demand it.

Comrade Lazzarri quoted a sentence from an article by Comrade Frossard, in which the latter says: "Neither absolute dependence, nor absolute independence. Such is the formula at once flexible and wise." Such are precisely the conditions which we are empowered to offer to the Third International. At the present time we are going through a period of preparation in Italy. Be sure that when we attain our object we shall not stop at anything to bring about the dictatorship of the Italian proletariat.

I made myself acquainted with the theses on the tactics which have been submitted to the Congress. We shall make full use of them in our movement, both against Anarchist fantasies, as well as against reformist illusions. And we hope that in this respect the work of the Congress will not pass in vain even for the Italian delegates. You understand that by assuming full responsibility for the decisions which you pass we cannot discard our duty to avoid as far as possible the mistakes and horrors of defeat, such as characterise the history of the workers of Germany, Finland, and Hungary. It is in this way that we prepare to serve the cause of the World Revolution in order to lay down the solid foundation for the liberation of the proletariat in our country.

Comrade Gennari spoke next.

Gennari began his speech by reading the resolution of the Executive of the 4th April, 1921, and declared that the Italian Socialist Party did not fulfil a single one of the conditions laid down by the Executive of the Comintern.

"My task is most simple," he said. "I only have to read to you documents from the history of the Italian Socialist Party, in order that all comrades be clear on the point that the Communists in Italy acted wisely in separating from the Socialist Party. I asserted that there are social-patriots in the Italian Socialist Party. That the latter did not succeed during the war in swinging the whole party to the side of social-patriotism is due only to the fact that the Italian proletariat, and even part of the bourgeoisie were determinedly against the war. Only thanks to the firmness of the Left wing of the party, which urged the whole party towards revolutionary irreconcilability, did we succeed in saving the party from sinking into the mire of social patriotism." Comrade Gennari supplemented his declaration by a large number of quotations from the writings of Turatti, Treves, and others. He produced a manifesto signed by socialists from Reggio Emilia in defence of the war, and appealing for war loans. All are mindful of the patriotic speech of Turatti after the defeat at Caporetto. The reformists substituted our principles of the class war and the dictatorship of the proletariat by nationalist principles. That same Lazzarri even called the representative of the Left Wing at the Florence Congress a lunatic. The fact that Lazzarri personally wrote a letter against the principles of Wilson does not alter the fact that the Mayor of Milan, Caldara, arranged a parade in honour

of Wilson. During the war the conduct of the reformist fraction became more insufferable every day. A secret conference was held at Florence, at which a Maximalist faction was organised, which passed a stringent resolution against the Right Wing. The conduct of the leaders of the Confederation of Labour was exactly the same as that of Turatti, Treves and Co. It is interesting to observe, said Gennari at the trial against Lazzarri, the Public Prosecutor based his indictment solely on passages from articles by Turatti and Treves. The question of excluding the right wing was raised repeatedly, for example, after the military defeat of Italy at Monte-Grapo, Turatti uttered a fervent patriotic speech in Parliament, in which he exclaimed, "Our country at Monte-Grapo."

Turatti's speech created a profound stir in the management of the party, when Volui, a former deputy and member of the Communist party, demanded the exclusion of Turatti from the party. But his demand fell through. Comrade Gennari then quoted various documents in order to bear out his statements, and recalled the time when Turatti, with his usual frankness, definitely declared, before the Bologna Congress, that a party with maximalists was not the place for him. Quoting various instances of the activities of the reformists Comrade Gennari stated that at the end of the war the Government founded a committee to prepare a plan of reconstruction. Turatti and the leaders of the Confederation of Labour entered this committee. It was only on the demand of the Party Executive that the latter left the committee, but the former did not deem it necessary to resign. As for Modigliani, he is a typical social-democrat. Comrade Gennari reminded the Congress of the fact that affiliation to the Third International was agreed upon against the wills of Lazzarri and Vacchi, who considered the affiliation to be premature.

Our opportunists are avowed counter-revolutionaries. Seratti called them such in his speech at the Bologna Conference. Here Gennari produced documents proving that the organ of the Italian reformists, "*Critica Sociale*," was in reality Menshevist, and printed articles against the Third International. Seratti calls Bolshevism a new form of imperialism. It is quite natural then, said Comrade Gennari, to ask why Turatti and his friends remain in the Socialist Party, and desire to remain in the Third International. Turatti himself answers this question. We remain, says he, simply because we do not wish to lose contact with the masses, and so become a group of generals without an army. Seratti always adopted a vacillating policy. Only recently he opposed the Maximalists, and only at the last moment saw the danger threatening from the Right Wing elements. After reading a number of documents, Gennari exclaimed: The declaration that Moscow dictated the split is a lie. And from what I have said, comrades, you will see that the Italian split was the result of a long protracted party crisis, and if any charge be brought against the Communists they can only be accused of creating this split too late. The whole policy of the Italian Party after the Livorno Congress was reformist and opportunist, and definitely approaching co-operation with the bourgeoisie. Such a party can no longer be trusted, and we

declare that the toiling masses, which, being betrayed by the leaders of the Italian Party, will desert this party after the decisions of the Third Congress of the Comintern. Varatona at least wishes to preserve a decent exterior to this party. He resigned from the Executive, and demanded the expulsion of the reformists. But Seratti continues to sink deeper in the morass of reformism, and continues day by day in his treacherous work of shielding the reformists and propounds a mere Christian kindness and passive resistance against the Fascisti in the columns of the "Avanti." We demand that the proposals of the Italian Socialist Party be rejected, and that the Third Congress place this party outside the Comintern. Only such a policy will expose the Italian reformists, social pacifists, and traitors in the eyes of the Italian working class. (Applause.)

Comrade Lenin said : Lazzarri asks for facts that would indicate the reformist character of the Italian Party. But are not the very existence of opportunists, not only as individuals, but as groups, facts? This group of opportunists is not a new one. It did not spring up in a fortnight. When Bernstein appeared with his revisionism he was strongly supported by the Italian reformists and their leader, Turatti. Comrade Lazzarri is of the opinion that these are not facts. After Seratti's return to Italy from the Second Congress the reformists opened a campaign in their press against the Third International, and called a conference of their own at Reggio Emilia, just before the Party Congress. Are these not facts? This is a complete opportunist faction; more than that, it is the beginning of a new party. When Lazzarri says to us : "You know the spirit of the Russian people; leave it to us to judge the spirit of the Italians." (I would not use such expressions at all.) We must state, however, that he knows, not the spirit of the Mensheviks, of course, the Italian Mensheviks, and not the Russian. Essentially the case is unchanged. It is the greatest misfortune for a workers' party to postpone the break with the opportunists at the proper time. Such was the case in Germany, where the labour movement suffered almost to the very last day. The same thing is evident in Italy, where they had to break with the reformists long before the war. Lazzarri says that the only difference between us is the question of the moment when it is necessary to break with the reformists. What arguments did Seratti bring forward in this very hall a year ago to prove that it was not yet time to break with the reformists? None. What arguments has Lazzarri today? Also none. He quoted Frossard to the effect that the Communist Party must have flexible tactics. That is quite true, and it is useless for Seratti to tell Italy worn out tales that we, the Russian Communist Party, want to force other parties blindly to imitate us.

You cannot take the Italian proletariat from the right track with such statements. On the contrary, we say to all that the conditions of the time, and place, must be taken into consideration, that it is not necessary to blindly follow the experience of the Russian Revolution. We say that to the Communist parties. In the history of the movement for the seizure of the factories the reformists completely revealed themselves. At this moment

the Italian Socialist party is quite ripe for co-operation with the bourgeoisie. It became clear at Kienthal that Modigliani was prepared for this. It is useless to allege that Modigliani did not enter the government. He was wise enough to refrain from that, and he is still an excellent tool of the bourgeoisie while remaining in the ranks of the workers' party. What did the Congress of Livorno prove? The reformists had 14,000 votes, the Communists 55,000, and the Centrists 98,000. That proves that the Communist movement in Italy grows rapidly, far more rapidly than even in Russia. We in Russia, previous to the Revolution, were in a considerable minority against our Reformist-Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionists. In Italy the conditions are much more favourable. There the working masses are closely attached to the Communist movement. That is not all measured according to the Russian scale, but entirely taking into consideration the Italian conditions, i.e., just as Serrati demanded. Serrati wanted freedom to manœuvre. Very well, we shall carefully watch your manœuvres. Now we know how Turatti manœuvred. He preferred 14,000 reformists, journalists, lawyers, and bureaucrats to 58,000 workers, Communists. This would have been unpardonable even if the Italian Communists had been anarchists and revolutionary phrasemongers, which is not the case, because, in fact, there are 58,000 workers Communists in the party. These again are not Russian conditions. Lazzarri said: If you exclude us from the Comintern, and we shall certainly do so, the Italian worker will be overwhelmed. I am confident that they will not be overwhelmed, if the Congress will just explain to them the real situation, and I have no doubt at all that the Italian workers will be entirely on our side. (Loud applause.)

NINTH SESSION.

The order of business for the morning session of June 29 called for the continuation of the debate on the Italian question. The following declaration of the Italian Socialist Party was read:—

DECLARATION BY THE DELEGATES OF THE SOCIALIST PARTY OF ITALY TO THE THIRD CONGRESS OF THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL

In conformity with the decisions of the Second Congress of Moscow, the Socialist Party of Italy, which had been one of the first to join the Communist International and one of its promoters at the Conventions of Zimmerwald and Kienthal, convened its Congress at Livorno in January, 1921, for the purpose of discussing the twenty-one conditions for affiliation, the acceptance of which had become necessary in order to have the right to remain incorporated in the Third International. By an absolute majority the Congress pronounced itself in favour of the following order of business:—

The Socialist Party of Italy deems it necessary to confirm its unity on the basis of the strictest homogeneousness of the organisation and its make-up; and, to that effect, it demands a system of the strictest centralisation, so that each member and each organisation of the party should subordinate its action to the general interest and the final goal; the work of propaganda must be centralised, as well as all other activity.

For the same purpose the Congress proposes to adopt all necessary measures in the sphere of trade union action to get the political idea and aim to hold precedence over all casual, temporary, or purely professional aims, and that the economic trade union movement should be subordinated to the political party.

In consequence, it recognises that it is indispensable for the party to preserve its closely welded unity in order that it be enabled the more rapidly to improve conditions and conquer the whole political power. For this acquisition all measures may be adopted, provided they remain within the limits of an absolute class uncompromise, and conform to the objects of the communist revolution, which requires the integration of the political and economic work of the Trade Unions. This implies the lawful or illegal organisation of all that may contribute to the masses and lead them on towards revolutionary conquests, of all that may serve as a means for conquest, or lay the foundations of the organs which shall replace those of the present social order.

Proceeding with the discussion of the relations between the I.S.P. (Italian Socialist Party) and the Communist International, the Congress again confirms its former spontaneous adhesion to that international organisation, as well as to the decisions of the recent Moscow Congress. It consequently declares that after the Second Congress it accepts, in substance, the twenty-one conditions, with the additional clause calling for the exclusion of the Freemasons. As far as the execution of the twenty-one clauses is concerned, it recommends that it should be interpreted according to the existing conditions and the historic exigencies of the country to which they are applied, in accordance with the decisions of the Executive Committee of the Communist International, as shown in points 16-21, as well as by the procedure already adopted in the case of other countries. It should be understood that, whoever adheres to the principles of the Communist International, should do it willingly and with the firm intention to put them into practice. With regard to the conditions contained in Clause 17, the Congress holds that the Italian Socialist Party has no ground to reproach itself with any betrayal of its principles during the long years of the accursed war. In its desire to prevent the usurpation of the glorious name of the I.S.P., so well known to the proletarian masses, by the deserters of yesterday and of to-morrow, it proposes to the Executive Committee of the International the provisional retention of that name, without, however, making this question an essential condition for the adherence to the Communist International,

from which the I.S.P. expects a more sustained and fraternal support in the future.

After the Executive Committee of the Communist International had declared that by this motion, the I.S.P. was excluding itself from the Third International, the Congress adopted unanimously this motion of Bentivoglio.

The Seventeenth Congress of the Italian Socialist Party confirming once more the decisions through which it signified its adherence to the Third International by accepting unconditionally all essential conditions, protests against the statement of the representative of the Executive Committee who had announced the exclusion of the I.S.P. from the International, which can be based only on differences of opinion with regard to contingent circumstances relating to actual conditions in Italy. Such disagreement could and should be settled in a fraternal and conciliating spirit. Affirming once more its adhesion to the Third International, the Congress of the I.S.P. trusts that the next International Congress will elucidate all differences and misunderstandings; and it undertakes forthwith to accept and carry out the decisions of the supreme tribunal.

In conformity with clause 9 of the Constitution of the International the delegates of the Socialist Party of Italy are now submitting to the Third Congress of the Communist International the reasons which have caused the majority of the Congress to adopt the above-mentioned decisions :

1. The Congress of the Socialist Party of Italy has not infringed upon the international discipline, as it accepts fully and explicitly all the twenty-one conditions. The Order of Business says expressly that the twenty-one conditions are accepted essentially and fully. The Congress of the Socialist Party of Italy had only put two questions to the Executive Committee, asking it to discuss and solve them by mutual agreement. They concern the methods to be resorted to for the exclusion of the reformists and the adoption of the new name, that of the Communist Party.

2. In regard to the exclusion of the reformists the Congress of Livorno in its majority raised no objection. The Socialist Party of Italy is able to refer to its rigid tradition dating to the times prior even to the formation of the Communist International. In 1912, the reformists, Bissolati, Bonorri, Cabrini, Podreca, and others, were excluded from the party for having violated the discipline and tactics of the Socialist Party of Italy; in 1914, it was decided to exclude the Freemasons whose pernicious work within the socialist organisations was driving the latter towards the collaboration of classes or into the extreme left wing blocks; in 1915, the partisans of the war were also excluded from the party. The majority of the party never concealed the fact that the same element which had remained in the party still continued in spite of their promise to respect the discipline, to favour a policy of compromise which was in no wise in accordance with the aspirations of the majority of the militant members and had caused dissensions several times. This is certainly prejudicial to the activities of the party, and presents a danger for its future. It is necessary certainly to eliminate this danger. But one must know

how to choose the moment and the methods for carrying out this operation. It is only on this point that the discord has shown itself. A group of comrades who have called themselves "Pure Communists" insisted at the Congress of Livorno that it was necessary to proceed immediately to the expulsion of the reformers, whereas the majority did not consider the moment to be a favourable one, in the sense that the working masses did not seem to have a clear conception of the necessity for such drastic measures.

This manner of considering the situation might give rise to discussion and adverse opinion, but does not constitute an infraction of international discipline. During the period which preceded the convocation of the First Communist Congress, it has been stated clearly that the elimination of the reformist and centrist elements becomes absolutely necessary when a certain phase of the struggle is reached involving an examination of the conditions influencing the action of a party at a given moment. Likewise, the same First Congress of the Communist International in the thesis relating to the policy towards other socialist tendencies, decided that the organic scission was a historic necessity, and that it is up to the Communists of different countries to determine the exact moment when such scission should be effected in accordance with the degree of development attained by their country.

The point of view on the co-ordination of the Communist tactics was confirmed by the Second Congress, since section 16 of the conditions stipulates that the Executive shall have to consider the various conditions in which each party is compelled to work and to struggle.

Basing itself on the great number of facts with which it considered itself to be thoroughly familiar, the majority of the Socialist Party of Italy considered that, in the interest of the Italian proletariat, the scission should not be effected immediately. The party and the working masses were still under the impression of the September events, when the seizure of the factories was undertaken with the absolute consent of the fractions of the party. This seizure had not led to a revolution, not because the opinions on the subject had been divided, but because the working masses did not dispose of the necessary technical preparation or of sufficient forces to pass over to an offensive against the forces of the army and the police mobilised by the Government. The National Council of the General Confederation of Labour made a statement to this effect, and this opinion was supported by several delegates from Turin, a town which from a technical point of view, seemed best armed for the fight.

The leadership of the party, consisting in its majority of members who ultimately passed into the phalanx of "pure Communists," proved itself to be irresolute and unprepared at the start, and during the whole period of the movement, in the same way as it had shown its lack of self confidence when the reactionaries burnt down the offices of the "Avanti," and when the revolt broke out in Ancona; later on, the events in Bologna (November, 1920), were to take it unawares without

impelling it to decisive action. On the occasion of the seizure of the factories the Communist leaders did not venture to encourage the development of the movement, notwithstanding the powers of attorney which they had received from the Executive Committee of the General Confederation of Labour, and they offered no opposition to its peaceful ending.

Moreover, one must bear in mind that in the eyes of the thoughtless masses the arguments of the right wingers of the I.S.P. have every appearance of logic. They have opposed the war, they have adhered to Zimmerwald as well as the Communist International, they have stood up for the Russian Revolution, they have approved the seizure of the workshops, and though they have not advocated the extension of this movement, it can be said that other Communist parties have not done more. In the trade unions they hold important posts, and possess the complete confidence of their electors. It would be very difficult to move them from these entrenched positions.

On the other hand, the chief culprits in the recent split, those "purists" who deemed themselves numerous enough and clever enough for the assumption of the entire leadership of the political and trade union movement have been up to now profuse in their promises, while their performances on the political and economic field have been in the nature of disastrous adventures.

All these facts influenced the majority at Livorno, and were a determining factor in its attitude and its vote. All these facts have been submitted to the Executive Committee of the Communist International, and have now been put before the International Congress in order to demonstrate to it, that in our policy we were inspired by very serious political considerations, and not by any substantial divergences of opinion, in matters of tactics or principle, nor by the paltry wish to shield individuals or groups.

The delegates of other nations have already condemned in unequivocal terms, before the Congress, the ill-advised and irregular action which led to the Livorno split. In Italy the fact that most of the Trade Unions were in agreement with the majority of the Socialist Party, and also the fact that several minorities which had followed the "purists" at the Congress of Livorno are now returning to the I.S.P. are sufficient proof that the Livorno majority was right.

I believe that we have presented a true picture of the controversy which this Congress is called upon to decide.

As far as the name of the party is concerned, the Livorno resolution on this subject does not require further comments. It shows clearly that the reasons formulated by the International cannot be applied in a general sense to the I.S.P. If the attitude of the I.S.P. during the war can be declared tainted with social patriotism then we can boldly say that compared to it no other party in the world can be considered worth sitting in the Third International. By the Entovoglio motion the I.S.P. definitely laid down its line of conduct. It will remain with the Third International. It will not tolerate any deviation from the principle of the class struggle, and it will condemn, as it

always did, all collaboration with the bourgeoisie. The administrative Council of the I.S.P. has already decided to convene another Congress, at which this problem will be discussed with all due consideration to the difficult political and economic circumstances of the period. The place of the I.S.P. will be always with the revolution, and never against the revolution.

Comrade Maffi was given the floor, when the declaration of the Italian Socialist Party had been read.

The speaker began by pointing out that after Lazzarri's exhaustive speech and Lenin's address he had nothing more to say. He wished, however, to expose Pro. Gennari's "mystification" in bringing over here scraps of truth across thousands of miles, which, of course, can prove anything you please. Gennari was himself secretary of the party, but failed to suspend Turatti's magazine, which he has here attacked so fiercely. This is simply due to the fact that, no matter who was secretary, the Italian Party always did the right thing and the same thing all the time. The speaker further in the same way refuted the rest of Gennari's statements. (A continuous volley of counter-refutations were fired at him from the seats.)

The Italian Party at its Livorno Convention, Maffi continued, decided to abide by any decision of the Comintern, and he also guaranteed that at the next party convention he would vote for any decision of the Congress, whatever its nature might be, but he could not do the same as regards his friends, as he had no instructions to that effect. He therefore thought there was no ground for excluding the Italian Socialist Party from the Comintern.

Comrade Rakovsky then spoke. He referred to the difficult position that had arisen in Italy. The division of the forces of the proletariat had enabled the bourgeoisie to commence an open and savage offensive against the working class. To lay the responsibility for this at the door of the Communists, who remained true to their word given at the Second Congress, would not be just. Italian reformism can claim to be older than the German. It poisoned the party during the war. When the speaker was being persecuted as a German agent by the Italian press, "Avanti" did not come to his defence. The presence of the reformists made it impossible for the Italians to conduct an honourable revolutionary policy. It may be said that the Entente employed less diplomacy to draw Italy into the war than the Italian Party employed to conceal the affair of Turrati. To do Turrati justice, he did not betray his past; he remained the same reformist and nationalist that he always was. He was an enemy of the Russian Revolution. The Russian is not called upon to refute the calumnies of the reformists, but these calumnies, drop by drop, poison the hearts of the Italian proletariat. It pictures revolution as some form of marriage ceremony without terror and without starvation. For a whole year, Seratti, in order to defend Turatti, has developed a special theory. He claims that Turatti is a better Communist than the

Comintern on the agrarian and national questions, and on the question of tactics in England and America. For this purpose all conceptions of time and space are abandoned, and a sort of abstract Communist party is developed. In this theory England and the United States are placed on the same plane, and Italian conditions are transplanted to England. All this is done to justify the presence of Turatti. D'Arragona, it is true is a reformist, but then he is so popular in the Confederation of Labour, Turatti, perhaps, is a bad Communist, but he is an excellent parliamentary strategist. A theory of unity was evolved; why did not Lazzarri think of unity at Berne, Kienthal, and Zimmerwald? If the principle of unity is so general and abstract, the notorious Bureau of the Second International should not have been broken up; nor should the break with the Scheidemanists and the Independents have been approved. But Italy seems to present an exception to all countries. They seem to have here a sort of original nationalist communism. This, by-the-bye, is a customary argument for all opportunists. The French opportunists said that the Germans were nationalists, and that Renaudel was the best guardian of Socialist beliefs.

The German opportunists said the French were opportunists, and they were the best pupils of Marx; this is an old story. The Italians, with their theory, may acquire ministers, but they can never make a revolution with them. One can excellently sabotage the movement of the metal workers with men like D'Aragona and Regeli, but one cannot make a revolution with a party which strives to conceal the difference between the leaders. All that can be done with this is to destroy the faith of the working class in their own strength, and one cannot make revolution that way. We ask the Italians what they are doing, and whither they are going. Are they going with the revolutionary proletariat into the Communist International, or will they return to Vienna or Amsterdam. Perhaps they will create a two-and-three-quarters' International, but they themselves have written too much against the Scheidemannists, against the Independents, and against the French opportunists, and on the day that you propose to the Italian proletariat to return to these, they will abandon you. The Italian comrade said here that the Livorno Congress resolved to submit to the Third Congress whatever its decision may be. They must merely declare here before the united proletariat, before its best representatives, that they, the Italian Party, will unreservedly accept the decision of the world proletariat gathered at its Third Congress here in Moscow.

Comrade Zetkin followed Comrade Rakovsky.

The present situation of the Italian working class, she said, demands the creation of a single, united Communist Party, not only by the Italian Party, but by the entire world proletariat. We have already seen how the Italian bourgeoisie treated its proletariat with the sword. Force must be met by force. I am of the opinion that the unitarian group of the Italian Socialist Party should closely unite with the Communists and present a single revolutionary front against the bourgeoisie. The party,

however, in spite of the decisions at Livorno, has done very little in this direction.

Comrade Zetkin then dealt with the 50,000 lire sent to the Italian trade unions from Amsterdam. It must be made clear to the Italian working class, she said, that this money comes from the traitors to the working class and Socialism, from the Scheidemannists, whose hands are stained with the blood of 20,000 German workers. This present was not sent with the object of expressing the International solidarity of the working class, but with the object of undermining the faith of the workers in the Red Trade Union International. How did "Avanti" regard this gift? It was jubilant, and lauded the solidarity of the working class. "It was time to say stop," said Comrade Zetkin. Such a party is no longer admissible. Until the Italian Party is cleared of Turatti and his politics, it and the Communists will be between the anvil and the hammer of the bourgeoisie. It is clear that he who shields the reformism of Turatti helps the bourgeoisie and goes against the interests of the working class. The Third Congress must declare to the Italian working class that it must reject Turatti and all groups with similar tendencies. The Congress must show our comrades, the Italian Communists, the correct procedure of fighting. The Congress must say to Comrades Lazzarri and Maffi that the International solidarity of the working class behoves them to explain the truth of the Congress to the Italian working class and to be honest co-operators in gathering and co-ordinating the strength of the Italian proletariat. In order to enlighten and intensify the consciousness of the Italian working class one must be an Internationalist, and not a Nationalist. (Applause.)

Comrade Trotsky followed Comrade Zetkin. He said :

I am not going to deal with the history of the Italian Party after Comrade Lazzarri has spoken. I merely wish to analyse its present situation. To all outward appearances the party carried on revolutionary propaganda, not taking into account the consequences. The September incidents were a result of this propaganda. And what did the Italian Party do, when the workers materialised this revolutionary propaganda, and as a result arrived at serious and practical conclusions? The party deserted them. It refused to lead the movement, and hence rendered the results of its work null and void. The workers should have regarded this propaganda with suspicion, and Turatti took an unprecedented advantage of it. He was able to demonstrate to the workers that revolutionary propaganda leads one to no good results. You tried, and found out for yourselves, he said. Therefore, revolutionary propaganda is futile. Such was the outcome of the September affair. You only spoke in terms of revolutionary phraseology, which proved to be nothing but empty words. You disorganised the working class, and refused to face the consequences of your own propaganda after it materialised.

Seratti always supported the idea of a concentration of forces. He wished to found a party which would consist of reformists, centrists, and communists. He brought this idea forward under

the guise of uniting all the revolutionary forces for a successful co-operation. But is it possible to have a co-ordination of the forces of all revolutionary elements which do not consider the revolution as the outcome of their activities. You cannot seriously say that Turatti wants a revolution when he speaks and writes against the very idea of revolution. In practice the idea of co-ordinating forces came to altogether contradictory consequences. You caused the workers to lose this faith in the party, in revolutionary propaganda, and the idea that it really wants a revolution. And now the young Communist Party of Italy will have to work very energetically in order to regain the faith of the Italian proletariat. Instead of a co-ordination of forces in the name of the revolution, the whole party, from its leaders to its press, drifted to the right. You say that Turatti submits to party discipline. But often this submission is only a formality. We Communists submit ourselves to bourgeois discipline in a bourgeois society, but we submit, and still struggle, to create our illegal organisations, and try to do away with the necessity of such a submission. Turatti obeys the discipline of your party in similar manner. He creates his own illegal organisation. He publishes his own press which mocks you, in order to remove the bounds of this discipline, and do away with the necessity of having to submit to it.

It is not at all essential that Turatti should enter parliament. Turatti is no longer a mere careerist whose sole aim is the possession of a ministerial portfolio. If such were proposed to him he would undoubtedly answer: "What use is your portfolio? I may lose it and the faith of the working class at the first ministerial crisis. Keep your portfolio, I will stay in my party and remain and work in the ranks of democracy." Turatti is a clever and experienced politician, and is no mere chance figure with but little significance in the party of whose ranks he is a member.

You said, when quotations were taken from Turatti's writings and speeches, that this was his own personal opinion, and had no connection with the party. Just imagine Giolitti ringing up Turatti and saying, whilst we are struggling here: "Turatti, is it not dangerous that Lazzarri has gone to Moscow and may give the show away?" and Turatti answering, "That is Lazzarri's own personal affair, and the party does not answer for him." You know well enough that Giolitti would not be fooled by such an answer. Why, then, do you try to convince us that all that which Turatti does or says is of no consequence to your party?

You mentioned your enthusiasm with what the Communist Party had done in Soviet Russia. This is a very delicate argument. I am not only speaking of you here, but am referring to all foreigners. You witnessed the Red Army parade, but you ought to see our children who are hungry. Poverty reigns here, a colossal national poverty. And if he, who is so full of enthusiasm over Soviet Russia, becomes disappointed at our poverty, then he is not a Communist.

He who uses this against us is our avowed enemy. Turatti acts thus. He says that Soviet Russia uses the International as a weapon, by the aid of which she hopes to bring about the revolution everywhere in order to save herself. Certainly, we all wish to see the revolution accomplished as soon as possible everywhere. But what Turatti says about us is the most malicious lie of our enemies, because if we really wanted a revolution in your country, to save ourselves without taking into consideration the conditions prevailing, then we deserve to be shot. Do you then want the executioner and his victim to be in the same International? We, in poor backward Russia, drove in the first pile of International Revolution, and we are defending it with all our might. Had Germany, France, and Italy erected such another, the significance of the Russian Revolution for International Revolution would have increased 90 per cent. We would have been inexpressibly glad, and would have defended the pillar with all the energy we possessed. Unfortunately, the time is not yet come, but until then our pillar is also yours, and you also must defend it to the best of your ability. Turatti said that our International is a fantastic International, but to me, after listening to your speeches, and the discussion on them, it seems that Turatti's presence at our International would be an anomaly.

Comrade Loriot followed. He said: Defending his party, Comrade Lazzarri spoke all the time of its splendid past. I must confirm that none of us forget the services rendered by the Italian Party. During the war, in Zimmerwald, our Left Wing very often had the support of that party. But Martov and Medein also participated in Zimmerwald.

We must not judge from the historical point of view, but on its merits, of that efficacy of the present moment. Here is the parallel that Comrade Lazzarri tried to draw an analogy between the Italian and the French Socialist Parties, to our disadvantage.

It is wrong for you to follow Seratti's example at the Livorno Congress, and to accuse the French Party. Our party was criticised at that Congress, and its weak sides were indicated. We accept the criticism, knowing that the French Party has as yet indefinite Communistic elements and reformism. But can anyone throw the general charge of opportunism against our party? To the question as to whether the French Party is on the road to revolution, we must reply yes, and although it is weak as yet to counteract the French bourgeoisie, it possesses a revolutionary will and energy. On the other hand, the Italian Party is on the road to counter-revolution. Much was said here about Turatti. The importance lies not in Turatti alone, but in that the entire Italian Socialist Party is imbued with the spirit of opportunism. What are the experiences of our French Party? What became, after the split, of Paul Faure, Mistral, Longuet and others? They are working with the "Populaire," and its main inspirer, Leon Blum, who is a direct supporter of the bourgeoisie. He is influencing the politics of the Longuet followers. He bound them hand and foot, and is pulling them into the abyss of the Social traitors. They are sliding down an

inclined plane against their own will. Also in your party, Comrade Lazzarri, Seratti is exploited by all the Social traitors, and is sliding upon the same inclined plane, which will bring them all to an unconditional collaboration with the bourgeoisie. Take, for instance, your Alessandri. He is now a steady collaborator of the "Populaire." Those of you who are honest and devoted to the cause of the revolution, must break completely with the reformists. This alone will be your great service to the world's revolution.

Comrade Lozovsky said: The representatives of the Socialist Party of Italy pointed out here that the policy of the party coincides with the policy of the Confederation of Labour. This is not exact—at the Livorno Congress a resolution was adopted in pursuance of which the Confederation of Labour should have left the Amsterdam International and joined the International Council of Red Trade Unions. What has the Confederation of Labour done? Has it joined the International Council of Red Trade Unions? No, on the contrary, it comes nearer and nearer to Amsterdam. The Italian Confederation of Labour asked Amsterdam to assist it in its struggle against the Fascisti. It received 50,000 lire from Amsterdam. The workers of Italy should know that those who have sent them that money are the allies of the manufacturers of Italy and other countries.

Recently, we received a suggestion from the Italian Confederation of Labour to convoke a Congress of Red Trade Unions at Stockholm or at Reval. We could not understand such proposal and answered that it was impossible for us to bring this about. However, yesterday we received a letter from D'Aragona, which explains to us why they were anxious to convoke the Congress at Stockholm or Reval. The letter stated that the delegates must be guaranteed. It means that D'Aragona expects better guarantees for the delegates of the Congress from the bourgeois governments of Sweden and Esthonia than from Red Revolutionary Moscow. This letter is very "diplomatic," but not clever, and shows clearly that they wish to remain in the Amsterdam International.

After Livorno, continued Lozovsky, the Party has ever been slipping to the right, I warn you comrades of the Italian Socialist Party against these errors and the hidden intentions of the Italian Confederation of Labour.

In the name of the Ukrainian delegation, Comrade Rakovsky proposed to end the debate, as the question was now sufficiently clear and nothing new was likely to be said.

Comrade Köenen, in the name of nine delegations, read the following resolution on the Report of the E. C. :—

RESOLUTION ON THE REPORT OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

The Congress takes note of the report of the Executive Committee and observes with satisfaction that the policy and activities of the Executive during the past year have been directed towards the carrying out of the resolutions of the Second Congress. The

Congress approves especially of the application of the twenty-one conditions laid down by the Second Congress in the different countries and sections, also the work of the Executive directed towards the formation of large Communist mass-parties and the relentless struggle against the opportunist tendencies which revealed themselves in these parties.

In Italy the attitude of the group of leaders around Seratti, immediately after the Second World Congress, showed that he did not take the resolutions of the World Congress and the Communist International seriously. The rôle played by this group of leaders during the September struggle, its conduct in Livorno, and still more, its policy since that time, has proved clearly that he and his partisans only wish to use Communism as a shield for their opportunist policy. The split was inevitable under such conditions. The Congress approves of the fact that in this case, which is one of fundamental importance, the Executive has acted with firmness and decision. It sanctioned the resolution of the Executive Committee which at the time recognised the Communist Party of Italy to be the only Communist section in that country.

In Germany the party conference of the U.C.P.G. in Halle was the consequence of the resolutions of the Second World Congress, which in their turn were based on the development of the labour movement. The work of the Executive was directed towards the formation of a strong Communist Party in Germany, and experience has proved that this policy was the correct one. The Congress approves completely of the attitude of the Executive towards the events within the U.C.P.G.

It expresses the hope that the policy applied to-day in enforcing the fundamental principles of international revolutionary discipline will be followed by the Executive Committee in the future.

The acceptance of the C.L.P.G. as a sympathising party of the Communist International had for its aim the placing of the C.L.P.G. on its trial, and to ascertain if it would adapt itself to the requirements of the Communist International. This period of trial should suffice, and the C.L.P.G. should be required to join the U.C.P.G. within a set period, or otherwise the C.L.P.G. is to be excluded as a sympathising party of the Communist International.

The Congress approves of the manner in which the Executive applied the twenty-one conditions to the French Party. By its tactics it has succeeded in getting the labouring masses, which are tending towards Communism, away from the Longuet opportunist and centrists, and to promote their development towards Communism. The Congress trusts that the Executive will do its utmost for the furtherance of an active and class conscious Communist Party.

In Czecho-Slovakia the Executive has followed up with great patience and tact the revolutionary development of a proletariat which has already given proof of its determination and readiness to take a share in the revolutionary struggle. The Congress approves of the decision of the Executive to accept the Czech Communist Party as a member of the Communist International. The Congress trusts that the Executive will insist that the

twenty-one conditions be unswervingly carried out by the Czech Communist Party, and that a united Communist Party be formed comprising all the nationalities of Czecho-Slovakia with a purely Communist programme under firm Communist leadership and on a centralised basis, and also that the trade unions of that country should be speedily and decisively won over and united internationally in the great proletarian movement.

Finally, the Congress repudiates the objections which have been raised by the open and disguised adversaries of Communism against a vigorous international centralisation of the Communist movement. It expresses its deep conviction that all the parties will send their best forces to the Executive, and thereby bring about a still more militant political central leadership which is necessary for the indissoluble union of the affiliated Communist parties. The lack of such a leadership made itself felt, for instance, in the unemployment and reparation questions, in which the Executive did not act promptly and effectively. The Congress expects that, with the strengthened collaboration of the affiliated parties for the organisation of a better contact apparatus, and with the collaboration of the parties in the Executive, the latter will be able to fulfil its ever-increasing tasks on a still larger scale than it has done hitherto.

The delegations of the—

C.P. of Italy,
C.P. of Bulgaria,
C.P. of Germany,
C.P. of Norway,
C.P. of Czecho-Slovakia (German Section),
C.P. of Hungary,
C.P. of Austria,
C.P. of Switzerland,
C.P. of Rumania, and
The International of Youth.

Comrade Lorient, in the name of the French Delegation, said that they did not sign the last resolution because the German question, split into the question of the March events, and the C.L.P.G. was not discussed as a whole like the Italian question. The French delegation hoped that the March events will be discussed by a special committee. It was also necessary that the delegations be given the opportunity of discussing the means of regulating co-operation between the C.L.P.G. and the U.C.P.G. Therefore, they proposed that this discussion end, but the voting to be postponed till the work of the committee mentioned above be completed.

Comrade Sax, for the C.L.P.G., supported the French proposal. They proposed that the resolution be voted upon in sections and to include in this report a clause defining their attitude to the C.L.P.G. Radek and Zinoviev energetically opposed the French proposal. Zinoviev said it was either a misunderstanding or a hidden insult to the Executive Committee of the Comintern.

Roland Holst, on behalf of the minority of the Dutch Delegation, supported the C.L.P.G., and called upon the Congress not to reject this party, which called forth a retort from Comrade Radek about the injured innocence of the C.L.P.G. At the same time the debate was further involved by the opposition of the U.C.P.G. (adherents of Levi) who at first opposed the French proposal, but supported it after the retort of Heckert and Zinoviev, who in turn declared that the lack of faith expressed in the Executive Committee was but the judgment of Levi. The conduct of the opposition of the U.C.P.G. was severely rebuked by Comrade Radek. The French delegation then asked for an interval of ten minutes.

After that interval, Comrade Loriot said on behalf of the French Delegation, they withdrew their statement and would vote on the aforementioned resolution, protesting at the same time against the idea that the French delegation wished to express its distrust in the Executive Committee by means of its former proposal.

Comrade Zinoviev was then allowed to make the final statement, but limited himself to a short speech on account of illness. He said that, on the whole, the Executive Committee of the Comintern was not criticised much. As for Italy he had nothing to add. This question had been sufficiently discussed by Comrades Lenin, Gennari, Rakovsky, Zetkin, and others. He gladly supported what Comrade Zetkin had said on the Italian question, her speech differing little from the attitude taken up by the Executive Committee. Then Comrade Zinoviev quoted the article of Kurt Geyer, published in Levi's paper, "Sovjet," which said that the defeat suffered by the Italian Communist Party during the elections was a defeat for the Executive of the Comintern. This was not true. The young Communist Party of Italy, although surrounded on every side by enemies, received sixteen mandates. This did not mean a defeat. Even if it was defeated, this did not signify a blow to the Executive Committee of the Comintern. Comrade Zetkin told us in her speech on the Italian question that she had no orders from the Executive Committee; but she could have warned the Executive Committee by a letter, as she was in Moscow. This shows that she was not correct. The representatives of the C.L.P.G. said that it was not easy for them to agree with the proposal of the Comintern, that they co-operate with the U.C.P.G. Neither is it easy for us. We do not wish to lose them, but we cannot permit a breach in our programme. We have waited till now, we can wait another three months. But after that they must decide. Comrade Markovitch, representative of the Jugo-Slovakian Party, did not deny my statement that there were many with centralist tendencies in their Party. I must tell him that at the Conference which I had with the Jugo-Slovakian delegates, they did not agree with the opinion of the Comintern towards the Italian and German questions.

Comrade Zetkin, continued Zinoviev, said that the delegates were sent abroad without success, and conducted themselves

irresponsibly. I must say that they did as much as they possibly could. One must not forget that although Seratti called them the representatives of the Cardinals, and Levi called them the representatives of Turkestan, Comrade Zetkin, at any rate, should not call them irresponsible, as the Executive Committee of the Comintern answers for them. We ask other Parties to give us their most active and experienced comrades to help us in the Executive Committee, and for sending to other countries.

We will now proceed with the voting on the resolution, which includes voting on the questions of Halle, the exclusion of Levi, and the opposition group of the U.C.P.G., together with the March rising, after the discussion on tactics. But the German opposition, I must say, should look to the future and not to the past. Levi may be their personal friend, but the Comintern and the interests of the proletariat should be placed first.

The Congress then proceeded to vote on the aforementioned resolution, which was unanimously agreed upon and was followed by loud and continued applause, ending with the singing of the International.

TENTH SESSION.

The Session opened at 12.45 p.m.

Before the discussion of the agenda commenced,

Comrade Lazzarri made the following declaration in the name of the delegation of the Italian Socialist Party :—

As delegates of the Italian Socialist Party, we are compelled to take cognizance of the resolution adopted with respect to us, the more so as it completely coincides with the Bentivoglio resolution adopted at our Congress at Livorno.

Yet we are unable to conceal the painful impression made upon us by certain details in the explanation accompanying your decision, and which, in our opinion, do not correspond to the real situation in Italy after the Second International Congress. But we promise to do our utmost to induce the next Congress of our party to approve your resolution. We are completely convinced of the necessity of revolutionary unity in the organisation of the various sections of the Communist International.

Lazzarri, Tortantino,
Maffi, Fabrizio,
Reboldi, Ezio.

Further, a declaration of the Swedish delegation, and a communication of the Czecho-Slovakian delegation were, without discussion, referred to the Executive Committee and the Small Bureau.

Comrade Radek thereupon took the floor on the next point of the agenda : "Tactics." He said :—

Comrades! The tactics of the Communist International do not form a problem separate from the concrete facts of the particular period during which it exercises its influence, but rather must the Communist International determine its tactics

by a concrete analysis of each particular period. The Communist International must utilise even a prolonged breathing spell gained from capitalist society to prepare for the world revolution and these preparations consist in organisation, agitation, and the formation of armies for the coming battles. Comrade Trotsky's report, and the discussion on it, demonstrated that even though we are certain of the world revolution, we do not close our eyes to the possibility of periods during which the world crisis will make way for temporary prosperity. We are at present, however, not on the eve of the ebb of the world revolution, but rather collecting our revolutionary forces for new struggles. Martov, whom we certainly never considered to be especially in favour of the world revolution, also admits, in the May first edition of the "Freiheit," that the world revolution is by no means at an end. And if the two-and-a-half International points out that we had been speculating on a swift victory, whereas they, as realist politicians, had been convinced of the slow tempo of development, we can reply to them that our idea of the slow tempo of the world revolution differs from theirs. The two-and-a-half International imagines that this period will be one of peaceful, calm and gradual preparation of the parties; and when these parties shall have become big and strong, then the time will have come, and then even Adler and Crispian will be found fighting on the barricades. We, however, know that this period will be a long process of fierce struggle, for the Communists will not be able to work slowly and peacefully, waiting for something to turn up.

Neither in Central Europe nor in Western Europe will the Communists get the possibility of developing and preparing undisturbed; on the contrary, such preparation will take place amidst persecutions and conflicts. During the course of the coming battles there will be no reason to give up a single one of the basic ideas with which we entered the battle.

The resolution of the Second and a half International on the methods and organisation of the class struggle states, among other things, that wherever there is a danger of a proletarian class rule supplanting the bourgeoisie, the bourgeoisie will, as a rule, attempt to put down the democratic development by force—only where the bourgeoisie does not have sufficient means of oppression will the proletariat be able to assume political power through democracy. But even then, the bourgeoisie will use its economic power and try to disorganise the proletarian state by means of sabotage. Therefore, even in this case, the proletariat will be forced to apply dictatorial methods.

On the other hand, wherever the bourgeoisie has the power and means to assert its domination by force, it will destroy democracy and provoke the proletariat to an open struggle. The decisive factor here will not be the ballot-box but the economic and military resources of the fighting masses. The proletarian dictatorship will have to be realised by means of Workers', Peasants' and Soldiers' Councils.

It means that, as a rule, the proletariat must down the resistance of the bourgeoisie by force. Thus we see that the Second and a half International did not succeed in discovering any new

ideas, and that in spite of all the small talk about our theoretical bankruptcy nothing remains but the banner of the Communist International, the dictatorship of the proletariat and the Soviet system. But they also held that the time will come when the State will be able to do without soldiers.

Lately the chief argument against the Communist International has become the assertion that the state of Russia is a proof that the proletarian dictatorship is not the way to victory.

Russia, they say, proved by its concessions to foreign capital and the petty bourgeoisie that the dictatorship does not lead to Communism. If Russia proves anything at all it is that an isolated and agricultural country finds it much more difficult to introduce Communism. On the other hand, the example of England and France proves that the way of democracy leads us to the rule of plutocracy, the rule of reaction. Our chief task from the very first day consisted in winning over to Communism the proletarian masses, to gather them into a revolutionary proletarian vanguard.

These tactics attacked some of the comrades who regard themselves as being more Left than ourselves—Gorter and Pannekok. It is said that the basis of proletarian dictatorship in Western Europe must be broader than in Russia, as the bourgeoisie is better organised. In this respect we are of the same opinion. The question consists only in how we should win the masses over to Communist ideas, objects and struggles. In this respect Gorter and Pannekok maintain the view that the small group of Communists should gather and take on themselves, so to speak, the task of prophets, who will rouse the masses by their example. With what example? They cannot start a rising, for that is a matter for the masses; the same holds good as regards mass strikes, consequently all they can do is to carry on propaganda. Contrary to this theory of the Dutch, the C.L.P.G. is willing to take up the struggle with anarchy in all its aspects. The Communist International must object to this theory, for experience has taught us that this theory has not helped the Labour movement to make a single step forward. It is only where the masses gather in the trade unions, where we also meet the counter-revolutionary elements, that we have to conquer that part of the proletariat which will go along with us.

Our main task consists in conquering the great masses for the ideas of Communism. This question can only be solved if we examine critically all the teachings which the practice of former times has left us. ~~Let us consider~~ the little English Communist Party. Imagine England, where a great class struggle is taking place at the present time. We can see here that even the smallest Communist party must show the way to the masses. It is not enough for us to rely on the motto, "Don't trust your leaders"; we must have the proletariat, and must be in the front ranks of the fighters. We must, therefore, call on the masses to go forward. If we analyse the lessons of the three great mass struggles of the proletariat—the Italian struggle with the seizure of factories, the Czecho-Slovakian struggles, and the German March rising—we shall discover the great way which we

have to follow. In Italy the most ill-used of the proletariat—the metal, textile, and chemical workers—took possession of the factories. The homeless proletarians took possession of the villas and palaces of the rich in order to utilise them for their wives and children. This was undoubtedly a great revolutionary mass movement. But Seratti states that this was a trade union movement. Half-a-million workers were taking part in the revolutionary struggle. The Government were powerless; but the trade union bureaucracy thought that it had the control of production in its hands, and broke off the struggle. The workers should have mainly attempted to use the actual control of production as a means of consolidating themselves against the capitalist state, and as the means of arming the working class.

The spontaneous movement in Czecho-Slovakia which started after the People's Palace had been robbed, assumed immense proportions. The German workers of Northern Bohemia joined in the struggle and made several demands; the restitution of the People's Palace, the liberation of the prisoners, the formation of the Workers' Councils, higher wages, the arming of the workers, etc. The leader of the Left Socialist Party ever since its foundation asserted that the masses were not sufficiently prepared, and that we cannot openly form a Communist Party. The masses were not ripe, and now events have proved that the masses were riper than the leaders. However, the Party has not profited by the lesson of this great struggle. The great movement was allowed to slip without leadership.

The German March rising gave us an example of the opposite. Levi, in his pamphlet, represents this movement as if it had been engineered by a few hot-heads, and in that case we could hardly draw any lessons from it. However, we are not going to discuss this. Let us all try to learn things.

Comrade Radek then gave a short retrospective history of the U.C.P.G. movement from its foundation as the Spartacus Union to the Halle Party Congress.

The German Party to this day has not a Press that is closely connected with the broad masses of the workers. It is still to a large measure a theoretical and explanatory Press, which publishes articles yards long but does not echo the demands of the masses. When we examine the files of the centre organ of the Russian Party, the "Pravda," we will find that it gives expression to what the masses feel.

The most important question which confronted the Party was how to approach the masses. In Germany the masses are organised in trade unions, which have a ten million membership, and a party which also counts its members in millions. The decision of the party to commence a great campaign with the object attracting the masses to the party, and to tear them away from their trade union and Social Democratic leaders, found its expression in the open letter. The great movement of the railwaymen and postal servants should have been used to bring pressure on the Social Democratic and trade union bureaucracy, either to create a united movement or, in the event of their refusing to do so, to leave us a clear field.

The Right wing in the party crystallised itself on the Italian question. The Left comrades remained alone on the Executive, and had now to make it more active; and here I come to the fundamental error. You say that the sky is overhung with black clouds, of the danger of the sanctions, etc. All questions were real. Up to the 17th of March the whole press was peacefully cruising in the old waters, and on the 18th of March it unmasked its guns. This is the main error. On the 17th of March the National Council was called together and the representatives were shown the great dangers. Above everything else, the party had to ask itself whether it was able to set preparations for the action going in the speediest possible manner. I assert that the party spiritually was not prepared for the great struggle. It must be asked how did the masses regard the dangers of the sanctions and Upper Silesia? The masses do not take up any attitude towards dangers which have yet to come. They operate under the pressure of events that immediately affect them, and the only aim of the party should have been to increase the organisation work, and to rally the organisation under the motto: "Be prepared!" The representative of the Central German organisations asked what should be done in the event of Hösing breaking into Central Germany. The reply was "Easter Eve is an unfavourable moment for fighting; try and avoid battle." Only when the factories were occupied did the party call upon the workers. When I asked a comrade from Central Germany why an armed struggle commenced on the 19th instead of waiting for instructions from the central committee, he replied that, if we had not commenced the struggle we should have had to live through something.

When the "Rote Fahne" wrote that everybody must arm, it was a signal for battle. The position of the Party was unreal; it should have stated, "if Hösing invades Central Germany we will stand by you." Its duty was to say to the Mansfield workers, "You are in a minority, and if you will allow yourselves to be drawn you will be defeated." It began an armed struggle, but did not issue the corresponding battle cries, and during the struggle it lost all sense of perspective.

Comrades! I assert that we stand by the March action, we regard it as the duty of the party to hasten to the aid of the Central German proletariat. The Mansfield workers were the centre, and not the hydrocephalus—Berlin. Whoever points to this or that defect but does not say what the Party should have done during the Hösing attack shows that he has nothing to say, that he wishes to criticise the struggle of the party but does not wish to learn from them. In Central Germany the number of workers that fought was not less than two hundred thousand, but that is not the point. The party had a tremendous struggle, and it has to recognise the errors. This struggle was not a Bakunin putsch; it was a struggle of a proletarian party in defence of the German workers. Mistakes, however, were made. The methods of the offensive were not strictly defined. With the exception of Levi, nobody opposed this theory. On the 7th of April Comrade Zetkin declared that

a large party is in duty bound to take up the offensive. But she repudiated the March rising because, in her opinion, it was a putsch and not an offensive. Comrade Zetkin's criticism, however, lacks the suggestion as what should have been done when Hörsing attacked Central Germany. That military expert, Clausewitz, in his chapter on "Offensive and Defensive," says: "While on the defensive, I cling to what I hold, and keep in contact with the enemy; while during an offensive my aim is to surprise him." Where is the base to which you will cling during the defensive, which is known better to you than to the enemy; and where is the possibility of surprising the enemy with millions of the proletariat? And Clausewitz says: "The defensive is a strong fighting method, for then I defend that which I possess. Up till now all the great fights of the proletariat were directed against attempts of capitalism to oppress. What is Social Revolution? It is the revolution of the suffering working masses which for four solid years were decimated by the guns of capitalism; and if we cannot win without a great attack of the compact masses we shall attack the enemy by trying to instil in the working classes the idea: "Save your skin, unless you wish to become a slave." The idea, therefore, that the party is exclusively bound to offensive tactics appears to us altogether wrong and impracticable. The party which does not embrace the masses has very little scope left for manœuvring.

We draw the following lessons from March,

The transition from agitational work to propaganda for a rising is by no means an easy one.

Even the great mass parties should not be over confident; you can only prove your metal in the struggle itself, and it is only then that we shall see which members really hold with the party.

It is not so much by his arguments, as by the way he acted, that Levi has shown that there is no organic connection between him and the party, and that he is able to stick a knife in the back of the party at a time when the party is in dire distress.

The March rising teaches us that our apparatus is not yet adapted to a struggle. The military and political departments have proved themselves mere illusions. First, because they did not actually exist; secondly, if they existed anywhere, they had no arms; and thirdly, because they were undisciplined.

If we say: "Comrades! the March rising, with all its errors, was a step forward," we wish to suggest that you are faced by struggles in which you must expect even greater defeats, unless you learn to guard yourself against everything that can be avoided.

Comrade Radek then discussed the watchwords which were issued by the Executive with regard to the partial struggles and risings which are in store for the proletarians, and which are encouraged by the Executive.

We must be clear as to the difference between the minimum programme of the Social Democrats, the activity and programme of the Centre, and the watchwords of the Communist International. The Social Democrats counted on a long period during which the capitalist order will remain in existence. Roß

Luxembourg formerly gave expression to this idea by declaring : "We fight rarely in order that labour may be bought for its proper worth ; that the workers obtain wages which allow them to recuperate their labour energies." Social democracy wishes to create an impression among the ruins of capitalist world dominion that it is most anxious to co-operate in the reforms of the declining order of society. The Centre wishes to create an impression that it does not share the platform of social democracy. It professes to stand on the ground of the social revolution, and is making only such demands which can be realised in the process of social revolution, and in the struggle subsequent to it. The U.S.P. in Germany, and the I.W.W. in America, have adopted the following plan. They quote Lassalle, who in the sixties told the proletarians : "You must concentrate your strength on the main point : do not look to the right and do not look to the left ; but ask every party and every man, 'What is your attitude to Universal Suffrage?'" The Centrists say democracy has realised it. And now the question is : how are we to wrest the mines and factories from the capitalists? In answer, they sketch a Lassallian revolutionary plan that the proletariat concentrate its action on the nationalisation of coal mines. The workers must obtain the right to the coal, and the idea is that the struggle to obtain this right will lead to tremendous clashes which will be the lever of revolution. Now the case in England shows that it is impossible for the proletariat at the present moment, when the workers are bleeding from a thousand wounds, to concentrate a couple of months on the fight for the socialisation, or rather the nationalisation, of the coal industry.

Rosa Luxembourg's minimum demands for the workers were : All power to the Workers' Soviets, arming of the proletariat, confiscation of the State debt and seizing of the factories. This programme arose in a situation when the Workers' Soviets were in power. Now the power has passed to the bourgeoisie, and the proletarian revolution is only in the initial stage. Thus we can neither advance nor organise when we come out merely with the programme of proletarian dictatorship. If to-morrow the worker can afford to give his children a slice of meat because of a five marks increase in his wages, we shall have to help him in his fight for this increase, and think at the same time that over and above this help we are to lead him to further and greater battles. When it is a question of foiling the sabotage of a capitalist, this slogan can unite great working masses who are not Communists, but whom Communists need in order to carry on further combats by the help of this united front. The second watchword which we must cling to for a long time is the demand for arming the proletariat and disarming the bourgeoisie.

As to the passage in Trotsky's solution on the importance of essentials, we emphasise the following points : Capitalism is breaking down, but not in a straight line. Revolution advances, but has its ebb and flow. Good revolutionary propaganda is the best preparation for action. And as we are approaching great battles, we say to you, "Be the great alarm bell to arouse the

living to the fight." But so far we are only a small bell-clapper. And so our slogan is, "First get your hold on the masses by all means, and then get ready for the great struggle that tomorrow has in store for us." Make the best out of every situation. It is a mistake to believe that this is a shift to the Right; it is just as wide of the mark to harp on the mistakes made by good elements of the Left. They are at the Left end of the Communist International, who are getting ready so as to be able to lead in the fight. And any one who obstructs their path by opportunistic theories is at the Right end.

We see the road to the world revolution running through the conquest of the great masses. And we shall lead the better if we use every available form of energy to rouse the masses, weld them for action, and utilise every agency to draw out their revolutionary energy, coupled with clear, cool insight. If we act thus, our victory is secured.

The Session closed at 4.20 p.m.

ELEVENTH SESSION.

Before proceeding to the order of the day, the Chairman, COMRADE KOENEN, suggested that it would be in the interest of the Red Trade Union International if the Congress adhered more strictly to the points on the agenda. The speakers were, therefore, requested to confine themselves to the points in question, and not to dwell upon irrelevant matters.

Thereupon the discussion on tactics was resumed, and **Comrade Hempel** (C.L.P.G.) took the floor.

We are in agreement with the first part of Comrade Radek's report, in which he states that an examination of the international economic situation yields the conclusion that the capitalistic economic system is bound to collapse, and that the proletarian revolution is bound to follow. But there are differences of opinion with regard to the actual course and form of the revolution. The experience of the revolutionary period since 1917 has proved that the organisational form of the masses are the Soviets. Therefore, we must preserve for the future the system of proletarian organisation. We have, therefore, renounced the old forms of the labour movement in order to give the revolutionary workers a definite direction in which the revolution should proceed. Before the war the task of the labour movement was to elect deputies to the Parliaments while the economic organisations were concerned with the betterment of the labour conditions by means of a fight or negotiations. After the revolution the workers' organisations could no longer place their faith in parliamentary activity to improve the lot of the workers or to raise their wages.

It is not in vain that the old labour movement possesses its special organisations, for they do not require revolutionary fighters, but men who can conduct negotiations both in parliament and with the employers. Trade Unions are only auxiliary bodies for the preservation of the capitalist order. You cannot

bring about a revolution with such organisations. The proletariat must create organisations which aim at the destruction of the capitalist state. We must, therefore, urge the workers to combine in unions formed according to the speciality of place of work in order to get hold of the productive forces and the factories. The methods of struggle must be revolutionary and they must be adapted to the present economic situation.

Our enemies are taking all the precautionary measures to preserve their power in the state as well as in the field of economics. For this purpose our enemies combine internationally, and the trusts that result from such combinations create huge unemployment. Hence the economic split of the proletariat: the worker who is engaged in work is anxious not to lose his job; whereas the unemployed becomes the enemy of those who can still exist. Thus the capitalist dominion is being re-established, for a short while at any rate, on the bodies of the starving workers. We must, therefore, frame our fighting tactics in such a way as to be able to take up the struggle in any one of its phases. For that purpose we must utilise every opportunity however insignificant, for, as Comrade Radek stated, we must try to prevent by all means the reconstruction of this system as proposed by the capitalists. As we must always be in a fighting position, the organisation of the proletariat must be built up in such a way that it will be easily concentrated. We shall achieve this by organising Soviets and by keeping in touch with the factories through trusty comrades and Soviets.

It is absolute nonsense to suddenly declare an offensive. We must come to a defensive by extending every conflict, by intensifying every struggle. When we were preparing rebellion by means of propaganda and pamphlets, the "Rote Fahne," "Freiheit," and all the provincial papers warned against spies, agents provocateurs, and other suspicious characters.

We welcome every rise and every struggle, for it is bound to bring us further ahead. Therefore we do not reject any partial actions. The state of things is now similar to that of the year 1918. In November of that year, the soldiers and the workers had learned the great lesson from the preliminary fights of January, 1918—the time of the great movement on the part of the munition and dock workers. The same will be the effect of the March fight of 1921. The March rising has taught us that we must go into the battle with the set purpose of doing away with the capitalist government, with the existing state of affairs.

The proletariat should be organised in order to be politically and economically represented in the capitalist state. It must organise itself for revolution. The Communist must create a frame, and such a frame we have in the organisations grouped by industries, industrial territories and entire countries. This does not imply that this party should be small; it should, however, know what it wants and be tried in battle. In order to lead, the Communist International must follow this line.

Anarcho-Syndicalists, whose tactics are decades ahead of time, lack the experience of welding the workers into one whole. Here Communists must step in and help them conduct the fight.

Whether we give up parliamentarianism or the Trade Union movement is, so far as Communists are concerned, not a question of principle, but of purely practical import. And now comes the question as to what the Congress will now decide. If it follows the traditional lines of the labour movement, it is bound to go down into the pit where the latter is now. If it takes a decided step to get to terms with the Left elements, and recognise that there is something good in them as well, the Third International Congress will give the revolution a new impetus. If it chooses the opposite course, it is sure to get stranded. It is within the province of this Congress to decide the issue. In the same light we consider the question of affiliation with the Third International.

Comrade Terracini is then granted the floor within the extended time-limit.

He said that Comrade Radek's theses were substantially the same as those advanced by Comrade Trotsky. Since we, as well as the German, Austrian and Italian delegates, and the Young Communists have approved the latter, we also stand for Comrade Radek's theses as they are now. Some amendments, however, may be suggested afterwards.

These theses convey the impression that in Italy the anarchists hold sway over the proletariat. On the contrary, after the confusion following the Livorno Congress had been overcome, the proletarian masses became more and more compact by the help of the Communist Party.

Radek, in his theses, used too strong language aimed at the Left tendencies. It is far more necessary to direct our attention to the reformist and centrist tendencies. We should by no means run away with the idea of clearing the Third International of some groups and centrism within its ranks. There still are leaders who have joined it under pressure of the proletarian masses. The Executive Committee must take care that Serattis and Levis no longer find their way into our ranks. We can only advise the French Party to keep an eye on the reformist tendencies within it.

As to the Czecho-Slovakian question touched upon in Radek's theses, I must say it is not enough that we point the way to the Communist Party to increase its membership by propaganda and agitation, because this is the view of the reformists. The task before the relatively colossal Communist Party in Czecho-Slovakia must rather consist in showing the masses by action that the party is the representative of the proletariat. The same can be said about Radek's theses as regards Radek himself. When the new fight sets in, the party must lead the proletarian masses; this fight, however, is soon to come in spite of the March defeats. The Italian masses are quite enthusiastic over the splendid heroism shown by the German comrades in the March uprising. And so the March fights have borne their fruit in this respect as well.

Revolutionary discipline has stood the test of battle, and we were enabled to unmask the reformists and the opportunists.

Radek treated somewhat ironically the theory of aggressive action. Under this term we interpret not only in a military sense, but in a general sense a mode of action opposed to passivity.

Comrade Frölich said that in view of Comrade Terracini's motions, and the amendments made by the three delegations, we should by all means take the offensive. We must by all means find the right line of action. It might be said that our theses are a compromise. Yes, but under certain circumstances obtaining within Communist ranks, compromises are absolutely imperative. After we have expelled even the centrists, Terracini still wants to keep up the fight; this must be ruthlessly combatted. Comrade Frölich then dealt with some detail with Terracini's amendments, which he rejected. The speaker then argued with more detail in favour of the amendments proposed by the German delegation.

Comrade Lenin said :—

To my great regret I must limit myself to the defensive. I say to my regret because having listened to the speech of Comrade Terracini, and having read in to-day's number of "Moscow" the amendments to our theses by the three delegations, I felt an insuperable desire to pass to the offensive. For unless the Congress will act very decidedly and against such errors, which are like the childishness of the Lefts, the movement is doomed to defeat. Surely we are organised, disciplined Marxians, and we cannot be satisfied with a verbal fight. When drafting our theses we must act in an organised way and strike the right line. It is an open secret that our theses are the result of a compromise and why should they not be such? Communists in their own circle and under certain circumstances must compromise. After the centrists had not only been formally condemned but altogether expelled, Terracini declared that we must wage a determined struggle against the centrists, and tells us what he understands by such a struggle. If this tendency is represented by these amendments then we must altogether ruthlessly combat it. I am only surprised that the C.L.P.G. did not endorse these amendments. Let us examine them. First amendment: to exclude the word "majority" and substitute the word "aim" for principles. There is a big difference between principles and aims. As regards aims, we could agree with anarchists. They also want to do away with exploitation and the classes. I have met very few anarchists in my life, but I always agree with them as regards our aims. But I could never agree on principles. Principles are not an aim or programme or tactics, nor are they a theory. How do we differ from the anarchists in our principle? The fundamental basis of communism is the proletarian dictatorship during the transition period.

This is a principle, but it is not by any means our aim. Comrades who imagine this are unable to understand the a.b.c. of communism. It is further proposed to exclude the word "majority" from that passage in the theses where it is stated that not a single European mass Communist Party was yet able to assume actual leadership over the majority of the working

class in a real revolutionary struggle. And it is here they want to exclude the word "majority." If there is no agreement on such elementary things, then there is nothing surprising in that we cannot agree on principles. Show me the party which has conquered the majority of the working class. Terracini did not even think of doing it. Even the German party does not lead the majority of the working class. This is a fact. We, after three years of our revolution, are not afraid of uttering this. And we are met here by three delegations which wish to start with such an untruth. If the Congress strikes out this word "majority," it will thereby emphasise that it wants untruth. Further, the amendments proposed to strike out the text from the words "open letters" onwards. To-day I heard a speech which suggested that idea. It was appropriate to that speech. It was the speech of Comrade Hempel, who stated that the open letter was opportunist. To my great regret I have already heard such opinions in private conversations. It is the greatest shame for the Congress to declare the open letter opportunist. And now comes Terracini in the name of three delegations and wishes to strike out the "open letter." Why should we then fight the C.L.P.G.? The open letter was the first attempt by practical means to win the working class to our side. Whoever in Europe, where nearly the whole of the proletariat is organised, fails to understand that we must conquer the majority of the working class, is lost to the Communist movement. He will never learn anything. Terracini states that we have won in Russia although we had a small party at our back, and he is dissatisfied that our theses declare that the Czecho-Slovakian Party numbering 400,000 to 500,000 members must, none the less, win over the majority of the working class. Terracini is at a loss to understand this.

What! 400,000 to 500,000, and it is necessary to win new ones? He is afraid of it, and wants to strike it out. We have been a small party in Russia, but we had the majority of workers and peasant Soviets on our side. Where else does that obtain? We have at least half of the ten million army on our side. Show me another country where we have half of the army. We must determinedly oppose the amendments of these three delegations. That is why I defend our revolution. Let no one imagine that this is pedantry. You cannot change it in a single letter, because the amendments proposed bear a political character. Terracini was advocating the offensive. For this purpose he referred to the dynamic tendencies and to the transition from a passive to an active spirit. We had political experience in this domain. For the last fourteen years or so we have been fighting with the Mensheviks and the semi-anarchists, and unless we had done so we should not have been able to remain in power for three weeks, let alone three years and a half. The dynamic tendencies and the transition from the passive to the active spirit were precisely the mottoes used by the Left S.R.'s when they were fighting us. The amendments moved do not bear a trace of Marxism. Do we discuss at all the theory of the offensive in our theses? Even fifteen years ago, when we had the Social Democrat in our midst, who doubted that a revolutionary party could assume

the offensive, we immediately called him an opportunist, and opposed him in a most determined manner. This was fifteen years ago. But now, after three and a half years of revolution, to discuss the dynamic tendencies and the transition from passivity to activity is a shame. It is not right to speak of an offensive in Germany at a time when no such offensive was in preparation. The March events were a great step forward, in spite of misguided leadership. But this is not fatal. The point is that hundreds of thousands of workers were heroically fighting. Radek was right when he said, instancing Hoeltz, that if anyone, be he even an anarchist, wages an heroic struggle against the bourgeoisie, he is doing good work. And if hundreds of thousands of workers are fighting against the mean treachery of the social traitors and the bourgeoisie, it is a decisive step forward. It is important to criticise errors, but if anyone, like Levi, opposes the struggle after hundreds of thousands have taken part in it, he must be expelled. We, in Russia, were victorious, we had an easy victory, because we prepared our revolution at the time of the imperialist war. We won because the enormous peasant mass was against the landowners. The S.Rs., the gentlemen of the Second and Second and a-Half International, were a great peasants' party in September, 1919. They demanded revolutionary action, but like true heroes of the Second and Second and a-Half International, they were not capable of carrying it out themselves, and as early as August, 1917, we stated that theoretically we shall be at war with the S. Rs. as before; practically we are prepared to realise their program. The peasantry, which, in November, 1917, after our victory, sent an S. R. majority into the Constituent Assembly, was won over to our side, if not in a few days, at any rate in a few weeks. Show me a single country in Europe where you can win over to your side the majority of the peasants in the course of a few weeks. Is it Italy? Some people say that we were victorious in Russia though we formed a small party, but those who say this betray their utter ignorance of the Russian Revolution and of how revolutions are prepared. The first step in our movement was to create genuine Communist parties. At the first and second Congress it meant: Down with the centrists! But the formation of genuine revolutionary parties is only the preparatory school. We are now at the Third Congress, and Terracini still continues to quote examples from the preparatory school lessons. A break with Centrists; down with the Centrists. Down with the Centrists. Hound them out of the party. Well, thank you, I have had enough of this. We must move forward, be it ever so slowly. We must leave that preparatory school, no matter whether in many countries we have not even thought of doing it. We won in Russia because we had a solid majority not only among the working class but among the army, and peasants as well. But such, as yet, is not the case with you. We must pave the way for the dictatorship of the proletariat, and that means combating such opinions as these.

The C.L.P.G. has often here misused the word mass, and has really ceased to understand the meaning of that term. The conception of "mass" alters with the conditions of the struggle.

At the beginning of the struggle it was sufficient at times to possess two hundred thousand men in order to speak of a mass; we know of cases when small groups took the place of masses. But when the movement develops and grows, when a genuine revolution is approaching, the conception of the word "mass" changes. Then the masses are no longer a couple of thousand men. Then the mass means the majority of the working class, and not only of the working class, but of all those who are exploited. Whoever fails to understand this is not revolutionary. It is possible that even a small party, if it rightly understands the situation, if it has well studied the life and habits of the non-party masses, will lead the whole mass—the millions of workers. And now comrades appear and propose carefully to expunge everywhere the word "majority." I urge you to fight such comrades. We must wage a real revolutionary struggle. The German workers have started this. Hundreds of thousands of German workers have been heroically fighting. Anyone who is against this should at once be expelled. But, having expelled him, we must not be satisfied with phrases, but learn by our mistakes, and not fear to reveal them to our enemies. On the contrary, we must openly state to the workers: We made a mistake here, and this means that we shall not repeat it next time. And after making the majority of the workers and exploited join us in the struggle, we shall win.

TWELFTH SESSION.

The session opened at 8 p.m., under the chairmanship of Comrade Koenen.

The discussion of Comrade Radek's report was continued.

Comrade Heckert, of the United Communist Party of Germany, was the speaker.

Before I begin to analyse the history of the March rising, he said, I must say a few words on the statements of Comrades Mihaliak and Lenin. Comrade Mihaliak spoke of the mistakes of the German Party, but, at the same time, fully agreed with Comrade Lenin's point of view, which is quite in contradiction with the critical outlook of the Polish party. One cannot but be surprised at such an apparent contradiction. As regards Comrade Lenin's speech, it contained some chronological mistakes. We did not write an open letter in 1919. It was written only two months after the formation of the United Communist Party of Germany. We quite agree with Comrade Lenin on the question of tactics and of aims. Communism is not only a social structure, but a movement with a certain definite object in view. Dealing with incidents in the life of the German Communist party, Comrade Heckert said: The United Communist Party of Germany has only been in existence since December of last year. It resulted from the uniting of the Spartacists with the left wing of the Independent Socialists. It is clear, then, that because of its origin and the inexperience of its revolutionary strength it could not foresee that it would have to take part in the first open fight with the bourgeoisie in the near future. It is well known that part of the Spartacists, which

had an Anarchistic inclination, left the party after affiliation with the Independents. The leaders of the Communist Party of Germany, in the person of its chairman, Paul Levi, were of the opinion that any step against the enemy meant the possibility of a putsch. On the other hand, the majority of the members of the Independent Socialist party of Germany came over to us, inspired not by their understanding of the revolutionary questions of the moment, but by their class instincts. The most intense activity amongst the Independents appeared during the advance of the Red Army on Warsaw. They thought that the Red Army would take Warsaw any minute and then proceed to Berlin. When the Red Army retreated, there was consternation in the ranks of the Independents. Hence, as a result of the unity convention, we did not get hold of those comrades whom we expected. No sooner had we united than the electric workers' movement began. And the first faltering movement began. Two wings appeared in the party. It was still during the Kapp days that Levi said that he thought of a revolutionary movement during the next three years. No suitable slogan was created for the spreading of the electric workers' movement, and hence it was lost to the cause of the revolution. Then the Italian question cropped up. It created a crisis in the party, and not only resulted in the resignation of five members, but shook the party to its very foundation. After some time, we had to attend a conference to decide on this question. Here, then, one should take note of the circumstances which existed on the eve of the March rising. They consisted of a combination of the interior and exterior conditions of the country. We were threatened by a struggle in Upper Silesia, then there was the question of the disarmament of Bavaria, then the threats of the Entente, and its decision to establish a custom barrier, then the refusal of the Ruhr miners to hand coal over to the Entente in accordance with the Spa agreement; and then the agricultural workers' movement, which all goes to show that the country was in a very dangerous position, and that an outbreak could be expected at any moment. Therefore, if the party did not wish to be in the same position as it was on the eve of the Kappputsch, it was evident that quick preparatory organising was necessary. On March 17 the Executive Committee decided to revise the activities of the party. At the same time Hörsing began his provocation. Our committee in Halle said, "Do not give way to this provocation." But our Mansfield comrades took no heed of this warning. The Hamburg comrades decided to support Mansfield. All this brought before the Executive Committee the fact that there was a rising. Could our party refuse to take part in the beginning of the proletariat's struggle? We could not desert this movement, because we would have lost the faith of the proletariat, who would have looked upon us as upon Social-Democrats or Independents.

The stimulating and courageous articles in "Rote Fahne" were criticised here. Of course, we confess that this was a mistake. But it was necessary to ring the alarm, because beside Hörsing's provocation there were expected outbreaks in Upper

Silesia. The Executive Committee itself criticised its activities during the March revolt, which criticisms were expressed in its theses on tactics published in the "Rote Fahne." But there are moments when circumstances compel a revolutionary party to take the initiative into its own hands. That which hindered the work of the party was the passivity of our comrades of the opposition, who sabotaged the March movement. We used all our strength to fight this opposition and sabotage.

In revealing the tactics of Levi, Comrade Heckert accused Clara Zetkin, who was popular in the revolutionary movement of the workers, of shielding the criminal activities of Levi and his supporters. If it were not for Comrade Zetkin, we would not have had to excuse ourselves for the March events, because the future would have shown that we had gained knowledge from our mistakes.

Comrade Burian declared, in the name of the Czecho-Slovakian delegation, that there were no Smeral tendencies in the constitution of the Czecho-Slovakian Communist party. There were various tendencies in the party, but there were not and could not be any Smeral tendencies. Comrade Burian emphasised the fact that he was not expressing his own personal opinion, but that of the entire Czecho-Slovakian Party. After we have seen at this Congress, said Comrade Burian, that there are such tendencies in certain parties, we can say with pride that there are none in our party. We will never have them, such is our need and aim.

When we heard of Smeral here, then it became apparent to us that it was not only a question of Smeral or of centrism and poor policy, but that the entire Czecho-Slovakian Communist Party reeked with Smeral, that the party was poor in quality, and suffered from passivity. We now affirm that this is not true. The revolutionary workers of Tchecho-Slovakia demonstrated their activities last December. If 200,000 workers took part in the March revolt in Germany, then we had the participation of 1,000,000 workers.

Comrade Burian quoted Comrade Smeral's declaration, made at the Congress, who stated that the party must make use of all the demonstrations of the proletariat for the propagation of Communistic ideas. This declaration is in agreement with the statements just made by Comrade Heckert.

Comrade Malzhan, for the opposition section of the Communist Party of Germany, said: We, representatives of the opposition, came to the World Congress to make the soil healthy for the future growth of the German Communist movement. We are in full agreement with the reports of Comrades Trotsky and Radek. What they have said will give impetus to the proletarian movement; while omitting to face errors, and hiding our mistakes and hardships is undoubtedly a sign of delusion.

What were the conditions in Germany before the March revolt? The Spartacists united with the Left Independents, swearing solemnly to do everything for the Revolution. As a representative of the Central Council of Trade Unions, I must say

that our influence, that is, the influence of our party among the trade unions, was very strong. That the declaration of the bourgeoisie to fight us, with its tactics directed against us, did not hurt us. On the contrary, it made our influence much stronger.

Comrade Malzhan then continued with an account of the internal and external situation of Germany much the same as Comrade Heckert did. In such circumstances Comrade Malzhan said: It was necessary to weigh the situation. On the 17th of March the Central Committee theoretically established the tactics for the "offensive." Anyone present at the session of the Central Committee, and having listened to the report of Comrade Brandler, must have come to the conclusion that in it he can read anything his heart desires, because of its extreme indefiniteness. Comrade Frölich declared that we must finish with the past, and commence a real preparation for the revolution. Comrade Friedland insisted that we must assume an offensive even if the Communists alone participate in it. I opposed his position, pointing to the impossibility of basing a movement on the action of Communists alone. Because an undertaking, which is based upon the forces of an insignificant number of Communists, is unable to succeed in bringing about a strike; Comrade Heckert affirmed that the Central Committee faced facts, and that in Hamburg it was impossible to hold back the workers from striking. Hamburg cannot be cited as a general case, since it has only 10,000 workers.

Comrade Malzhan is surprised at the fact that nothing was mentioned about it in Berlin. This great industrial centre participated very little during the March rising. Where were the results of the March events? As a party, we lost the confidence of the workers. The active element was discharged from the factories, and others grew despondent and passive.

Exciting articles of the "Rote Fahne" did not attract any more the workers to our side, on the contrary, these articles were driving them into the arms of the Mensheviks. That the point of view of our opposition was correct, you yourself affirmed here at the Congress. You have stated that for a party to go over from agitation to action is a hard task.

With regard to Levi, Malzhan then said: The Third International is dearer to us than single individuals. The Congress decided the question of Paul Levi, and therefore we have done with it. We came to this Congress in a spirit of enthusiasm, and we hope that our discussions will result in building secure foundations for a healthy Communist movement in Germany.

The speech of Comrade Malzhan was very often interrupted by remarks of the delegates of the United Communist Party of Germany.

Comrade Bucharin, in discussing the question of tactics, said: A number of questions are touched upon which are accepted as truisms. This is what happened with the "discovery" by the Communist Labour Party of Germany, of the theory of the offensive, and concerning which, in so far as this theory is reduced to a dogma, Comrade Lenin has already emphasised

here, has been outgrown by us. The question under discussion, however, is not tactical theories, but the concrete conditions which can be applied to the working out of definite tactics. Our theses are not something congealed and eternal, as there can be no tactical principles, which are incontestable under all circumstances. In May of 1919 the Bolsheviks refuted the bourgeois lies, that they wanted to kindle a civil war, and in October of that same year called for civil war. Comrade Lenin was in favour of the conclusion of the Brest-Litovsk peace, under some conditions, and in favour of the offensive against Warsaw, under others. All these tactical indications were correct in their time and place, and do not by any means contradict each other. This only proves the flexibility of the party, and proves its ability to grapple with various circumstances. I want to warn all those who may think that the new Executive Committee, whatever its composition will be, will very severely reprimand every party which will not assume the offensive at the first necessary conditions.

Further, the speaker dealt with the case of Levi, and said it is necessary to discuss that question, as there are still some sympathisers of his in the Communist Parties. What ought the Communist Party to be, a mass party or sect? Last year Levi was a fiery defender of the Communist purity of the Third International, and after his expulsion from the party, he accuses it of sectarianism, and demands the creation of a mass party. On the question of the party and its leaders, Levi was formerly a fiery opponent of the Communist Labour Party of Germany, now he supports the "labour opposition" in the Russian Communist Party, and republishes their theses in full. In analysing the situation in Soviet Russia, Levi recommends full freedom of thought, seeking obviously to unite the hands of the Mensheviks and the Social Revolutionists. Last year, opposition to the dictatorship of classes, to the dictatorship of the party, seemed as absurd to Levi as it does to-day. Now Levi says, "The dictatorship of class is always the dictatorship of the party, but not always is the dictatorship of the party the dictatorship of a class." Such a statement would appear the height of absurdity to every Marxist.

If the dictatorship of the party is accomplished—if that party is really Communist, i.e., expressing the interests of the working class, then its dictatorship is the dictatorship of a class, even if the proletariat in the mass became declassed and the dictatorial Communist party continued to hold power in its hands. It is perfectly clear that Levi makes use of everything that he can, for the purpose of harming the committee of the party. From the dictatorship of the proletariat, Levi is infallibly drifting to bourgeois democracy, and is going over to the Menshevik position more and more.

In conclusion, the speaker touched on the Communist Labour Party of Germany. In his pamphlet, Gorter said that the Russian and European Revolution is perishing from the fact that the Russian Communist party and the Comintern lacks the understanding of historical materialism. Is that not a consequence of not having carefully read the pamphlet of

Gorter on the subject? At the commencement of his pamphlet Gorter says that it is impossible to transfer the methods of Russia to Europe, and at the end, speaking of the Kronstadt events, he says that they prove the necessity of Russia adopting the methods of the West. Thus the Gorter truths change with every page, when it is necessary to prove the righteousness of the Communist Labour party of Germany. The Communist Labour party of Germany put forward a special theory on factory committees; therein lies the crux of the C.L.P.G. Meanwhile, the opinion that capitalism is organised on enterprise is a wrong one. Contemporary trusts embrace not only enterprises, but combine whole branches of industry. The only way which is possible, and which must be taken, is this: the trade unions must be organised just as great capitalist industry is organised. The opinion of the Communist Labour party of Germany, that the trade unions are no good, because they arose long ago, and are of an extreme type of organisation, can be applied with equal justice to the party. The only conclusion which it is possible to draw from such a situation is to give the trade unions another form, in the same way as was done with the old Social-Democratic party.

In conclusion, Comrade Bucharin pointed out that the Communist Labour party of Germany was almost at one with the Kronstadt mutiny, not understanding in the least that that was an attempt at a peasant Vendee, and if the Russian Communist party had not put an end to it, it would have meant the end of the Russian Communist party.

THIRTEENTH SESSION.

The session was opened at 12.35 p.m., with Comrade Koenen in the chair. The debates on Radek's report were continued. The floor was granted to Comrade Balaster, member of the American delegation.

Comrade Balaster declared in the name of the American delegation that the latter fully agrees with all the theses on tactics advanced by the Russian delegation. "The question of working within the trade unions is one of great importance for the American movement," he said, "and in America we are already successfully putting these tactics into operation. We likewise recognise the absolute indispensability of the existence of a legal Communist party in addition to the one underground. The latter is essential only in so far as the White Terror in America has developed, perhaps stronger than in Europe. The amendments that we would wish to insert in the theses are purely of a technical nature. One of these we have already accomplished—that is the unification of the two Communist parties of the United States."

In conclusion, Comrade Balaster said: We, having come from a country where the most powerful and aggressive capitalism exists, have examined the theses with all seriousness, and consider that they entirely correspond with our aims for achieving the triumph of the proletariat.

Comrade Friesland spoke in the name of the United Communist Party of Germany.

He said: "The opposition declares that Radek's thesis is, in their opinion, the basis upon which a mutual understanding between them could easily be achieved. Yes, but if they earnestly desired such an agreement, why did they not come here and declare frankly: We have committed an error in associating with the elements that came out against the party, and in that we did not criticise the party from within. Now, in Moscow, you consider that the March uprising was not a putsch, but even a step forward. The opposition assures us that the errors we have committed have lost for us the faith of the working masses."

Coming to Lenin's remark on the importance of the Communist parties winning over the majority of the working class, **Comrade Friesland** said: "Of course, no one will be so naive as to assert the contrary, but the question is, how are we to win this majority? It is obvious that if our party wishes to attract the majority of the proletariat, it must show that it is ready to utilise every situation in order to defend the interests of the proletariat."

Comrade Brandt spoke next in the name of the Polish delegation.

"The Polish delegation yesterday declared," he said, "that it would second the amendments to the theses on tactics and introduce its own besides. We do this because we wish to make the theses a basis for the tactical training of the masses, which will, in its turn, strengthen the virility of the party. We consider the construction of the theses insufficiently clear, which is like putting a weapon in the hands of the reformists. They always come with figures and assert that we are incapable of fighting. To my mind the theses contain also an exaggerated fear of so-called putschism. There were no putschist tendencies with us in Poland, but during the Red Army's advance against Warsaw we did not in the least hesitate to call upon the workers to revolt and support the Red Army."

Lenin is so afraid of the extreme left that he regards the proposal to exclude from the theses the mention of the open letter as a denial of the mass movement on the part of the German delegation. That open letter, however, did not have the significance **Comrade Lenin** attributed to it.

Comrade Neiman, representative of the Opposition of the United Communist Party of Germany, spoke next.

We are charged with possessing no materials, but, as is proved by a telegram sent by **Comrade Thalheimer** from Moscow to the Central Committee of our party, those comrades who had that material were not allowed to go to Moscow. Thalheimer wanted to use that telegram in order to create the impression that the masses are not with our comrades. We are also accused of having presented this material to the organ of the Right Independents, "Freiheit," but then even the telegram which was despatched to the Central Committee was published in the "Freiheit." I protest against such accusations, and ask the

Congress to take note of this circumstance. Friesland spoke here about manifestoes in the "Rote Fahne." I said that I am glad that the "Rote Fahne" has at last assumed a more energetic and more revolutionary one. When the March action was started it was said that a defence had begun, then it was said that we have acknowledged our mistakes here in Moscow, and not in Berlin. I consider it my duty to tell you that on the well-remembered Wednesday, Heckert, Thalheimer, Stoecker, and others, at the meeting of the Central Committee of the party, were for the cessation of the strike, but the "general" declared it was possible that the uprisings would break out among the peasants of Eastern Prussia and Pomerania. After this it was resolved to continue the strike, in spite of the fact that Thalheimer already had a manifesto for the cessation of the strike in his pocket. You see now how inconsistent were the tactics of the Central Committee of the party. I come to the conclusion that if one regards the March action from the standpoint of the struggle, it was undoubtedly a step forward, from the point of view of a proletariat insurrection it was a mistake.

There was much to learn from the reports of Comrades Trotsky, Zinoviev, Radek, and from Comrade Lenin's speech, but I say that had Comrade Radek made that report at the meeting of the E.C. on April 17th, there would have been no Levi pamphlet. (Applause.)

Comrade Munzenberg, International Council of the Young Communist Leagues, said: "We in general agree with the theses, but they are too severe to the left wing, whilst they show an unnecessary tenderness to the right opportunist elements. Experience has shown us that the right elements are far more dangerous than the left, and this fact should be emphasised in the theses. Considering the insufficiently rigid tactics of the French party during the mobilisation of the 19 class, the party did not show enough activity in helping the German party. Whilst not opposing the statement of Comrade Lenin that mass Communist parties were essential, Comrade Munzenberg emphasised that it was not enough that the Communist party be a mass party, it must be a revolutionary Communist party, calling the masses forth to fight for the triumph of the ideals of Communism."

Comrade Thalheimer (U.C.P.G.) was the next to speak. He said: Comrade Lenin opposed us with a vigour which astounded me, as he is in reality knocking at an open door. We fully agree with the thesis, and our amendments merely aim at separating those paragraphs which we consider it necessary to emphasise. We have excluded Levi, finished with Seratti, have sent an ultimatum to the C.L.P.G., and have done away with the anti-parliamentarian tendencies of the Italian and Austrian Parties—all these are political facts. But they will never secure the Comintern from the possibility of centrist tendencies cropping up. Comrade Lenin concluded from our amendments that we reject the tactics of organising mass parties, but we have now been fighting for a long time the very thing of which Comrade

Lenin accuses us. We have already proved this by deeds. We are, however, afraid of forming such a constitution, which would open the way to opportunistic tendencies, being predisposed to a statistical conception of things. This also applies to the Czecho-Slovakian Party. We are not opposed to the further growth of our party, we only wish to balance the theses, and to emphasise the necessity of the real revolutionary training of those workers who are already in the party.

Comrade Zetkin followed. She said: Those facts, which I quoted here, dealing with the loss of our party's influence after the March incidents, were compiled by our own party accountants, but I have no reason for believing them to be incorrect. I have already asked the Executive Committee to ask for this material, and to examine it objectively. As regards the Levi affair, I wish to say nothing, as a decision has already been reached on this question, and I submit to it. I only think that the last word belongs to Comrade Levi, who, I am sure, will again return to the party, and this is vouched for by his past work.

But I must absolutely protest against the desire of creating a Zetkin affair similar to that of the Levi affair. I confess that I was in error in two things: I should have turned to the wide party masses to save them from the Executive Committee's mistakes; and possibly I did not fight with sufficient energy the incorrect theoretical conceptions leading up to the March revolt, which were advanced by the Executive Committee. It is desired to represent me here as a kind of turncoat, wobbling from the right to the left. Comrade Radek quoted my words in the attempt to prove that I was also guilty of holding the theory of an offensive policy. If this be so, then in this I am in the good company of Comrade Radek himself. In the middle of March he wrote in the Communist International of the necessity of the German party taking up an offensive attitude. As a matter of fact, I did not oppose the March incident, but I was against the estimation of this revolt as an act of the proletarian offensive against the bourgeoisie.

I think that we ought to bind ourselves closely with the masses of the workers in the trade union movement, in the factories, and prepare the Labour movement in an organised fashion, and not spend our time in theoretical speculations. The mistakes of the Central Committee during the March events were by no means mistakes which might have taken place at any such action. They arose from the incorrect theoretical point of view which dominated the Central Committee.

We cannot limit ourselves to criticism within the party. We are bound to the broad masses of the workers, and it is impossible for us to refrain from expressing our point of view simply because these criticisms will be heard by those who are not possessors of recently received party books.

The fundamental principle laid down by Comrades Trotsky and Radek are the main guides to our immediate work. It is remarkable that these theses were drawn up by our Russian comrades; and this is a guarantee that these theses take into

consideration not only theory, but also that great revolutionary experience of Russian comrades, which in itself is a great stimulus to the intensification of the efforts of the European parties.

Comrade Lukatch next spoke in the name of the Communist party of Hungary. He said: The problem of the function of the party in revolution is closely connected with the March rising. Two points stand out in the analysis of the latter: first its reality and the reality of that which followed from it, and secondly, the manner in which this rising was conducted, and the theoretical basis of its initiative. It should be observed that such a tremendous movement, which, without a doubt, represents a step forward, was regarded simply as a putsch.

What were the tasks of this rising? To what extent were they dictated by German conditions, as distinct from those prevailing in every European country?

In the first place, in Germany there was a large Communist Party stronger than in any other European country, and this circumstance imposed a special obligation upon it; secondly, in Germany there are counter-revolutionary labour organisations, which in the theses are called trade unions, and which are dominated by counter-revolutionary leaders. The task of the Communist Party is to smash these trade unions out of the hands of the Social-Democrats and Centrists, and to break up the Right Socialist parties. The process of differentiation between workers' parties began even before the revolution, and aroused the political activity not only of the Communist parties, but also of the Social-Democrats and Independents. Therefore, the Communist parties have to deal not with an amorphous political mass; it had before it not only the trade unions, but also the counter-revolutionary labour organisations, with a definite political program. If the party desires to tear the masses from their counter-revolutionary leaders, it can never do so by means of isolated risings, because the latter have not for their aim the disarming of the bourgeoisie and the arming of the proletariat.

Comrade Vaillant Couturier declared that on the whole he approved of the theses. The amendments which he proposed refer to certain details. The first refers to the theses on parliamentarism, which must be expressed in such a manner as not to allow of any ambiguity. Then there is the question of the "Lefts." He declared that there was no left tendency in the French party until the very last moment. On the contrary, there is a centrist element. Did not the party grow out of the old Social-Democratic party? They desire that the thesis should direct its wrath mainly against the Rights, while to the Lefts our attitude must be friendly, if severe.

Dealing with the question of coloured troops, Comrade Couturier expressed the wish that the colonial question in the theses be discussed more widely. We have aroused a tremendous interest in the minds of the peoples of the Near and Far East, and it is really necessary for us to come to their assistance with all means at our disposal.

Comrade Bell, of the British Communist Party, expressed regret that as a consequence of the debate on the March events, the British Communist movement had been left in the background. He hoped that Comrade Radek would devote more attention to the British movement in his concluding speech. Comrade Bucharin spoke of the necessity of organising mass parties. What is a mass party? One must be clear and definite in the understanding of this term. In England and America, those classic lands of capitalism, there are no mass proletarian parties. Several years ago small groups were formed there, but they did not take root, and had no influence upon the masses. But we have passed that period, the struggle is only just commencing, and now we have based our party on the lessons which we have learned from the actual situation. On the one hand, we had the example of the numerically strong Labour party, which was completely saturated with compromise, like the whole of the bourgeoisie in that classic land of compromise.

We chose the middle line—between sectarians and opportunists.

A great deal was said here about Serratti, Smeral, and other centrists and opportunists. But their essential character flashed out only where the party had to take the open field. We think that we should not fear large parties, because events will always bring out the real colour of those who, at the critical moment, will come out against the working class.

It was said here that the British Communist Party is small. But England has no political parties at all in the proper sense of the term. The political parties of England are mere electoral machines. Even the Labour party, with a membership of four and a-half millions, is only a combination of forces for the solution of certain political and economic problems. Viewed from this point, the British Communist party, only three months old, and having a membership of 10,000, is already a considerable political party, and warrants the hope that the rate of its further development will be just as rapid. Of course, it is not only the size, but the qualitative grade of its membership that decides what the party really amounts to.

Comrade Sachs, of the Communist Labour Party of Germany, pointed out that the very program and form of organisation of his party insured it against the mistakes that can be traced to the wavering line of action during the March events. Why, even Lenin admitted that even small parties can fight victoriously—provided, of course, they attract during the fight large proletarian masses. There is absolutely no sense in doing what the Czecho-Slovakian and the German Communist parties did, i.e., first to recruit a numerically large party and then decide by practical tests whether such a party is capable of revolutionary action. Mere inert numbers do not solve problems, nor lead to victory. The March rising showed that the most active elements were gone, and those who had been passive even before this could now say, "We told you so, you should have acted in this way."

In conclusion, Comrade Sachs handed the chairman the theses of the C.L.P.G. dealing with the tactics of the Communist party.

FOURTEENTH SESSION.

The Congress opened at 8.40 p.m., with Comrade Köenen in the chair.

The discussion on tactics was continued.

Comrade Zinoviev said: There has been much debate on the question as to whom we must combat, the left or the right. I think we must discuss this question from the point of view of certain tendencies which exist within the labour movement. At the Second Congress the so-called "left menace," as an organised force, was not very great, but it represented a danger for the International in the future. The discussion has shown that this tendency exists now, as it existed at the Second Congress. Comrade Bell expressed dissatisfaction at my reference to the danger of sectarianism in England and America. Of course, this sectarianism has its root in the economic conditions of those two countries. Various incidents during the miners' strike showed that our English comrades still remain isolated from the masses. Much has been done to overcome this during the past year, but the Third Congress is not yet in a position to pass any definite judgment upon this. Another danger consists in young parties prematurely going into battle. In 1920 Serrati and the whole Italian delegation was convinced that the situation in Italy was sufficiently ripe for a great revolutionary movement, that the majority of the peasants in the army were with us. And yet we must now start from the beginning. That is a step back, and the responsibility for this rests on the Serrattists. The same thing happened with Germany. During the Kapp putsch, the counter-revolution was a spark which set the whole working class aflame. The proletariat was ready for battle, and were on the eve of taking power, but the proletarian party missed the opportunity. Of course, when the revolutionary nucleus of the German working class experiences a crisis, part of the proletariat becomes impatient and strives to enter the battle prematurely. Again, we have to emphasise that the responsibility for this lies with the social-patriots, the betrayers of the working class. Nevertheless, we must not disregard the danger from the left. Comrade Roland Holst, for example, said that the lefts are our best friends, that they are ready at any moment to sacrifice themselves for the proletarian revolution, and, therefore, the danger is not great. But we must apply here the Russian proverb of the peasant with regard to his wife: "The more I love you, the more I beat you."

As for the Italian Socialist party, it has already been stated here that until the bourgeois agents are driven from its midst, it will not be accepted into the Communist International. When Serratti said that they work with Turatti because Terraccini erred in his estimation of the tempo of the movement, we say that this is sheer hypocrisy.

Dealing with the German question, Comrade Zinoviev said that the question of the March rising is approaching a satisfactory solution. Although there are some differences between the theses of the Russian delegation and the amendments of Comrade Zetkin on the United Communist Party of Germany, nevertheless unanimity is possible. We are on the eve of complete agreement, and that will be an important result of the Congress.

No advantage can accrue from re-arguing the question of the March rising: we must discuss what will happen in future. One thing is clear, and that is we must avoid another split in the German Communist party. The German question is not a national, but an international question; and that is why the Congress is highly interested in achieving unity. The theses of the Russian delegation provide the basis for this unity. Thus the bridge to unity has been laid, but the International must have guarantees that the majority of the Central Committee of the German Communist party will carry out the resolutions of this Congress, and the opposition must also give us such guarantees. The existence of opposition groups within the German party cannot be tolerated, and if the comrades consciously strive to carry out the resolution of the Congress, they will dissolve the opposition group.

With regard to the Czecho-Slovak party, I think Comrade Bell exaggerates when he says that Smeral is a bourgeois ideologist. The Czecho-Slovak party is a good proletarian mass party, as yet in the process of clarifying its Communist conscience. The party has yet much to go through, but the better it is prepared for these difficulties, the easier it will overcome them.

We hope that in the long run we shall find a homogeneous policy. Somebody may say that this is a move to the right, but that would only be an evidence of stupidity. At the Second Congress we had much to do with the so-called left, nevertheless, what we then resolved was a blow to the right and centre. I think that the decisions of the Third Congress will be the death blow to these gentlemen.

Comrade Teilman, of the United Communist Party of Germany, spoke next.

If the March incidents were simply confined to demonstrations of protest, the masses would not have understood such a policy, and would never have forgiven the leaving of their Central German brothers to be slaughtered. The very fact of the March rising, disclosing the revolutionary impatience of the masses, shows that already the symptoms of the collapse of capitalism are forthcoming, and that the masses are prepared to fight. Trotsky's estimation of German conditions is wrong. Germany is facing an industrial decline and a rise in unemployment, and this behoves the German party to discover whether it does express the sympathies of the majority of the proletariat. To do this we continually demonstrate to the members of Trade Unions and kindred organisations that a general strike is of equal value as an armed revolt. It must also be said that those

comrades who regarded the March revolt as a Bakunist rising have now seen how mistaken was their idea.

The speaker then severely criticised the criminal conduct of Paul Levi, who struck a blow in the back of the party, as Kautsky did in his attitude towards the Russian Revolution in 1918. Under the slogan of free criticism the proletariat was disorganised, and an attempt made to pit the working class against the Communists. Zinoviev said that a split in Germany would not be tolerated. But Däumig and others are already organising in Berlin for a split. We are threatened not by the left but the right, the very side which is followed by Comrade Zetkin, but which is, however, only a small fraction of the party, not more than 5-7 per cent.

He considered it absolutely unpardonable that members of the party should discuss its vital questions outside the party. This was altogether contradictory to the general understanding of discipline in the Communist party, and considered that the Russian comrades were opening their doors to dangerous crises, which might make it extremely uncomfortable for the Communist party in Germany.

Comrade Trotsky followed..

Comrade Teilman, he said, accused Comrade Lenin, without any evidence, of almost refusing the delegation the right to amend the theses drawn up by the Russian delegates. Comrade Lenin did nothing of the kind. He stated that these theses were not the result of the labour of the Russians alone. Comrade Teilman could learn this from his own delegation. These theses were formulated after many debates and much compromising with all the delegations, including the German. Of course, they do not satisfy every group, but we regarded them as a compromise to the left.

Many delegates are dissatisfied with the time taken up by the German questions and the discussion of German internal affairs. Such an attitude is not correct. The main point of discussion is the March affair. Too much detail has been stressed on purely personal affairs, but we must not lose sight of the March revolt, as it is a question of international importance.

The German party occupies a singular position amongst the other parties of Western Europe. Developing into an independent large party, it independently led the revolt. And if the young parties of France and Italy are in similar position, it is essential that they especially learn a great deal from this question. In discussing the March rising I will begin with the amendments to the theses, as we have to choose between two tendencies. We regard the March revolt as a fight imposed upon the United Communist Party of Germany by the attack of the Government on the Central German proletariat. We regard with pride the heroic stand of the United Communist Party of Germany, which has proved that it is really the party of the revolutionary German proletariat. Then we pointed out their chief mistake, and concluded with a number of instructions to the U.C.P.G. to avoid a repetition of such mistakes.

Our comrades proposed that the Congress regard the March rising as a step forward in the light of an attempt by the Communist party to secure the leadership in the fights of the German proletariat, and to regard the revolt as valuable because it demonstrated to the party its serious mistakes and intensified party discipline. When we say that the revolt was a step forward, then I understand by this that the Communist party, from a mere propagandist party with a great deal of internal opposition from the independents, became a real, self-supporting and centralised party, and at last had the chance of taking part in the struggles of the proletariat. But this does not mean that the first attempt of the party was successful. Some say that a great deal can be learnt from its mistakes, but surely a revolt is not started in order to find out which mistakes should be avoided in the future. Comrade Heckert explained to us the critical international and national conditions in force during the March revolt. But it is not clear why only a small minority of the proletariat took part in it. We had three descriptions of the situation. One was that there was an all pervading excitement, the other that there was complete inactivity, and the third that excitement reigned in Central Germany, when all around was stagnation, activity, as it were, enshrined in passivity.

All this makes an impression as if some members of the German delegation continue to regard it their duty to engage in advocacy, instead of analysing and enquiring into things. I now consider Comrade Teilman's statement that—"Even if we adopt the theses, without amendments, on our return to Germany, we shall be faced by a most important crisis in the party. We shall have to go through a complete change."

The point is that when the representatives of the German party saw that the comrades of the International do not see eye to eye with them, they attempted a strategic outflanking movement. The amendments are dangerous, not on account of what is definitely expressed in them, but by reason of what is left unsaid. It is an attempt to give in a rather nebulous form the thoughts on the tactics of the period of the offensive, ideas which were spread by the Central Committee of the U.C.P.G. in the heat of battle.

Comrade Teilman and others decided not to go home with the theses, which amounted to their being repudiated. We do not want either to repudiate the German Party—one of our best parties—but there are some things which it is necessary to disown.

The German comrades desire to secure a resolution which would approve and not give any exact estimation of the position. This we cannot permit. I think it will be better for our cause if we make this question absolutely clear. The Congress must say to the German comrades that the first attempt of the party to guide a great mass movement cannot serve as an example.

The same thing applies to our French friends. The Executive Committee discussed the question as to whether the French party should have called for a refusal to answer the call up of the 19 class. I asked one young comrade how he pictured the resistance to the mobilisation. He said: "With arms, of

course. With revolvers in our hands." We poured a little cold water on his natural revolutionary enthusiasm, and I think that the comrade now will be better able to judge circumstances. The notorious theory of the offensive is absolutely non-Marxist. Nevertheless, thousands of German comrades have been trained in the spirit, and they are awaiting the reply of the Congress to this question. We must say frankly and clearly that the philosophy and tactics of the offensive is a great menace, and any application of it in the future will be a crime.

If I were to speak of Italy in the language of Heckert or Thalheimer, I could describe a country destroyed by the war, and given over to violent conflicts between the working class and Fascisti, and conclude by saying that a party which could not immediately call upon the proletariat to take up the offensive is an insignificant party, which will be condemned by history. But if we take a sober view of the situation, we will have to say, with Comrade Zinoviev, "Gain the confidence of the workers, and prepare for the fight."

There are three groups or temporary tendencies at this Congress, which, if we do not properly understand, we shall not be able to estimate the co-relation of forces at this Congress. In the first place, there is the German delegation, which comes directly out of the fire of the March events, and the extreme representatives of which developed the theory of the offensive. This group also includes the Italian comrades; besides these there are those who think that the March events took place as a result of an order from the Executive, and that Levi was expelled for refusing to carry out the orders of Moscow. Some French and Czecho-Slovakian comrades fear that similar orders will be given them, and that they will be expelled if they do not carry them out. There is a third group, whose opinions we hope are expressed in our theses. They say that it would have been madness for the Executive Committee for the sake of an offensive to have acted by means of artificially created revolts. Our task is to lead the mass movement as a centralised party, and for that reason it is our duty soberly to examine the situation in every country, and only where circumstances allow to take up the offensive with all the strength at our command. We must conquer capitalist society and overthrow the bourgeoisie, and for this purpose we must be able to combine the sober language of statistics with the passionate language of revolutionary will. We will learn to do that and we will be victorious.

The chairman stated that a resolution had been sent in to close the discussion, and give Comrade Radek the final word.

After considerable discussion, it was resolved to adjourn the Conference for ten minutes. On the resumption Comrade Zinoviev proposed to close the discussion, after Comrade Radek, and then proceed to take the vote. If any delegation desired to introduce any amendments to the theses, they could be submitted to the Commission. This was agreed to, and the floor was given to **Comrade Radek**. He said: Allow me, after the two days' discussion, to sum up and determine the facts which it has exposed. The first to second the theses was Comrade

Lazzarri, even before they were expounded by me. He fully agreed with them, excepting the place which makes mention of Italy, the representatives of other countries also agreed with the theses except where they referred to their respective countries. This means that in judging we should be guided by the general principle of the International. The danger of opportunism in the labour movement is by no means overcome. We still have the Amsterdam International. Everywhere, with the exception of France, there are powerful opportunist parties. Opportunism has not yet been overcome within the International itself, and the danger will be enhanced in proportion as the course of events develop. I consider it a dangerous symptom of opportunism that there are here representatives of parties who hold that all is going well with them. We spoke quite differently about the relations to the Czecho-Slovak Party than was our original intention before the Congress, for we have convinced ourselves that here it is a question of a slow process of development, but a development leftwards.

The path of revolution is a thorny one, and upon which people are prone to make thousands of slips and blunders. Take the British comrades. I assert that from their party Press one cannot observe the slightest appearance of real activity on the part of their party in relation to the miners' strike. I gathered information about this from the comrades. They painted to me a very dismal picture. In the meantime representatives of the British delegation came here and protested against it. I can, however, corroborate my assertion by British newspapers, three-quarters of which are filled with illustrations, and not a word about what interests us. It is most deplorable that such a young party as the British party, with such insignificant activity and brief experience behind it, should come up here and declare that everything is well with them. The British comrades contend that Lloyd George's party is also a small one. Nevertheless, the fact remains, that power is in Lloyd George's hands and not in yours. When we tell you, get to the masses, and you reply that Lloyd George also has a small party, I consider it a most intolerable situation. Of other parties, the French, for example, we have hardly spoken here. We recognise that conditions must ripen in France, but in future we shall see to it that the French Party carry out the theses which it has opposed here.

Most attention was here paid to the German Party. This controversy is destined to be of cardinal importance not only to the German Party, but to the whole of the Comintern. It is the destiny of the German working class to be the bearer of the first great revolutionary movement in an industrial country. The lessons of the Russian revolution have supplied the International proletariat with the slogans of dictatorship and the slogan of the Soviets. But the path by which we achieved victory in Russia will be shorter in all capitalist countries. We have disputed much here about the United Communist Party of Germany and the Communist Labour Party of Germany, not because in one there are better Communists than the other, but because the Communist movement in

Germany, by its errors and reverses, shows other parties how to avoid blunders. I did not accidentally compare the three instances of the Italian, Czecho-Slovakian, and March events. I did this because the comparison of these three movements will enable others to appreciate the exigencies, possibilities, and dangers of direct action, and the duty of the party during such action.

We fight the left because their blunders augment opportunism, strengthen our deadly foe, to crush whom is our first duty. The discussion on the German events has furnished us with two conclusions. First, that the party acted properly when it called upon its members to hasten to the aid of the working class, which was being subject to an attack by the capitalist government. This was not a putsch, but a genuine revolutionary action by hundreds of thousands of proletarians. Secondly, that a number of blunders of a practical nature were committed in the leadership of this mass movement. Later a part of the comrades, impelled by the prospect of new battles, created a fallacious theory about the necessity of the party taking the offensive. We have proved that this theory of an offensive was a fallacy because, under the prevailing conditions, it did not stimulate a sober appreciation of the state of affairs.

The March events could not be the product of an offensive policy, because the workers of Halle replied to the exile of Stern with a strike which was declared without the sanction of the Central Committee. This proves that the desire to fight has taken root among the proletarian masses. This was the principal factor which impelled the party to fight, and impelled it in such a manner that it entered the battle in March perhaps earlier than it should have done. We now tell them that it is necessary to prepare for battle proportionately to the strength of the enemy, for our task is not to display the courage of the proletariat, but to defeat the enemy. We, too, have committed blunders, and that is why our attitude to the blunders of others is not like the attitude of those who consider blunders to be the product of bad reasoning. In drawing the balance of the German movement, it must be stated that some of the leaders of the party sabotaged the fight. I will further observe that a large part of the good comrades whom we wish to have in the party sided with Levi, who betrayed the fight to the bourgeoisie.

These comrades are necessary to the party, but they must remember that such action will not be forgiven by the Communist International. Comrade Teilman is wrong when he asserts that there must be no criticism in the party Press because the enemy will use it to his own advantage. We consider criticism essential for our activities, but every comrade should use tact in considering whether criticism is permissible at any particular moment. Comrade Zetkin wished to know what she should say to Crispin when he asks her attitude to the March revolt. She should answer: "I do not wish to argue with people who helped to defeat the Mansfield movement." It is important to us that the German party should look to the future and not the past, and should prepare for new fights, independent

of whether we wish them or not. We must now devote all our energy to forming a new, powerful, active and revolutionary party in Germany.

I will now deal with the C.L.P. of Germany, which I have already remarked is a small party with ideas of a new International. If Comrade Sachs imagines that a small party can lead millions of people, then this can only be done where these masses are amorphous and are not organised in large historic parties. We ourselves must organise these large organisations, and how can this be done by a small party without securing the confidence of the masses or fighting for the vital interests of the proletariat? If this party continues to avoid the real issues by avoiding trade unions and parliament, then our ways must part. We demand that you join the party which showed by the March revolt that it wishes to, and can, fight. A fight against opportunism, a struggle against the right—and the left, which has been forewarned of its mistakes—this is our policy, from which we cannot deviate.

The Russian Communist Party feels that it bears a great responsibility as a party which has already had a long revolutionary existence. And if it admonishes you, it does so because it cannot wait twenty years till you gradually achieve victory. The proletariat can nowhere be left alone for any length of time in its fight.

The E.C. warns you of mistakes because of its sense of responsibility. Comrade Bucharin is a thousand times right when he says that we will regard in a different light those who allow a suitable chance for fighting to pass by after our warning.

We must strive to create a revolutionary army, ready to fight and spring into action, and not a mere library of revolutionary books. The enemy is powerful, and the Communist International must be sufficiently organised and capable of judgment to win the tremendous struggles which confront us.

We must win over the masses to the Communist International, prepare them for revolutionary struggles, lead them into these struggles, take every advantage possible, avoid unnecessary sacrifice, and place our plan in opposition to that of the bourgeoisie.

After Comrade Radek had finished, the theses of the Russian delegation were unanimously accepted. The amendments were sent to the committee for preliminary discussion.

FIFTEENTH SESSION.

The session was opened at 2 p.m. The order of the day was the report on the relations between the Third International and the Red Trade Union International in the struggle against Amsterdam. **Comrade Zinoviev** was given the floor to report. He said :

Comrades, the Second Congress of the Comintern theoretically laid down its relations to the trade union movement, and there is therefore no need for theoretical formulæ. The fact that during the last year the Trade Union bureaucracy in England, Germany, France, and America has been ejecting the Communists

from the unions is sufficiently clear proof of the justice of our position. Our task now is to co-ordinate and organise the struggle against the Yellow International, and to work out the inter-relations between the Communist International and the revolutionary trade unions.

The entire activity of the Amsterdam International demonstrates that the latter is a thorough bourgeois institution. Many have disputed this assertion on the grounds that it is an exaggeration. We categorically declare that it is no exaggeration or a polemical method; it is the statement of an actual fact. The Amsterdam International is a toy in the hands of the bourgeoisie, it is the combined product of the trade union bureaucracy and the bourgeoisie, it is the bastion of capitalism. During the strike of the miners in England Thomas played the part of a traitor. When the workers in Germany have to be bled, Hösing, an old participant in the Amsterdam International, comes upon the scene. All the economic and political coups of the international bourgeoisie against the working class are carried out under the leadership of the Yellow International. This, of course, is most deplorable for the working class, and we must understand that the struggle against Amsterdam is not a simple struggle of factions within the trade union movement, but a class struggle. This class struggle is all the more intricate and difficult that it takes place on the basis of the trade union movement. Nine-tenths, however, of our difficulties will have been overcome if we but emerge the victors in this struggle and destroy this last bulwark of the world bourgeoisie. The chief task of the Communists in the trade union movement at present is to expose to the proletariat of the whole world the true face of the Amsterdam International.

We have had definite successes in the international trade union movement during the last year. The General Secretary of the Red Trade Union International informed me that the latter organisation now unites about 16,380,000 members. This figure, of course, is very large, but we should not exaggerate its importance. There are also countries where our Communist parties have not yet taken the lead of the trade union movement, have not yet come to appreciate the full extent of the importance of working in the trade unions. There are other countries, for instance, Spain, where the revolutionary proletariat is most progressive, and where the syndicalist organisations have a huge membership. The Communist party has not succeeded in assimilating all these revolutionary elements. In Italy the Confederation of Labour counts two to three million workers, led by the reformists. In Sweden the former Socialist party has become converted into a Communist party, but the leadership in the trade unions is still in the hands of men who, although they belong to the Comintern, still look up to Amsterdam.

The Red Trade Union International has received an influx of syndicalist elements. During and after the war they experienced the same crisis as the Socialist parties. The outcome of this saw the evolution of three kinds of Syndicalism. The first is arrant reformism, of which Jouhaux is representative,

which suffered complete bankruptcy, and whose spiritual leaders are in Amsterdam. The second is most sharply expressed in German and Swedish syndicalism. In Germany it is small trade unions which do not belong to Amsterdam, but all the same pursue the usual Scheidemannist line in their Central Organ, "Syndikalist." The Swedish Syndicalists are typical Centrists, wobbling between Moscow and Amsterdam. The third (most representative of which is France) are our friends, the genuine revolutionaries.

What should be the inter-relations between these Syndicalist unions and the Third International? This is a question that we must solve right here. In connection herewith the questions of the party, the neutrality of the Trade Unions, and the significance of the political struggle, arise also.

The idea of neutrality of the trade union movement in the political struggle is a phantasy. The coal strike in England, for instance, could that be called a purely economic question? The idea of neutrality was artfully exploited by the bourgeoisie in their own private interests. Thus, the Trade Unions that are even revolutionary, objectively become counter-revolutionary when they cultivate political neutrality.

Our Congress is confronted with the question of the inter-relations between the party and the trade unions, between the Third International and the Red Trade Union International.

The discussion in "Humanite" on the question as to whether the trade unions should be subordinated to the party or not, evidently shows that the French party does not yet understand the rôle of its trade unions. We, Russian Communists, have now been fighting for fifteen years to influence the trade unions, and each party member on joining a union was expected to work intensively not only during large strikes but in their usual everyday work of organising. We are not opposed to a certain amount of independence to the trade unions, not, of course, creating opposition between them and the party as do the opportunists. The party must not interfere in the usual routine work of the trade unions, it must work along general lines.

The Red Trade Union International was created by the initiative of the Comintern, but as yet is only in the stage of organisation. Although we aim at a co-ordination of these two organisations, owing to the vast differences in the world's trade union movements, there must be a certain differentiation. The Communist is not a mere arithmetical sum of different organisations, but a definite whole, the head of the entire revolutionary proletarian movement. Hence, whilst allowing a certain organisational independence to the Red Trade Union International, we still keep the political leadership in the hands of the Comintern.

Every Communist must realise that these problems are vital to the international revolutionary movement. If we can destroy the Amsterdam International and on its ruins unfurl the Red Banner, then we will be on the way to victory. This is the problem of our Congress, the inaugural Congress of the Red Trade Unions.

Comrade Heckert then gave his report on the practical work of the trade unions.

The old trade unions stood for the mere betterment of the workers' conditions, but the satisfaction of these meagre demands was impossible under the capitalist system. As a result there developed two tendencies in the trade union movement. The one hoped to achieve these demands peacefully, and the other by revolutionary force.

Capitalism was shaken to its very foundations by the war, and we know that its collapse is merely a question of time, irrespective of any attempt made by the proletariat to overthrow it. What, then, are the trade unions to do? To wait till the temporary apparent recovery of capitalism is over or strengthen our revolutionary organisation to overthrow it?

The social patriots say that Socialism is only possible with the full development of the productive forces and proposes co-operation with the bourgeoisie. But we Communists say that the existence of the working class is not possible with the preservation of the capitalist system. Hence the trade unions must concentrate all their energy in overthrowing capitalism by means of strikes, demonstrations, revolts, etc.

Capitalism is united nationally and internationally by means of powerful trusts. The contemporary organisation of our trade unions does not coincide with the contemporary organisation of capitalism. We must create a centralised workers' organisation, built upon the basis of industry. Other countries must follow Soviet Russia in doing this, as this is the most suitable form of organisation. The concentration of capital forces the centralisation of our trade unions, and we must strive to do away with any form of federalism, because the latter spells the doom of trade unionism. There are some workers who imagine that the immediate uninterrupted revolutionary struggle is of more importance than the struggle for the workers' immediate needs. But we Communists say: "Fight for the immediate needs of the working class, for this is, at the same time, a fight for the organisation of the working class as a whole." Capitalism, in its collapse, is throwing millions of workers into unemployment. Our problem is to have them re-absorbed into industry, but this is a difficult question. We must let workers understand that the return of the unemployed into the workshops is for their own benefit, so that they themselves may not be thrown out of work. This agitation must be carried on everywhere. The trade unions must prevent the closing up of the factories, in order not to increase the number of unemployed.

The trade unions must take up the offensive and compel capitalism to defend itself. Capitalism is curtailing and sabotaging production in order to weather the crisis.

The issue, then, is clear; we Communists must organise the British, Belgian, German, French, and Italian workers internationally and not nationally. Capitalism is already seeking to pit the workers against each other by taking advantage of the less developed element. The trade unions must put a stop to these tricks. The miners of England should have been supported by the transport workers and railwaymen, not so much

for the benefit of the miners as for themselves, so that they could prevent the capitalists splitting the ranks of the English workers. The capitalists have now adopted a new dodge. They offer the workers part of their profit (surplus value). What an irony—our chief task is the destruction of surplus value. Some propose nationalisation and socialisation, but only in a peaceful manner. A real socialisation means the seizure of power by the proletariat.

In summing up, I must state that besides the indicated forms of trade union organisation (existing on the principle of centralisation and the international basis of industry), the workers must arm themselves in every country as a permanent organisation against the armed and advancing capitalism. Then our chief problem, as Comrade Zinoviev pointed out, is the controlling of the trade unions by Communists in order to transform them into Communist trade unions.

The session ended at 5 p.m.

SIXTEENTH SESSION.

The 15th session of the Congress was opened by Comrade Kolarov at 7.20 p.m.

Comrade Varga presented the report of the Commission on the investigation of the world economic crisis.

He stated that the Commission has arrived at a unanimous decision by adopting certain amendments—the proposals of all delegations and amendments can be summarised in four groups.

The first group consists of the question how best to investigate the special conditions of the existing economic relations in separate countries. No changes were effected here. The second group, dealing with the economic conditions in Entente countries, mainly in France, was revised at the instance of the French delegation. The third group was also revised—in the part played by the peasantry in Western Europe. In this question the commission devoted special attention to the contradictions between the middle class and rich peasantry and the bourgeoisie. The bourgeoisie in its struggle against the proletariat wants the support of the rich and middle class peasantry. But the latter, not wishing to bear the burden of restoring the capitalist industries, refuse to pay the taxes. In view of the above, amendments were made both in the economic and in the political part of the text of the report. The fourth group—are questions of tactics, closely connected with the conditions of world economy. The text has been accordingly altered on the question of the offensive and the defensive of the proletariat in its political and economic struggle. After reading the text of the amendments, Varga proposed to the Congress to adopt them without discussion.

After Comrade Varga's report Comrade Frolich declared on behalf of the U.C.P.G., that they endorse the theses with the amendments made by the commission. The amended theses were put to the vote and carried unanimously.

The next question was the elections to the commissions. The proposal of the Presidium was carried. It provided for the composition of the following commissions :

1. On the question of tactics—
Chairman comrade Radek.
2. On Co-operation—
Chairman comrade Khirtchuk (R.C.P.).
3. On the question of trade union Movement—
Chairman Heckert (U.C.P.G.), and Rosmer (France).
4. On the Eastern question—
Chairman to be appointed by the Small Bureau of the Comintern.

The chairman then stated that the commission on the trade union movement will as far as possible work conjointly with the corresponding commission of the Trade Union International.

The Congress then passed on to a debate on the trade union movement, having previously offered to allow the C.L.P.G. to appoint a speaker on this question in view of its opposition to the Comintern on points of principle.

Comrade Bergman, of the C.L.P.G., said : I agree with comrade Zinoviev that the trade union question has a great economic and political importance. I must point out that the mere conquest of political and economic power is not sufficient. We must be able to maintain power. We saw this in the instance of the German revolution of 1918, when the proletariat, after gaining a victory, was compelled to give up its positions to the bourgeoisie. The Communists must, therefore, even now, within the limits of a bourgeois State, create organisations which when necessary will be able to take the economic power in their hands and keep it. Yesterday, comrade Heckert, after analysing the part so far played by the Trade Unions, pointed out what they should be in reality. But even he agrees that the tasks which the unions have to perform cannot be fully realised within the limits of bourgeois society. Comrade Zinoviev was right when he pointed out that the trade unions are only one of the contrivances by means of which the bourgeoisie deceives and holds the working class in bondage.

The Communist groups in the trade unions possibly do carry on destructive propaganda, but the wide masses of the proletariat know nothing of it. The Communist Labour Party of Germany, in creating its own workshop committees, declared that other methods must be adopted than those allowed by the Workshop Committees Law. Our revolutionary workshop committees do not merely exist in name, like the legal workshop committees. They spring from the masses, lead them, and on the day of revolution will stand at the head of the movement. Such workshop committees must be created everywhere, in every country. Organisations similar to ours in Germany are springing up in other countries. In Britain, for example, the shop stewards are fighting the trade unions, and have and take part in a political struggle. It is the task of the Communists to make the trade unions Communistic and revolutionary by organising them on the basis of the workshop committee. Just

now the International Council of Trade and Industrial Unions is holding its first congress in Moscow, with the object of formulating a revolutionary line of action in the trade unions. The idea, however, that the trade unions can be utilised for the revolution by means of conquering them from inside is absurd, and the fact that a trade union has declared itself in favour of Moscow by no means proves that it will work in the spirit of Communism. We do not oppose working in the trade unions, but this policy need not be placed in so prominent a position. We must always emphasise our ultimate object.

Comrade Earsman (Australia) said : We listened with great pleasure yesterday to Comrade Zinoviev's speech. When he stated that the Communist International was not determined to control the trade unions, I must say that if Comrade Zinoviev had stated the opposite, that the party should rule the trade unions, then we Australian workers would not have recognised this. We are not opposed to the party controlling the Unions, so long as it is done from within and not from without the trade unions.

The trade union workers of Australia were always more developed than those of any other country. Consequently the danger from bureaucracy was more significant than anywhere else. For in all the parliaments of Australia, both in the Lower and Upper Chambers, the Australian Labour parties played a big rôle, and at times held the government in their hands. A trade union official's position is merely a step to parliament. But since 1917 the situation has radically changed.

The members of the Labour parties have discredited themselves in the eyes of the workers, and now they dare not speak in parliament in the name of the working class.

We received news from Australia to-day to the effect that at the trade union Congress 85 per cent. of the members have declared themselves in favour of the Red Trade Union International. We only counted on 40 per cent., and the result, surpasses all our expectations. It is clear demonstration of the victory of Communism in Australia. It is rather remarkable that the Congress was convened by the conservative elements of the trade unions, with the hope of consolidating their position, and now they have been cruelly deceived.

The Industrial Workers of the World carried on an intensified propaganda amongst us, with but little results.

In conclusion, speaking on passivity, the speaker declared that he was convinced that the workers would sooner or later have to devote their attention to various political questions.

SEVENTEENTH SESSION.

Speeches on Clara Zetkin's birthday.

The morning session opened at 12 noon, under the chairmanship of Comrade Kolarov.

The Chairman stated that to-day Comrade Clara Zetkin celebrated her 65th birthday (loud applause). Comrade Heckert then delivered a commemorative speech.

Heckert : Comrades, to-day our old heroic fighter, comrade Clara Zetkin, celebrates her 65th birthday. For the International Clara Zetkin is a programme in herself. From her youngest years she joined the labour movement with a full and fervent heart, and to this very day is still its true and self-denying guard. Clara Zetkin has a great and glorious fighting past. Persecuted and cursed by the bourgeoisie and even by some of those with whom she has worked for many a long year, our old comrade, Clara Zetkin, was always in the forefront of the Socialist movement. After the repeal of the anti-Socialist law, and when the German Socialist party had taken a turn to the right, Clara Zetkin went over to the left. She was the most inexorable opponent of all revisionist ideas. Together with Rosa Luxembourg and Franz Mehring, she fought the revisionist movement from the very first moment of its inception, supported the radical tendency in the International, and opposed the ideas of Bernstein. She supported, at that time, Karl Kautsky, who was still a member of the Left Wing of the German Social-Democratic party. She was always in the ranks of the fighting proletariat. During the war, as editor of "Gleichheit," she opposed the German Social-Democrats, the flag-waving patriots, and the social chauvinists. At the end of the war and during the revolutionary period, Clara Zetkin joined the Spartacus Union, and was one of its most clear-minded members. She was the most fearless leader of the small Spartacist movement of Germany. But when the United Communist Party of Germany was formed, she became one of the leading forces on its Executive Committee.

A slight divergence of opinion arose between the E.C. of the U.C.P.G. and Clara Zetkin. This, however, did not create for a single moment any personal animosity, for we entertain too deep a reverence of our aged fighter. We know how much she gave to our cause, and she always stood for us, and we know that she will always remain on the side of the proletariat. We not only hope, but we already know, that she will again take up the fight on our side. We know that the difference of opinion that arose between us will not outlive the Congress, and I think that the Communist International will see Clara Zetkin for many years to come as one of our chief fighters and the leader of the great Red proletarian army of the workers' left wing movement. (Loud cheers.)

Comrade Zetkin then took the floor. The entire Congress stood up and gave her a prolonged ovation. Deeply touched, and her voice breaking with emotion, Clara Zetkin said :

Comrades, your praises have deprived me of strength. I feel overwhelmed with a sense of depression, as I find that I have not yet accomplished all that which I set out to perform. The life and spirit of the Revolution have given me a great deal, but I am still in debt to the Revolution. Comrades, that which I have done is only a small fraction of all that should have been done. I only obeyed the call of my own conscience, and hence deserve no praise. I could be no other than that which I am. Would you marvel at the stream which flows ever

onward? Would you praise the birds for their song? I served the Revolution because I had to satisfy the call of my soul.

I consider it my duty to point out that for all I was able to do, I must thank the German theory and practice; and the history and example of our French and German brothers. For my revolutionary morale, I have to thank my deeply inherent ties with the Russian Revolution as far back as the seventies, and I shall be eternally grateful to the Russian Revolutionary Social-Democrats and the Bolsheviks. I cannot but recall those who were and will always remain a part of my existence—Rosa Luxembourg and Karl Liebknecht. All that I did, all that I lived for, was a product of the work done in conjunction with Rosa Luxembourg, and I can hardly restrain my emotion when I think that she is no longer with us.

There is only one desire, which comes from the depth of my heart—that is to work and fight, that before I go down to my grave I may yet live to see the revolution in Germany, and if possible in other countries. (Stormy applause.)

The garland to crown my work, my struggle, can only be the proletarian revolution, only the victory of the revolutionary proletariat. (Prolonged cheers.)

Loriot : Dear comrade Zetkin : Not being a brilliant speaker, I will speak simply, and I am confident that I will thus express the general feeling here. To-day the Communist family that has gathered here interrupted its difficult work to render praise to your excellent and noble activities. The German delegation, in the person of comrade Heckert, sketched in general outline the stages of your glorious life, but to you only, dear comrade Zetkin, is known how much suffering, how much violence, how much pure and deep joy, and also the many bitter tears the forty-three years of the stern struggle represent.

Only just now, from the platform, with deep emotion, which was shared by all, you recalled to mind your dear friends, Rosa Luxembourg and Karl Liebknecht. Only you can realise what the memories of those deceased dear ones mean, who fought together with you during the forty-three years at Stuttgart and Copenhagen. You belong to the international proletariat, and the latter cannot think without enthusiasm of you in their tragical periods. They cannot forget that in 1915 you were the initiator of the Berne Congress, where you said to the women workers what no one else could have said to the deluded proletariat.

We, the French Communists, especially remember your visit to the Tours Congress, but we were in no doubt as to your success. We had known that the French police knew you too well to allow you into France. But we did not know that a woman, even with your energies, could get the better of the police. How great was our joy, and at the same time how the French bourgeoisie was dumbfounded, when you passed the frontier and were in our midst.

Dear comrade Zetkin, the Revolution to which we have sacrificed so much has now to a considerable extent begun to be realised. The Russian Revolution and the development of the German movement give us confidence that you will witness the

crowning glory of your activities. The Revolution is going on at full speed, and you will gather the harvest of your labours, the complete and final liberation of the world proletariat. These are our wishes. (Cheers.)

Comrade Sachs said: We understand the difficult situation of Soviet Russia and consider that the crux of the question is how the Russian Communist party hopes to extricate itself from this position. The danger of the policy outlined by comrade Lenin of paying tribute to European social revolution, which we agree is necessary at the present moment, is that it may radically change the foundations of the dictatorship of the proletariat in Russia. But the guarantee lies in that the Russian Communist party will remain what it is now. The international significance of the new policy is now less serious. The carrying out of the treaties will strengthen European capitalism and retard the development of Communism. The British capitalists took advantage of this situation to point out to the striking miners that they were doing harm to Soviet Russia.

Comrade Radek followed. He said: The question is not whether Russia's purchase of goods in Western Europe will postpone the crisis of imperialism, but whether the foreign and home policy of the Russian Communist party is right and necessary from the point of view of the Russian proletariat.

If it is recognised that Soviet Russia at the present moment is the advance guard of the world revolution, which creates the possibility of carrying on Communist system of production, not only in the large industry, but also for the employment of the forces of the Russian peasantry, it will be also recognised that our policy is necessary from the point of view of the world revolution. Of course, it represents a great danger, against which only one thing can be done, and that is to hasten the world revolution. Until that relief comes, we undertake to defend our position until the end, and you must not lose time in doing everything in order that victory may be assured. The policy of the Soviet Government and the Communist International must be one that can be adapted to every situation. Our motto must be, "To gain time for preparing for victory, for organisation, and, as Lenin said, not for reading books, but for organising on the basis of the lessons which we have learnt from the struggle."

Comrade Kollontai said: Comrade Lenin's report raises a vital question, namely, do we think the change in the economic policy will consolidate the Communist system of production? For that, indeed, is our aim. The capitalist system in all countries is living its last days, and the Social Revolution is inevitable. For that reason, we ask: Is not the change of policy a return to the capitalist system?

Comrade Lenin says that the new economic policy will help us to gain time and hold out during the development of the world revolution. But it will be possible for us to hold out if the new policy will not damage the Soviet system itself. We must bear in mind that as a result of this policy, the peasantry

will become economically and morally stronger, while the proletariat will lose confidence in its own strength. If we continue the policy, and grant concessions, foreign capital will consolidate itself here, the proletariat will become weaker, disorganised, and a new revolution will be necessary, which the proletariat, however, will not be able to carry out.

Comrade Lenin spoke only of mechanical forces, but said nothing with regard to the creative efforts of the proletariat. Instead of seeking an outlet, by rousing the initiative of the masses, we seek assistance from outside sources.

Comrade Trotsky, in connection with the keen discussions abroad as to the alleged split in the Russian Communist party, said that those who are at all acquainted with the internal life of the party know that there are no serious differences within the party, except with the small group, the representative of which has just spoken. When the question of concessions was being discussed, the only point that arose was the practical one of where, and in what spheres to grant concessions. And precisely on this question, I was always in complete agreement with comrade Lenin.

What are the dangers which comrade Kollontai raised in her speech? On the one hand, the danger of Western European capitalism, and on the other, from Russian Communism. This question was discussed in our Economic Commission. One of the members of this commission endeavoured to prove that capitalism will find the road to salvation on the broad steppes of Russia. But if, with our railway system, the tremendous distances and our general economic condition, capitalism in a short time would be able to re-establish itself, it would mean that we also are sufficiently powerful economically and, therefore, there would be no need for us to resort to the aid of Western European capitalism. But we are not sufficiently strong to refuse the aid of capitalist technicians in order to heal our wounds. This is the inherent logic of things. The main thing is that the proletariat holds power, and will grant concessions only in so far as it regards it necessary. If capitalism had beaten our army, there would have been no question at all of concessions; capitalism would have *taken* all that it required. The mere fact that we are discussing the question of concessions shows that power is in the hands of the proletariat, and that the proletariat is in a position to solve this question in its own interest. Those comrades who express fear merely show that they exaggerate the importance of our technique and transport, and undervalue our Communist consciousness.

Comrade Kollontai bases her whole case on the almost metaphysical premise that capitalism is living its last days. If that were correct, then, if a British or a French army were to appear on the Black Sea coast, let us say, we could say to ourselves: Capitalism has outlived its time, and therefore we could calmly fold our arms and do nothing. With such ideas I think we should all soon be sent to perdition with the permission of comrade Kollontai. Capitalism will not ask whether according to the theory of comrade Kollontai it has outlived its time or

not, but with the aid of the rifles made in its factories, and its soldiers, who submit to capitalist discipline, it will annihilate us. This proves that capitalism is still strong. Comrade Kollontai may say that trade with capitalist countries is one thing, but to grant concessions is altogether unpermissible. What are concessions? In order to buy, say locomotives, we must pay in timber, but to obtain the timber we must have saws and other technical appliances. Well! we say the English capitalist can receive the timber that he has to receive in a certain forest, let him bring his saws and necessary technical appliances, let him fell the timber, and in return for it he will give us locomotives. Where does comrade Kollontai's objection on principle begin and end? Is it at the point of buying locomotives, or at the point of buying in timber?

Another of comrade Kollontai's objections is that we are diluting the workers with other forces. On the one hand, of technicians, and the other the peasantry. From the very beginning of the war we worked with technical forces, officers, etc., and this at first was opposed by the Central Committee. But if we had relied entirely on the energy and self-sacrifice of the working class, whose services, of course, were tremendous, we should long ago have ceased to exist. The tremendous initiative displayed by the working class lies in that it was able in a backward peasant country, by force and propaganda, to draw the officers into its services.

We must start out from the fact that we are surrounded by capitalist countries, and that we are compelled to give concessions. We retained the conviction that our proletariat as a member of the great international family of the working class, will be able to take advantage of the present unstable position of the capitalist system, in order to obtain the greatest possible benefit from alien forces. It is not we who have lost faith in the working class, but the small group in whose name comrade Kollontai spoke.

Comrade Kerran (British Communist Party) expressed surprise that so few foreign delegates participated in the discussions on the Russian question. The political state of Russia, he said, is not nearly so important as its economic position, and he would not have the delegates go away with the impression that industry in Russia is in an excellent state. On the contrary, Russia is experiencing an acute industrial crisis, which has been rendered even more acute by the failure of the harvest. For that reason he could not reproach the Russians for giving concessions to foreign capital. The Communists of other countries were not yet in a position to help Russia economically.

The speaker related that while he was in Germany and Belgium, capitalists expressed the desire to him of establishing relations with Soviet Russia. One German millionaire declared to him that if he could come to Russia—and convince himself that the experiment being made here had some chances of success—he would place all his wealth and factories at the disposal of Russia.

The slump in industry according to comrade Kerran is explained by the fact that previous to the war, a great part of industry belonged to foreigners, and immediately they left Russia a crisis was inevitable.

In conclusion, comrade Kerran said: "We communists could assist Russia to establish her industry by sending experienced workers here who conjointly with the Russian workers would energetically begin to re-establish industry. The welfare of Soviet Russia is the business of the Communists of the whole world, and its destruction would be a catastrophe for all our ideas.

Comrade Hempel (C.L.P.G.): In answering Comrade Radek's question on the tactics of the Russian Communist party we consider that these tactics suit the particular conditions of Soviet Russia. As regards comrade Kollontai's impression on the concessions to the peasants and foreign capital, we have no doubt that if the international proletariat had come to the aid of the re-establishment of Russia's economic life there would have been no need to approach foreign capital. But how can the international proletariat help Soviet Russia? It cannot send machines, and only a revolution will make it possible for skilled workers to leave Western Europe and come to Russia.

Comrade Roland Holst (Holland) said: I wish to deal with three points that arise on the report on tactics. I think that the initiative shown by the Russian workers is unexampled in the world's history.

I think that Soviet Russia should pay more attention to the world revolution. Soviet Russia will receive some goods from foreign capitalists, but this represents a great danger.

Finally, some think the tactics of the Russian Communist party incorrect. But the Russian Communist party is the only party which trusts the workers and understands their creative energy. They created the revolution and understand the proletariat from experience; and what they say is full of truth. If they adopt a new policy then they do so with the complete trust of the workers and peasants. Unfortunately, we in Western Europe have neither the experience nor the confidence of the proletarian masses.

Comrade Bucharin followed Roland Holst, and said: Comrade Sachs stated that the concessions of Soviet Russia to foreign capital would consolidate the position of international capital. I would like to show the inexactitude of such an impression: (1) Russia receives goods from many countries, whilst Russia's exports are scattered throughout the world; hence our imports are of much more significance than our exports. (2) This significance of our imports is still increased if we compare their value to the economy of Russia with the value of our exports; for example, what significance would an equivalent export of petroleum have on the economy of Britain. (3) Every one of our concessions creates political

competition between capitalist countries, which also is important.

Comrade Kollontai is under the influence of old menshevist recollections, and what she says sounds much worse than what is said by our contemporary treacherous mensheviks. She said that a new ruling class of bourgeois experts and bureaucrats is being formed here, and that the Russian working class would have to create a third revolution to regain their rule. However, comrade Kollontai declared that this new ruling class is composed of the peasantry. But do the concessions to the peasants mean that the government has passed into their hands? Comrade Kollontai tried to scare us with State capitalism. But State capitalism is used in an altogether different sense to that which is used in Western Europe. There the bourgeoisie control the government in the interests of its own factory owners; here the government is in the hands of the proletariat, who merely leases this or that factory to a capitalist. Comrade Kollontai is overcome by a great fear, but this fear serves no useful purpose. (Trotsky: "Except making a long speech.") Even if the Russian revolution did go under this would not mean the end of the social revolution.

Comrade Hempel learned only one thing from Comrade Kollontai's speech: the need of developing the workers' initiative. We quite agree with this, but comrade Kollontai gave us no concrete examples of how this was to be done. Comrade Hempel spoke of the dangers which the R.C.P. should watch. But I think that Comrade Lenin's speech and other of our speeches eloquently show that the R.C.P., better than anyone else, takes note of these dangers and, instead of hiding them, reveals them to all those who are interested in the final victory of the social revolution.

RESOLUTION ON LENIN'S REPORT

At the close of the debate the following resolution was put and carried:—

The Third World Congress of the Communist International having heard comrade Lenin's report on the tactics of Russian Communist party, and having studied the proposed thesis, declares:

The Third World Congress of the Communist International watches with admiration the four years' struggle of the Russian proletariat for the conquest and the strengthening of its political power. The Congress unanimously approves of the policy of the Russian Communist party, which from the very commencement could correctly discern any threatening dangers, and in accordance with the principles of revolutionary Marxism always found a way and means for surmounting them; which now, during a respite in the civil war, by its change of policy in connection with the peasantry, on the question of concessions and revival of industry, concentrates all the forces of the proletariat, directed by the Russian Communist party, for the purpose of retaining in their hands the dictatorship of the

proletariat in Russia until such time as the Western European proletariat will come to their aid.

The World Congress expressed its conviction that it is only thanks to that expedient policy of the Russian Communist party that Soviet Russia may look upon itself as the first and most important rampart of the world revolution, and at the same time denounces the treacherous conduct of the Menshevik parties who, with their campaign in all countries against Soviet Russia and the Russian Communist party, strengthen capitalist reaction in its struggle against Russia, and endeavour to delay the social revolution all over the world. The World Congress calls upon the proletariat of all countries to come over unanimously on the side of the Russian workers and peasants and respect the events of October, 1917, all over the world.

Long live the struggle for the dictatorship of the proletariat!
Long live the world social revolution!

EIGHTEENTH SESSION.

The discussion on the report of the Trade Unions and the Third International was continued.

Comrade Malzhan said comrade Zinoviev was quite correct when he said that the Amsterdam International was a pillar of the bourgeois state, and hence a class struggle, in the full meaning of the word, must be carried on against this International. And we quite agree with him, that this vital question will solve the fate of the world revolution. He was also quite right in his sketch of the relations between the trade unions and the Communist party. The neutrality of the trade unions can only be solved by the method contained in comrade Zinoviev's report.

But how can all this be carried out in practice? The Third Congress stated that Communists must work inside the trade unions, as any attempt to exclude any revolutionary element from the Trade Unions must inevitably result in the weakening of our fight. The German Trade Union movement presents a glaring example of this. In 1919 there were 3,000,000 members in the German united trade unions; in 1920, after the revolution, there were 9,000,000. But the so-called alliance of the free unions only mustered 300,000 members. This alliance is controlled by the Syndicalist elements. What is the result of such a split? There is not a united front, the forces are divided, and the Amsterdam International has met with great success in its slogan of "Exclude them from the trade unions."

The Communist Labour Party of Germany has nearly played into the hands of the Amsterdam International bureaucrats, which uses this slogan for the systematic exclusion of Communists from the trade unions. Knowing full well the tactics of the Communist Labour Party of Germany and the harm it causes in the task of uniting the revolutionary workers of

Germany, we heartily endorse the decisions of the Congress re this party.

The task of the Communists is to influence the trade unions with the object of revolutionising them. Of course, it is not necessary to make every trade unionist a Communist—as the Communist Labour Party of Germany seems to imagine. It is enough to gain control in order that it may be possible to revolutionise them by means of a politically conscious minority.

The representative of the Italian Communist party said that he completely agreed with the conclusions arrived at in the report of Comrade Zinoviev and the speeches of many comrades. Especially did he agree with the decision of not destroying the trade unions but conquering them for the revolutionary struggle. The working class must have its own proletarian army always ready for action. Such an army are the trade unions. The speaker considered that the trade unions must take an active part in the political struggle, but must be left absolutely independent on the solution of their economic problems. The Congress must clearly define the relations between the political and industrial organisations of the proletariat.

But the trade unions, whilst fighting to establish the dictatorship of the proletariat, must not forget the everyday struggle of the working class to improve its conditions.

The speaker considered the German workshop committees to be revolutionary organisations. The task of the German Communist party was to revive them. There were workshop committees in Italy which the Communist party was trying to win over, but unfortunately they are still influenced to a great extent by the Reformists and Socialists.

The Italian Confederation of Labour is carrying on a fierce war against the Communists. It carried a resolution to remain in the Yellow Amsterdam International and at the same time sent two of its representatives to the Red Trade Union International Congress in Moscow. When they arrive here they must be exposed as men who assist the Fascisti in their dirty work.

In order to retain their hold on the masses, the leaders of the Italian Yellow trade unions, unable to improve the conditions of the working class, are organising co-operatives which sell goods to the workers at cheap rates and thus attempt to alleviate their situation. This is how they carry on the class war.

The speaker appealed to the Congress to define a clear and accurate line of tactics cast on the basis of experience.

Comrade Erval (Upper Silesia) said that the Communists are faced with a tremendously difficult task in those districts where the proletariat is composed of many nationalities. It is essential to penetrate the trade unions and create a united front. The Polish Socialist party trade union bureaucrats, who supported Korfanty in the recent Upper Silesian rising, have passed sentences of death on many strikers. However, there are some revolutionary trade unions in Upper Silesia (with a membership of about 20,000) which have not changed

their tactics since the recent terrible days. Are such organisations necessary? Experience has shown us that they only lead to a division of strength. During the past few years the better element has left the trade unions, and that which is left is unable to cope with the trade union bureaucracy.

The absence of a united front clearly demonstrated itself during the rising, when the betrayers of the working class managed to play on the patriotic feelings of the Polish and German proletariat. However, the workers in some parts began to understand how they had been deceived, and after a couple of weeks they unfurled the red banner.

Only an energetic push inside the trade unions by the Communists will make it possible to create that unity which will make it possible for the proletariat to win its final battle.

Comrade Haywood (Industrial Workers of the World) said: Comrade Zinoviev spoke of the increasing membership of those trade unions which affiliate to the American Federation of Labour. I must say that the opposite is the case; that the membership of this Federation is decreasing. In general, it is absolutely impossible to carry on any work inside this Federation, so reactionary is it.

Gompers gave a report on Soviet Russia at the last Federation Congress in Denver, in which he declared that the workers must not help Soviet Russia.

Comrade Trotsky, in his report, spoke of some small revolutionary groups which ought to be liquidated. Amongst the American delegation to the Red Trade Union International Congress there was a fairly extensive section which believed that the Industrial Workers of the World should be entirely liquidated. Such an attempt would be absolutely unsuccessful. Capitalism with its press and third degree tried to kill our movement, but met with no success, simply because the Industrial Workers of the World is a revolutionary organisation, and although numerically small, it is a product of necessity created by the particular conditions of the American workers movement. The object of this organisation is the overthrow of the capitalist system; it takes its stand on the basis of revolutionary class war. Its numerical weakness is explained by the unceasing persecutions and repressions to which the Industrial Workers of the World was, and still is, subjected. Over 30,000 members have been arrested and many have been killed. In spite of this the Industrial Workers of the World takes part in every strike, and always comes to the help of the working class.

When one talks of working inside the American Federation of Labour, the fact must not be lost sight of that the appearance of revolutionary propaganda not only counteracts the trade union bureaucracy, but also that mass of rank and file members who take no part in any political activities. This is why the masses must first be instructed in revolutionary thought.

The Communists recognise the necessity of an industrial organisation. If the Russian Revolution were achieved by workers

already trained in the technical and industrial control of industry, then we would not have witnessed that industrial paralysis which exists to-day in Russia. That is why the Industrial Workers of the World believes it to be of the utmost importance to train the working classes industrially, so that, as soon as capitalism has been superseded, it can immediately take hold of the industrial life of the country.

Losovsky then spoke: The whole philosophy of syndicalism, he said, is independence. Whose independence? Their whole aim is to replace Communism with something else which the revolutionary syndicalists consider sufficient to create the social revolution. We would like to know how the trade unions of Britain, Germany, and France can be independent of Communism in the fight which they are waging to-day? Facts prove that the "Sacred" Amiens charter is somewhat out of date, and it is time it was superseded by some other answering the needs of the day. Of course, granting the independence and autonomy of the trade unions, we at the same time create two parallel movements which have the same object in view. Is it possible for two movements which are saturated with Communism to remain independent of each other? And if they do exist, is it not time that a bridge was built between them?

Recognition of this autonomy and independence must inevitably lead to this, that those who still cling to the Amiens charter will become our enemies and work hand in hand with the reformists. It is astounding how the revolutionary syndicalists cannot perceive this extraordinary contradiction. They cannot see that the enemies of the working class crush the workers' movement with the self-same slogans of the Amiens charter which they themselves use.

It is absolutely impossible and unpermissible that the Communists and the syndicalists should take different paths during a gigantic struggle between the workers and the bourgeoisie. They must either work together or oppose each other. There is no other way. This is the alternative, and you will be convinced of it in your own countries.

Comrades, you know that the White Terror is raging in full force in Spain. Every day workers are most brutally killed by orders from the government. So the Amsterdam International addresses a letter to that government, in which, with exquisite politeness, it reminds it of various points in Versailles Treaty, which secured the freedom of development of the labour movement in every country, that the representative of the Spanish government took part in the Commission on Labour Legislation, and therefore the conduct of the Spanish government to its workers is unkind. In such a friendly tone do the Amsterdam leaders address the government of robbers, and at the same time they suggest to the workers to keep away from politics and theoretical discussion, and only to apply oneself to economic questions.

Comrade Marshall, in the name of the American delegation, replied to Comrade Haywood. The American party, during a period of 26 years, also believed it was utterly impossible to

work inside the trade unions, impossible to reform or revolutionise them. After the Second Congress it came to the conclusion that there is no other way except that of working in close conjunction with the working masses, that the 26 years of work outside the trade unions gave no results; small powerless groups were formed, and the active elements were expelled from the trade unions. What finally opened our eyes and compelled us to smartly change our tactics in connection with the trade unions, was the striking similarity between the devices of Gompers and the Industrial Workers of the World. Gompers, as well as the Industrial Workers of the World, wished, and still wish, one thing: that the revolutionary workers should leave the trade unions, i.e., they pursue the one and the same reactionary object.

Comrade Haywood's point of view of the Russian Revolution is absolutely untenable. He said: If the Russian workers were as highly developed industrially and technically as the Industrial Workers of the World, they would have accomplished the revolution much more successfully, and we should not have witnessed an industrial crisis in Russia at present. It was not the form, but the spirit, the revolutionary idea, which was inspired by the Communist Party, which was the prime mover of the revolution. It is not the form which defines the revolution, but the contrary, and in Russia the revolution took the form of the Soviet system. To speak of the form of the Soviet system, of the spirit of the Industrial Workers of the World, it expressed itself, for instance, in an article in their paper, in which the statement was made that in Russia a workers' republic does not exist, as the workers are not permitted to move from place to place in search for work.

Protesting against the probable liquidation of the Industrial Workers of the World, comrade Haywood cites the importance and influence of the Industrial Workers of the World as a counter-balance of the American Federation of Labour, whose numerical strength is supposed to be decreasing from year to year. That statement is contrary to facts. In 1918 the American Federation numbered 2,700,000 members; in 1919, 3,300,000; in 1920, 4,578,000; in 1921, 3,800,000 members.

The Industrial Workers of the World, after an existence of 16 years, number only 25,000 members in its ranks.

The experience of many years proved that work outside the trade unions is useless, and only leads to the splitting of revolutionary forces. By daily contact with the masses by immediate work in the factories and in the trade unions, it is possible to overcome the trade union bureaucracy, and to convert them into a mighty machine for the revolution.

After the speech of Comrade Marshall, the Chairman, Comrade Gennari, declared the session closed.

NINETEENTH SESSION.

The Session was opened at 8 p.m., with comrade Gennari in the chair.

The debate on the trade union question was continued.

Comrade Reece (Australia) denied the statement of comrade Herzman, made at the previous session, to the effect that the Australian Communist party was organised by the trade union leaders. The Communist Party of Australia arose in 1920 out of the Australian Socialist party, which had been conducting a revolutionary struggle since 1910. After the First Congress of the Communist International, this party applied for affiliation to the Third International, but did not receive any reply. It repeated the application after the Second Congress, and on the receipt of the demand for the expulsion of the sectarian left elements, a party conference was convened in October, at which the basis of the Australian Communist party was laid. Comrade Reece also denied that the party had not conducted any revolutionary agitation between 1917 and 1920. The party, during that period, conducted an energetic agitation in favour of Soviet Russia, and for the conquest by the proletariat. It was also stated that at the last Trade Union Congress 85 per cent. voted in favour of joining the Red Trade Union International. "If that is so," said Comrade Reece, "why do not the Australian workers establish the dictatorship of the proletariat?"

Comrade Knight (Canada) said: According to comrade Haywood, fifteen years ago the I.W.W. had 80,000 members, and to-day that number has been reduced to 15,000 or 16,000. The whole policy of creating an ideal organisation of industrial workers was ridiculous and absurd, and every attempt in that direction has proved unsuccessful. In the first place, it is absurd to strive to create a new society "within the shell of the old." The whole propaganda of the I.W.W. is directed towards the overthrow of the capitalist system, and strives to "perfect its own organisation." In the official organ of the I.W.W. we read: "We will always remain a pure industrial organisation, and hope to solve all the social problems on the basis of industrial unionism. For that reason we cannot subordinate ourselves to a political party, no matter whether it is a Communist party or any other one, without at the same time abolishing our independence. For us the acceptance of the programme of the Third International would mean the abandoning of the principle of world leadership, and subordination to the leaders of that political party." Thus, the I.W.W., with a membership of 15,000 lays claim to "world leadership."

The fear of the domination of the party is absolutely groundless. We do not go into the trade unions and declare that we propose to subject them to ourselves; we subordinate the trade unions to ourselves by working within them, participating in their struggle, and winning the confidence of the workers, and finally becoming masters of the situation, to use it for the purposes of the revolution. It is for that reason it is necessary to penetrate into the trade unions, and closely bind them with the party, in order to create a great united revolutionary party for the overthrow of capitalism.

Comrade Beci (Spain) dealt with the question of the relation between the Communist party and the trade unions on the standpoint of the condition which prevailed in Spain. The Spanish Communist party in working out its programme, based itself on the resolutions of the Second Congress of the Comintern. Communist groups have been formed in the trade unions, who are working in the spirit of the Communist International. The comrade then dealt with the various organisations in Spain, and the attitude of the Communist party towards them, and in conclusion emphasised the necessity of working in the Spanish trade unions on the basis of the theses accepted at the Second Congress, which, in its turn, will facilitate the speedy amalgamation of the two Communist parties existing in Spain.

Comrade Kolarov (Bulgaria) stated that formerly in Bulgaria there existed two trade union organisations. The Social-Democratic and the Revolutionary, "The Tecniaks," and these two organisations naturally differed on the important question on the relations of the party and the trade unions. The Yellow unions advocated the principle of the neutrality of the Unions, and, on the other hand, the "Tecniaks" advocated the other organic connection between the trade unions and the party. The Yellow Unions limited themselves merely to the immediate struggle of the workers. Previous to the war, the neutralists had considerable influence among the masses, and the majority of the workers belonged to their organisations. But gradually the Communists won position after position from the Yellows. During the war the falsity of the theory of the neutrality of the trade unions became clearly revealed, and the workers began to see that only the revolutionary trade unions really defended their interests. Now the Bulgarian party has the support of the whole of the organised workers. The revolutionary unions were in complete contact with the Communists, and many of the comrades who are the head of the trade union movement are active party members.

Comrade Tomasi (France): The question of the relations between the trade unions and the party is closely related to the great revolutionary problems. Bourgeois parties have their agents in the trade unions, who declare that the organisations must only be used for improving the workers' conditions, and must steer clear of politics.

On the other hand, there are members of the Anarchist school in these trade unions who try to put their doctrines into practice. Although demanding the neutrality of the trade unions in so far as politics are concerned, these elements nevertheless preach politics there, so that the trade union is the arena where all political tendencies meet in conflict. And whenever there is any question of syndicalist activities in the trade unions, then it is always determined by politics. The French trade unions were founded by the Socialist party, which, instead of leading them along the path to revolution, merely interested them in election campaigns and one or two improvements in the economic status of the workers. It is no use accusing the Amiens Charter. Those people who formulated the Amiens Charter have rapidly evolved since then, and are daily coming nearer to us. I agree with comrade Lcsovski that we must wage a revolutionary mass struggle; we do not desire a split, and far from this taking place, I am convinced that the trade unions will only have a single revolutionary front in France. We did not ask the Comintern whether it was going to subject us to it, because a force cannot be disciplined. We wish to define a clear, strong, and accurate revolutionary party.

Those who have not yet agreed to work with us now confess that there is no arguing over the question of leaving the Amsterdam and joining the Moscow International.

Just think of the difficulties we have had to encounter, and the tendencies from the right which are still a danger. Do not forget the French working class, poisoned by jingoism and nationalism during the four odd years of war, still believes a victory over Germany would ease its position.

However, I am convinced that the next year, when we again meet at the Red Trade Union Congress, we will have only one revolutionary front.

Comrade Andrews (American Communist Party) refuted the statement of comrade Haywood purporting to show that if the Russian workers were as technically and revolutionarily organised as the I.W.W., then the Russian revolution would have been more successful and that chaos which reigns in Russia to-day would not have been in existence. "Comrade Haywood should know," said Comrade Andrews, "that the chaos in Russia is not the result of the lack of technical organisation, but that of the seven years' war and other economic reasons. An altogether false impression exists in the I.W.W. that the trade unions should prepare for their future economic rôle within the shell of the capitalist system. As a matter of fact, the function of the trade unions under a capitalist régime is merely the continuation of the struggle on the economic field, and the experience of Russia has shown us that the trade unions can only prepare to control economy after the proletarian revolution."

The statement of comrade Haywood that a section of the American delegates to the Red Trade Union International wishes to liquidate the I.W.W. is not without foundation. But the

Communist party and the American delegates to the Comintern Congress disavow this. On the other hand, we consider that we must work both in the American Federation of Labour and the I.W.W. The exit of the Communists from the latter organisation would not liquidate it, but on the other hand would strengthen the influence of the Anarcho-Syndicalists, who are already powerful enough.

Our delegation supports comrade Zinoviev's theses, and believes the neutrality of the trade unions unpermissible, as there are already many responsible Communists in America, of the ordinary trade unionist type, who discard the robe of Communism when in their Trade Unions and believe in the non-interference of Communism in their trade union work.

In conclusion comrade Andrews dealt with the question of organisation. The Red Trade Union International has its bureaux in all countries, and these bureaux must work hand in hand with the local Communist parties. Communists who are members of these bureaux must still be dominated by party discipline. In order to have no confusion or friction here, it is essential that the future constitution of the Comintern and the Red Trade Union International should be drafted in a collaborative form.

Comrade Bell (Britain) said : We quite agree with comrade Zinoviev's conclusions. The Communists can only be victorious when they have become closely welded to the masses. The trade unions must become the schools of Communism, but we must educate the masses in these unions in the spirit of Marxism and the revolutionary struggle.

The bourgeois trade union bureaucracy uses to its own advantage the workers' craft unions, and counteracts any attempt of the workers to organise their unions on an industrial basis. They know that the small craft unions play into the hands of the bourgeoisie by scattering the workers' strength. The slogan of the British trade unions should be, "From craft to industrial organisation." One trade union for one industry, such should be the immediate task of the British Communists.

Neutrality in the British trade unions is very prevalent. The British working class movement has always rejected any attempt to transfer their economic fight into the political field. The Communists must show in deeds that these two problems are indissolubly bound together.

The Amsterdam International by itself creates no furore in Britain. The most active way of fighting it is by attacking the bureaucrats who have found such a comfortable nest in the British Trade Unions.

Comrade Fiur was the next speaker. He supported the I.W.W. because of the personal contact he had with it whilst in the U.S.A. and Canada. Those quotations, he said, which purported to show that the I.W.W. rejected Soviet Russia were made by persons who are no longer members of the I.W.W.

The words of a few persons by no means represented the actions of an entire organisation.

In examining the activities of the I.W.W., comrade Fiur declared that during the whole period of its existence this organisation had taken part in every industrial conflict which had taken place in the U.S.A. But in its fight for the workers' interests it was not only brutally persecuted by the Government, but was left in the lurch by all workers and socialist organisations. Let the Communists not repeat the mistakes of the American Socialists. The Communist Party of America was very small. Where could it draw its energy, but from the I.W.W.?

In conclusion, comrade Fiur contradicted the impression that the I.W.W. supported neutrality, by quoting a resolution of the I.W.W., which comrade Haywood, for some reason or other, forgot to mention in his speech of the previous day. It says that the aim of any revolutionary movement can only be the overthrow of the capitalist system and the establishment of the workers' dictatorship by means of the Soviet system and, further, the subjection of the trade unions to the party must not be merely a formality handing over the control of the latter, but must be done during a process of active work.

Comrade Gennari, the Chairman, declared that the list of speakers was exhausted. The final word on the report would be given to comrade Zinoviev, after the work of the Committee, which was discussing that question with the representatives of the Red Trade Union International was concluded.

TWENTIETH SESSION.

The Session opened at 7.45 p.m., with comrade Kolarov in the chair.

The item on the agenda was the Young Communist Organisation, which was introduced by Comrade Munzenberg. The speaker began by surveying the economic conditions in which young workers are living at present. Previously, he said, apprenticeship presumed future independence, whereas to-day the young worker, from the very first day of his apprenticeship, binds his fate with the workshop and factory, in the capacity of a wage worker. The labour of young persons is the most badly paid category of labour. The war has still further deteriorated the position of the young workers. In a number of countries the wages of young persons are falling much more rapidly than that of adults. But the most important factor is that the war and the crisis that followed it considerably increased the ranks of exploited young workers. The army of young workers is greatest in the Western countries, where, in some cases, it represents almost 50 per cent. of the working population of the country. In Germany at the present moment it is estimated that there are four million young workers. Such an economic situation naturally facilitates the spread of Communist ideas among young persons, and facilitates their organisation under the banner of Communism.

It was necessary to take advantage of the enthusiasm of the young people and to train the workers which the Communist party so much requires. After pointing out the importance which the bourgeoisie attach to the organisation of young people, the endeavour of the Second and Second and a-Half International to win over the youth, the successful efforts of the Young Communist League to combat this, and the growth of the Young Communist League, Comrade Munzenberg said that the Young Workers' movement during the war became the centre of revolutionary propaganda against the imperialist war, and gradually became one of the branches of the mighty Communist movement. It is quite evident that the independent development of a Young Communist movement would create the danger of parallel Communist parties growing up in each country. In order to avoid that, it is proposed in the theses presented to the Congress that the Young Communist organisations submit to the political guidance of the Communist party. The task which confronts the Young Communist International is to extend the leagues into mass parties. Secondly, to create and consolidate young workers' organisations in those countries where they do not yet exist, or are very weak (Britain and America), and to extend the work of the leagues to the petty peasantry, the youth of which are susceptible to Communist ideas. For this purpose it is necessary to have a special organisation politically and tactically subordinated to the Communist party. An independent organisation is necessary and desirable, for the reason that special methods are required to work among young people, which the party as a whole is not able to conduct.

In conclusion, comrade Munzenberg referred to a statement made by comrade Trotsky to the effect that the adult workers of Central Europe were weary and that their minds were poisoned by the ideas of Social-Democracy; it was therefore necessary to organise cadres of the proletariat from among the young workers, as yet untouched by the poison of compromise. The question of the organisation of young workers is an extremely serious one, and comrade Munzenberg expressed the conviction that the Congress will devote to it the attention that it deserves.

A discussion on the report then followed. The first speaker was **Frolich**. He said that the theses submitted by the Young Communist International were very significant for the reason that they abandon political independence in favour of the political hegemony of the Communist International. Comrade Frölich added that the young workers during the war, and even previous to it, were revolutionary, and it was thanks to them that many international groups were formed. Besides that, the Young Communist leagues did much preparatory work for the Communist parties of all countries and for the International. In Germany, for instance, the best workers originated from the Young Communist leagues, with the assistance of the party in complete contact with them. The Young Communist leagues were able to do very much important work, much better even than the adults. It is necessary that the two organisations support each other, and that the party keep the leagues informed

of its undertakings. The International should also support the Young Communist league.

On the debate on this subject coming to an end, the chairman reported that several delegations had submitted amendments to the theses, and that the Presidium proposed to appoint a commission, composed of Comrades Frölich, Bucharin, Chatskin, Munzenberg, and Kolarov, to deal with it. This was carried unanimously.

The next item on the agenda was the women's question, and **Comrade Zetkin** was called upon to deliver the report. She stated that she wished to report on the result of the activity of the International Women's Secretariat, in connection with the International Women's Conference, which has just been held. The revolutionary movement among women during the past year has made considerable progress, both in the West and the East. She regretted to have to state that in many countries the work among women was conducted without any support from the Communist party. We know from experience that in revolution the woman plays a part almost as important as that of the man. Women are taking a great part in the economic and political conflicts which are now being waged for improving the conditions of the working class and for the final overthrow of the capitalist system, as a result of which, the relations of forces between men and women have changed. As a consequence of the war, women have been drawn into industry, and consequently into the class struggle of the proletariat. Not only the proletarian woman, but even the bourgeois woman, cannot remain passive in the growing struggle. The Communist parties must revolutionise the women, equally with the men. The Executive Committee of the Comintern had devoted all its energies in this respect by trying to attract as many women as possible into the revolutionary movement. The Russian party as well as the Spartacists' Union, worked in the women's movement together with the men. We hope that this will be the case in every country after the Second Conference of Women Communists. This Conference, when compared with the First, is a big step forward. At the first there were 20 delegates, representing 16 countries, whilst this year there are 82 delegates from 28 countries, 61 of the delegates having a decisive vote. This Conference is of great historic value, as the women of the East are represented in it for the first time. This fact in itself shows that revolutionary consciousness has made a tremendous stride forward this last year. The Conference always worked in the spirit of the Third International, of which it is a part. In considering the form of organising the women's movement, the Conference was governed by the idea that there could be no special women's movement, as the proletariat has only one organisation and one aim. However, in view of the specific conditions under which the proletarian women had developed, the Conference proposed to organise special departments in all parties, for working amongst women. These departments, of course, must work hand in hand with the party. They must carry on an oral and written propaganda, must perform all the

agitational and organising work among women, always bearing in mind that on the education of these women masses will depend whether they will be for or against the revolution. We believe that the proletarian women must be instructed by the party in carrying out legal and illegal work. She must work hand in hand with the men, and take her rifle and fight in the workers' struggle. The Conference also took note of organising branches in all those institutions where women are predominant.

She considered it of vital importance to create an International line of communication with the International Secretariat in Moscow. The removal of the Secretariat is explained not only by the proximity of the Executive Committee of the Comintern, but by the fact that the Secretariat can benefit by the experience and practice of the Russian Communist Women's movement.

Russia has shown us that women cannot be freed without the conquest of power of the proletariat, and that the dictatorship of the proletariat is impossible without the participation of women.

In Soviet Russia woman takes part in all the spheres of political and industrial life, and suffers all the hardships of the battlefield and economic chaos. The tradition of the Russian revolution must be made our slogan. We women are the greatest enemies of the bourgeoisie, and in spite of the dangers of civil war, we must always say, "Forward to the dictatorship of the proletariat and Communism."

Comrade Colliar, of France, then spoke, and said that the French Communist party had never yet taken any steps to organise the women proletariat. After our approach to the party for help, we decided to organise a special sub-department for propaganda amongst women. Unfortunately, our comrades do not yet realise the importance of such work. The last 1st of May movement has shown us that those strikes in which women took a part were the most successful. They understand that their emancipation lies in the emancipation of the proletariat. It is essential that we establish such propaganda papers in France as exist in Russia, Germany, and Bulgaria. Whilst the party has a daily organ, and the Young Communists their own paper in Paris, the woman has none. "The Woman's Voice," although published by Communists, is not a party paper. The Executive Committee of the Comintern must compel our party to undertake work among women, and give us women Communists the possibility of carrying on such work on a wide scale. If this is done we will be able to create the necessary condition for the success of the revolution, and will be able to avoid those mistakes which we made during the war.

Comrade Kollontai: Comrade Zetkin has already outlined the problems of the women's Communist movement and very little more needs be said. Our chief task is to win over the broad masses of women into the Communist movement. The fact that women are not organised in any political movement greatly facilitates the task of the Communist party in carrying on propaganda amongst them.

In order to attract women into our movement, we must create a propaganda which corresponds to their particular social and economic conditions. But the emancipation of woman will only be achieved when the dictatorship of the proletariat will have attracted her to the new creative work.

In Soviet Russia, woman has a tremendous influence on any legislative acts, which in any way affect the position of women. All our women's departments have many privileges in the sphere of legislative initiative, such as the protection of labour, public welfare, etc. Has this policy weakened Soviet Russia? No; we have benefited and enriched it, as is clearly demonstrated by three years of experience.

Comrade Kolarov, the chairman, then put the resolution on the form and methods of working amongst women to the vote. The resolution was carried unanimously.

TWENTY-FIRST SESSION.

The Congress opened at 8.30 p.m., with Comrade Gennari in the chair.

Comrade Radek delivered a report on the question of tactics. He states that the commission was engaged mainly with the questions of Czecho-Slovakia and Germany. It appeared that the Czecho-Slovak working class displayed considerable revolutionary activity, but that there were a number of Centrist tendencies in their ranks. Comrade Smeral, who succeeded in arriving in Moscow, does not deny it. The Commission came to the conclusion that Smeral is inclined to carry out the wishes of the Executive Committee. With regard to Germany, the Commission states that the March rising signifies a step forward for the revolutionary working class movement in Germany, and that hundreds of thousands of workers in Germany participated in the movement headed by the party. The remaining amendments in the theses were purely of a verbal character. Comrade Radek, in the name of the Commission, proposed that the Congress accept the theses unanimously.

Comrade Zinoviev, in the name of the Russian delegation, proposed to accept the resolution, and stated that the Congress has very carefully examined the German question, and has arrived at the conclusion that the unity of the German party at the present moment is more important than at any other time, and demands of the Central Committee of the German party, above all, to maintain a correct attitude of the former opposition. On the other hand, the Congress demands of the former opposition that it immediately disperses its legal organisation and its unquestioned subordination to the decisions of the Congress. In the event of any members of the former opposition refusing to submit, they should be immediately expelled from the German party and from the International.

Comrade Zinoviev then quoted a letter he had received from the representative of the Executive Committee in Germany, which states that the opposition is doing everything to bring about a split. A few days ago a meeting of the opposition took place, at which Daumig and Levi spoke. They pointed out that the Congress was developing more and more towards anarcho-syndicalism, and a rapprochement with the C.L.P.G. As a consequence it was resolved that the opposition must strengthen their organisation, and Levi, in a long speech, pointed out that the Russian party was hanging in the air.

In conclusion, Comrade Zinoviev pointed out that the dangers of a split in the German party undoubtedly exists, and that the Central Committee nevertheless must exert all its efforts in order to prevent it. On the other hand, the Executive Committee of the Comintern will carefully watch what is taking place in Germany, and if the opposition does not subordinate itself to the Executive Committee, serious measures will be taken. Comrade Zinoviev expresses the conviction that the delegation of the right section of the party will unreservedly carry out the decisions of the Congress and use its influence in order to prevent a split in the party.

Comrade Malzhan, in the name of the opposition of the German Communist party, speaking on the above resolution, said that his group was deeply interested in preserving the unity of the Communist party. They would unreservedly carry out the theses on the tactics accepted at the Congress. The situation which has been created at the present moment, the attacks of the Menshevik parties, Social-Democrats and Independents, the sharpening class contradictions in Germany, all imperatively dictate the necessity for preserving the unity of the party. But the resolution of the Russian delegation suffers from one-sidedness, and therefore they put forward another which calls upon the whole party to subordinate itself to the Executive Committee, whereas the Russian resolution simply refers to the opposition. Comrade Malzhan added that if it was desired that the complete unity of the party be brought about in the quickest and least painful manner, the Congress should vote for their resolution.

Comrade Thalheimer, in the name of the United Communist Party of Germany, stated that the Russian resolution dotted the "i's" and crossed the "t's," whereas the resolution of the opposition was vague. He therefore proposed that the Russian resolution be accepted. Comrade Zinoviev declared that the opposition did not insist on their resolution being put to the vote, but that they desired merely to have it recorded in the minutes. Comrade Zinoviev added that if the comrades of the opposition abroad unconditionally submit to the decision of the Congress, all the better. But if they conduct another policy as it is hinted in the letter read to the Congress on the activities of Levi, Daumig and others, our resolution will be a weapon

in the hands of Zetkin, Malzhan and Neiman in their struggle against these intractable comrades. The resolution was carried unanimously.

Comrade Mestcheriakov then reported on co-operation. He said that previous to the revolution the labour movement was divided into three groups entirely independent of each other, namely, the political party, the Trade Unions, and the co-operative societies. At the present moment the labour movement must unite all its forces, and while we have achieved this with regard to the parties in the trade unions, nothing has been done in this connection with regard to the co-operative societies. Usually we revolutionaries did not take much interest in the co-operative movement and peaceful economic work, and devoted our attention chiefly to an active political struggle, with the result that the co-operatives fell into the hands of the opportunists, who have converted them into their fortress. We must take possession of the co-operatives at all cost, and make them a bulwark in our struggle for Communism. Not only have the opportunists captured the co-operatives, but they have imbued them with their ideas. This we must combat, and completely re-construct the idea of co-operation. Formerly co-operative societies took no part in politics; this must now be altered. Formerly co-operatives were composed of voluntary members; now, the whole of the working class must belong to the co-operatives. Formerly the aim of the co-operatives was to adapt itself to bourgeois society, and to ameliorate, at least, some of the evils of capitalism. We must now convert it into a weapon to combat capitalism; thus, the very essence of the old co-operatives must be radically changed and our task must be to capture the co-operatives at all cost.

Comrade Mestcheriakov read the following theses on the co-operatives, which were carried unanimously:—

THESIS ON THE WORK OF COMMUNISTS IN THE CO-OPERATIVES.

(1) During the period of the proletariat revolution, the revolutionary co-operative movement must help the workers in their revolutionary struggle for political power, and where this power has already been seized must help them to build the Socialist system.

(2) The old co-operatives followed along the tract of reformism and avoided any revolutionary struggle by every possible means. They propounded the theory of a gradual growth of socialism, without a dictatorship of the proletariat.

They believe in political impartiality, whilst they subordinate the co-operatives to the political aspirations of the imperialist bourgeoisie.

Their internationalism only exists in words. In deeds they replace the international solidarity of the workers by co-operation between the workers and the bourgeoisie of their own country.

The whole policy of the old co-operatives is not to advance the revolution but to retard it, not to help but to hinder the proletarian in his struggle.

(3) The different forms of co-operatives cannot be of equal service to the revolutionary aspirations of the proletariat. The most useful are the consumers' co-operatives. But the latter include many co-operatives with bourgeois elements. Such co-operatives can never support the proletariat in the revolution. Only the workers' town and village co-operatives can be of any service.

(4) The problem of the Communists in the co-operative movement is to propagate Communist ideas and to transform the co-operatives into weapons for the revolutionary class war, without, however, isolating separate co-operatives from their central organisation.

All the Communist co-operators must form a well organised fraction in their respective co-operatives, and must aim at the creation of a central Communist co-operative in every country.

These groups must be in close touch with their central organisation, with the Communist party and with the latter's co-operative representatives. The Centre must define the tactics of Communists in the co-operative movement of their own country, and must guide and organise the movement.

(5) The practical problems facing the revolutionary co-operatives of the West will crop up as their work goes on. But to-day some of them can already be determined.

(a) Oral and written agitation and propaganda of Communist ideas. A struggle for freeing the co-operatives from the control of the bourgeoisie and compromisers.

(b) The approach of the co-operatives to the revolutionary and trade union organisations. The direct and indirect participation of the co-operatives in the political struggle by making them take part in the demonstrations and political campaigns of the proletariat. The material assistance of the Communist party and its press organs, and the material assistance of strikers and workers locked out.

(c) A struggle against the imperialist policy of the bourgeoisie, and a struggle against interference in the affairs of Soviet Russia or other countries.

(d) The creation, not merely of ties of principle and organisation between the co-operatives of different countries, but real business relations.

(e) A struggle for speedy conclusion of trade agreements and the resumption of trading with Soviet Russia and other Soviet Republics.

(f) As broad a participation as possible in trading with these Republics.

(g) The participation in the benefiting from the natural resources of Soviet countries by means of taking up co-operative concessions

(6) The problems of the co-operatives after the triumph of the revolutionary proletariat will themselves crop up in that period. But from the experience of Soviet Russia some of their general outlines can already be determined.

(a) The consumers' co-operatives will have to take upon themselves the responsibility of distributing goods along the lines laid down by the proletarian government. This will place the co-operatives in unparalleled conditions for development.

(b) The co-operatives must become the organisations uniting all the small producers (peasants and tradesmen) with the central economic organisations of the proletarian State. The latter will then direct the work of these small producers on a general scale by means of these co-operatives. The consumers' co-operatives will then become in part the collectors of the produce and raw material of these small producers, and will distribute them to the consumers and the government.

(c) Besides this, these consumers' co-operatives can unite several small producers in common workshops which will allow the introduction of mechanical labour and technical skill. This will create a technical base under these small producers which will make it possible to create socialist production, and will replace the individualist psychology of the small producer by a collective psychology.

(7) Taking into consideration the colossal rôle which the revolutionary co-operatives will have to play during the proletarian revolution, the Third Congress of the Communist International wishes to impress Communist parties, groups and organisations with the importance of continuing an energetic campaign in propagating the idea of revolutionary co-operation in the co-operatives, the transformation of the co-operatives into weapons of the class war and the creation of a single front between the co-operatives and the revolutionary trade unions.

■ The Congress instructs the Executive Committee of the Comintern to form a section for co-operative work, which must work out the above-named problems; if need be, meetings, conferences and congresses must be called for the solving of revolutionary co-operative questions on an international scale.

TWENTY-SECOND SESSION.

The Twenty-second Session opened under the chairmanship of Comrade Kolarov at 8 p.m.

Comrade Koenen spoke on the report on the structure and organising work of the Communist parties. He said :—

The Communist parties, as the vanguard of the proletariat in its struggle against capitalism, must adapt their organisations to suit : first of all, their primary aims and activities, and then the historically determined conditions of that country wherein

the party works. That is why the leadership of the party must aim at organic unity, the greatest possible fighting preparedness and adaptability to the changing conditions of the struggle.

Successful leadership can only be attained by a very close alliance with the proletarian masses. This alliance is attained by democratic centralism. The fight against the bourgeoisie demands the greatest co-ordination and centralisation of the party activities, the internal co-ordination inside the party is attained by means of a broad democratism.

The fundamental tasks of the party, such as the organisation of its activities, demand from every member his uninterrupted and continuous work in this or that particular line. The theses gave a detailed list of all the various kinds of work and forms of organisation. It is essential that all this does not remain on paper, but be put into actual deeds. Dealing with branches and workers' groups as the fundamental forms of the party's organisation, the speaker said that the mere mechanical division of the parties' work amongst these various groups was not sufficient : only those groups which can fulfil their appointed tasks can be of use to the party. A training in the different departments of the party work is also essential. However, the workers must not be allowed to remain too long in any one department ; a change from one department to another is of great importance, as it helps to freshen the work, and is necessary so as to form a group of versatile party leaders.

No matter how varied be their forms, propaganda and agitation must always keep one basic view in mind : a close and direct touch with the mass movement. Wherever a fight is taking place, no matter whether it be the every-day or small conflicts of an insignificant local movement, the Communists must be there with their propaganda and agitation. The most important thing is to show the workers that we are their defenders, and so win their confidence. This participation in their every-day struggles will give us that experience which is so essential for our future big fights. The struggle with the trade union bureaucracy must be carried on in harmony with our aims and plan : not so much by means of mere word fights as by actual demonstration of our worth in the proletarian struggle as opposed to the underhanded and treacherous policy of the compromising trade union leaders.

Special tactics must be applied in approaching the semi-proletariat, such as the peasantry, clerks, etc. We must first of all free them from the fear of Communism put into them by the bourgeoisie. If they cannot be made to join our side, then we should at least aim at their neutrality, as these strata will play a decisive rôle in the moment of the proletariat's struggle for power ; of course, the press is the best method of propaganda and agitation, and the party should pay special attention to this.

The speaker then dealt with political activities, and pointed out that there was not a moment in any country when the Communist party had no opportunity of taking part in political activities ; experience shows us that such demonstrations as the

British "Hands off Russia" Committees and the Polish demonstrations during the advance of the Russian army, met with great success,

The general structure of the party organisation must always keep one thing in mind: that the centre of gravity of the party must rest in the chief towns and large industrial centres, where large masses of workers are concentrated.

In conclusion, the speaker dealt with the question of relations between the Executive Committee of the Comintern and local organisations, and proposed a resolution, which said that the period when separate parties were merely propaganda organisations has passed, and that to-day all parties had to be organisations of deeds. In order that our International be a really active International, it is absolutely essential that all our parties be kept in close touch with the Executive Committee. Every party must feel itself a section of the International, and to do this every party of every country must, as far as possible, organise local conferences and congresses with neighbouring parties. Thus the international character of individual parties will be clearly expressed. Steps must be taken in Western Europe to have all important agitation and propaganda information translated into all languages.

The representatives of the Executive Committee must see to it that instructions and information be sent to every local party.

The secretariat of the Executive Committee must be re-organised, and consist of at least three members, as far as possible representing the three most powerful countries. The Secretariat must stay in Moscow, as the centre of the World Revolution, but the Executive Committee must take the necessary steps to organise as many congresses and conferences as possible abroad.

After Comrade Koenen's report, the Congress decided, on the proposal of comrade Couturier, to create a special Sub-Commission to deal with the question of re-organising the Executive Committee, parallel with the organisation commission.

TWENTY-THIRD SESSION

The sitting of July 12th was presided over by comrade Zinoviev, and opened with a discussion on the Eastern question.

Tom Mann (Britain) opened the discussion. He ridiculed "Free England," in which the majority of the children never had sufficient food or clothing. Turning to the question of India, he stated that out of 320 millions of population 200 millions were under the subjection, not of Britain as a State, but of a small handful of people. The dominant bourgeoisie of Britain exercises its power not only by means of a dictatorship but also by means of artillery. We were struggling against this tyranny and were endeavouring to unite with the groups in India (as yet small numerically) who were striving to liberate the nations enslaved by Britain. The state of affairs in India is repeated in Egypt and also in England itself, in Scotland and Wales, where the domination of the bourgeoisie has reached its highest development. Struggling with all its strength for the liberation of the working class of Britain, the British workers

let no opportunity pass to forward the liberation of other nations. Narrow nationalist movements will never be capable of assuming the dimensions necessary for the overthrow of the world plutocracy, and all active revolutionaries are confronted by the problem how to direct the efforts of the oppressed nationalities into a general revolutionary channel. In conclusion, Tom Mann expressed the hope that many European countries would speedily follow the example of Moscow.

Suleimin Nuri spoke in the name of the Turkish Communist party, and characterised the Anatolian nationalist liberation movement as of the greatest agitational value for all the nations of the East. Before the war, the Turkish nation lived under the yoke of the Sultan and the Pashas. During the war the Turkish workers and peasants, dressed in soldiers' uniforms, understood quite well in whose interests they were being driven to the slaughter. The nation has arisen against the force and oppression of the Entente, but the Pashas have succeeded in snatching this movement into their own tenacious hands. Kemal Pasha is governing the country by the same methods as those of the Sultan Hamid. He carries on a most ruthless war against the Communists, for he is afraid that they may utilise the liberation movement for seizing political power. Of course, the Pashas have also deceived the labouring masses and have organised their official party with would-be Communist battle cries. But this does not deceive the Turkish workers and peasants, who are grouping themselves more and more around the Communist party. They will support Kemal so long as he wages war on the bitterest foes of the Turkish nation—the Entente; but if Kemal continues to murder Communists he will be overthrown by the Turkish masses.

The Greek delegate, **Dimitricus**, dwelt on the difficult position of Greece on account of its being drawn into a new war with Turkey. The Greek workers and peasants by no means desire to die for the interests of England, and they show this by their mass desertion of the army. Half of the Grecian army has run away. The Greek Communists do all in their power to emphasise the fact that the interests of the Turkish and Greek toiling masses are identical, that they bear no enmity to one another—their common foe being the imperialist Entente and their own bourgeoisie. Naturally, the Greek bourgeoisie hurls its whole terrorist apparatus against the Greek Communists, but this does not prevent the latter from advocating closer relations with the Turkish, Bulgarian and European proletariat.

The Persian delegate who followed related how, after the Russian revolution, his country had been subjected completely to British influence. The British merchants had bought up all the grain, and as a consequence the whole country had suffered unheard of privations, of which some millions of people had perished. Risings broke out over the whole country, and the British Government was compelled to recall its troops. At the present moment, Persia is going through a national

awakening, but the seizure of power by the Communists is difficult to realise—for this the co-operation of the world proletariat is essential. On this account the minimum programme of the Communist party corresponds to the needs of the backward state of Persia, and is directed mainly to the development of its productive forces.

The president of the committee of the revolutionary Mussulmen then gave a report of the course of their work in various Mussulman countries, declaring, however, that this committee was not Communist—whereupon comrade Zinoviev explained that the Communist International could only support real revolutionary movements and was bound to unmask every form of pure nationalism whatever fine disguise it might wear.

The next speaker, the representative of Armenia, was the well-known veteran revolutionary, **Kaciyan**, and he was given a very warm welcome by the conference on rising. "Comrades," said Kaciyan, "there is no corner of the world where imperialism does not execute cruel and base deeds under cover of high sounding phrases, and one of the corners in the Near East is Armenia. From the very beginning of the October revolution, the Entente, particularly England, endeavoured to create in Armenia a basis for its fight against Soviet Russia." By their intrigues and repressions, Armenia had been well nigh ruined. But the people rose and now the country has entered upon a period of peaceful constructive work. "We now see how under Soviet authority Armenians and Mussulmen have started to live in harmony, and the only dangers now threatening free Armenia are the imperialist aims of the Turkish nationalists."

The Georgian delegate, **Tschakaya**, pointed out the traitorous rôle of the Georgian Mensheviks, who, no sooner did they rise to power, than they became the meanest lackeys of the Entente. The bourgeois-property-owning imperialism and nationalism of the Georgian Mensheviks was rapidly unmasked by the Georgian workers and peasants. Georgia adopted Sovietism, thanks to the complete political and economic bankruptcy of Menshevism, and if at the present moment Messrs. Tscheidze, Tseretelli & Co. are attempting in Western Europe to distort historical facts and to prove that they had, forsooth, organised an ideal democratic dominion and had created a paradise in which their pupils—the heroes of the Yellow International had sojourned, then how can one explain the fact that Jordania himself, on the eve of the coup, had, in his report, described the position of Georgia as tragic, and had called on his colleagues to create some sort of new current of democratic imperialism which would alone be powerful enough to avert the catastrophe overtaking the country. The behaviour of the Mensheviks immediately after the coup was particularly base. They despoiled the whole country, they took away in French vessels all that still remained in the unhappy country after four years of the vandalism of German, Turkish and Entente imperialism. They took away not only gold, diamonds and valuables, and all the sugar; but, worst of all, all the quinine, whereby they condemned the whole country

to destruction by malaria. The army with which the Mensheviks went off numbered thirty thousand, but only five thousand ever reached Batoum, and of these only *twenty* went with them on board their vessel in spite of the fact that the Georgian Mensheviks promised to pay their soldiers five years' wages and equipment in advance. This shows the indignation of the Georgian nation against the traitorous Mensheviks. In alliance with other Soviet Republics and under the guidance of the Comintern International the Georgian Soviet Republic will develop and will serve as a striking example to all the nations of the East.

Comrade **Aviloff** (Azerbaijan) described the course of development in his country, and affirmed that at the present time the Soviet Government is firmly established throughout the land, in the constructive work of which the poorest peasantry and the workers are taking part.

One of the most impressive events of this sitting was the appearance of a number of delegates from the Far Eastern countries. The first of these, **Oshi-Chara** (Japan), brought greetings to the Congress from the newly formed Japanese Communist party. He indicated the difficulty of Communist work in Japan in view of the rabid reactionary policy of Japanese imperialism which, having swallowed the whole of Korea, is endeavouring to swallow many-millioned China, and is trying to strengthen its own position in Japan itself by an enormous exploitation of the people. The Japanese imperialists desire to employ the population of backward China as a weapon against the revolutionary proletariat of the whole world, hence, the latter must take an active interest in the success of the revolutionary struggle of the Japanese workers.

Comrade **Nawanchua** (Korea) struck a deeply despondent note. For ten years now Japan has been sucking out the lifeblood from Korea. The labouring masses of this country are outside all law. Out of seventeen million of population, over ten million are workers. Driven to despair, the labouring masses of Korea rose in rebellion, and this spread throughout the country. The risings were crushed by means of unheard-of tortures, and the terrible treatment to which women, young girls, and children were subjected is absolutely indescribable, and called forth a series of hysterical articles even from the cold-blooded, calm English journalists. The Korean prisons at the present moment contain 150,000 Korean revolutionaries. 80,000 have been killed during the last two years. The Koreans, helpless in their unequal struggle, look for help only to the Third Communist International.

Mai-Tai-Leil (China) demanded that closer attention be given to his country. Imperialist Japan may indeed be ready to utilise his compatriots as a weapon against the world revolution, but under the influence of the Russian revolution, the Chinese workers have begun to move, revolutionary ferment is now very strong, and the European proletariat must consider the Chinese problem in all seriousness.

Kara-Sadiel, who had been to Turkestan, pointed out that the circumstances in the West differed considerably from those in the East, and if, perhaps, a slow progress and lengthy preparation were necessary in the West, in the East rapid activity and swift attack were essential. The Near East is now the key to India, and to China, and it is characteristic that here every activity which may result in revolutionary action bears at first a national character. Revolutionary work here must start by freeing the labouring masses of their religious prejudices—only then can purely Communist education begin. The workers of England must get into touch with those of India, and if then the German and French workers follow, the English will cease to feel secure against revolution in India.

The reporter of the commission on the Far Eastern question wound up the discussion by an analysis of the economic position of the Eastern countries. The class of small masters and hand-workers is rapidly disappearing, and instead of being converted into proletarians, as in Europe, they are transformed into small landowners. Their position in the East is, however, peculiar. The large farmers strive to keep the small landowners at a low level in their exploitation of the land. In the East the feudal class is closely connected with the imperialist and commercial capitalists, at the same time the class of small bourgeoisie, having few privileges, is often at one with the factory workers, the ruined hand workers and small landowners under the common cry of war against imperialism. This question has become particularly acute since the Russian Revolution, which has proved to the Eastern nations that the Soviet system brings about the self-determination of nationalities not only on paper, but in actual experience. The second congress of the Communist International mapped out our policy on the Eastern question, and there is no reason, so far, to deflect from it.

After the Italian delegate had expressed warm greetings to the workers of Soviet Georgia on behalf of the Italian Communists, and had condemned the criticisms passed by the Italian parliamentarians, such as Treves, on the behaviour of the Russians in Georgia, the sitting of the congress was adjourned to the evening. This final evening session was presided over by Koenen. A series of manifestos and recommendations were handed over on the recommendation of the presidium to the Executive Committee for revision and publication: (1) On the Eastern question. (2) The proposal of the South African delegation on the question of work and propaganda amongst the negroes in connection with the Eastern question. (3) A manifesto to the Italian workers, drawn up with the help of the Italian Communists, and directed against the policy of the Serrati group. (4) A manifesto to the Rumanian workers regarding the White terror. Further, the Executive Committee was instructed to draw up in the name of the Congress a manifesto to the workers of the world on the possibilities of the movement under present conditions. Three further resolutions or manifestos were also referred to the new Executive

Committee: (1) On Jewish pogroms. (2) On the special conditions in Palestine. (3) On the position of White Russia. The chairman then announced that the mandate committee had accepted the Greek mandates, and that Greece had been put in the fourth category, with ten votes.

Frölich reported on the commission on the question of the Young Communist International, after which the conference discussed the report of the organisation commission given by Koenen. Amongst the more important points in the project of organisation are: The question of a centralised democracy. The need for energetic propaganda amongst national minorities as far as possible in their own language. The question of trade unions and their relation to tariff agreements. The need for propaganda in the army and navy. The party press and its responsibility to the party and the International. The need for specific agitation amongst the peasantry and amongst women. The desirability of attracting the rank and file members of the party to discuss and to take part in the solution of every question. On legal and illegal work, and finally on the construction of the executive committee and its chief sub-committee—the Small Bureau. After a lengthy discussion it was decided that the latter was to consist of members of the Executive Committee, but in exceptional circumstances the Executive Committee could co-opt other members of the party to work on the Bureau.

Heckert gave the report of the commission on the trade union movement, which was adopted with one abstention. The central idea in this report was the necessity of Communists working within the trade unions for the purpose of winning over the trade unions to Communism, and not to disrupt them by the formation of new trade union organisations.

Bellont, on behalf of the Italian, German, Bulgarian, Polish, and Hungarian delegations, proposed Comrade Zinoviev as president of the new Executive Committee. The proposal was adopted unanimously, with great applause.

A proposal to discuss the working out of an international language was referred to the Executive Committee. The chairman then announced that 381 telegrams of greetings to the congress had been received—the majority of these were from Russian comrades, a large number being from various sections of the Red Army. The chairman then expressed a few words of warm thanks to the organisers of the conference and to the Russian Communists. "They have given us not only theories, but by their experience they have also taught us the practice of revolution . . . and we all consider ourselves the pupils of these great revolutionary fighters." Koenen then noted the great number of victims who fell in the course of the revolution and the whole-hearted sacrifices made by the Russian Communists for the Russian and world revolution, and concluded: "Comrades, this is why we express such warm gratitude to the Russian nation, to the Russian party, to the Russian leaders. I think we shall all join with great enthusiasm in the cry, 'Long live Soviet Russia,' 'Long live the Russian Communist party,' 'Long live

its leaders,' 'Long live the Third International.' " (Prolonged applause.)

Zinoviev then delivered the closing speech. He first of all thanked the congress for his unanimous election, after which he went on to point out that when they made the proposal for a Third Communist International in 1917 they were ridiculed as a group of visionaries—even if it were formed, the existence of such an international, it was said, would be but ephemeral. Well, at the first congress there were indeed only a handful of conscious revolutionaries. The second congress showed our growth—while now we were already a mighty organisation. The speaker then emphasised that in spite of the difficulties of the world situation, the decision of the conference on principles and tactics had been unanimous—this being no mere parade unanimity, such as was the case in the Second International. The Third International was quite unafraid of differences. Had there been such they would have fought them out in the open. "Our unanimity is the real unanimity of the revolutionary proletariat of the whole world, inspired by the class consciousness of the proletariat of the whole world." They had not been afraid to admit and discuss their mistakes. The main idea behind the resolution on tactics was to draw the attention of all their brother parties to the fact that they were faced by a quite different foe from that which confronted the Russian party during the October revolution. The bourgeoisie in Europe and America is more clever and cunning, better organised and armed to the teeth. They have learnt their lesson from the Russian revolution, and were now doing everything to disarm and weaken the workers. Our comrades in Europe will have to go through very severe battles, and their preparation for them must be correspondingly more careful and solid. In connection with the resolution on tactics, Zinoviev touched upon the Italian situation—the special importance of the Red Trade Union and the Young Communist Internationals, also the women's congress, which preceded the congress of the Third International. He then examined the resolution on organisation and gave a rapid survey of the latest views regarding the revolutionary condition of the European situation. The congress had honoured Russia by again meeting in Moscow. He hoped, however, that next year they might meet in Berlin, Paris, Milan, or even in London, in spite of its bad climate.

In Russia they still had great and difficult problems, but the worst period was over. But for the rest of the world proletariat the greatest battles were still to be won, but they were all ready for the sacrifice—"if each of us had ten lives we should be prepared to sacrifice them all for the party." (Applause.)" We must educate our young and adult workers that there is nothing higher and nothing more holy in the world than the Communist world party—the Communist International, and let be what may be, comrades, let destiny demand even greater sacrifices, let the struggle be even harder, and it will be harder, we shall still live and die with the one cry on our

lips, 'Long live the Communist International.' " (Prolonged applause.) The members of the congress then rose and sang the International. The sitting dispersed at 2.30 a.m.

RESOLUTION OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE THIRD INTERNATIONAL OF JULY 13th, 1921.

In spite of the statement of the C.L.P.G., which does not conform to the actual state of affairs, and represents a declaration of war against the Communist International, the newly-elected Executive Committee has passed the following resolutions :—

(1) To publish immediately a detailed open letter to the members of the C.L.P.G., and to demand a resolution of the C.L.P.G. within two months.

(2) To send a delegation to the Congress of the C.L.P.G.

(3) In accordance with the resolution adopted by the Congress, the delegate of the C.L.P.G. is for the time being entitled to remain on the Executive with a consultative vote.

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE ON THE CONVICTION OF BRANDLER.

The Executive Committee of the Third International has despatched the following radiogram via Nauen.

To the German Proletariat.

The Executive Committee of the Communist International declares its absolute solidarity with Comrade Heinrich Brandler, leader of the valiant United Communist Party of Germany, who has been convicted to five years' imprisonment by the Extraordinary Court of the Ebert Republic. It also declares its solidarity with all the other hundreds of the bold fighters who took part in the March revolt, and whom white sham justice has condemned to long prison sentences and hard labour, that same justice that has not touched a hair of the heads of the leaders of the Kapp putsch, or the infamous assassins of Karl Liebknecht, Rosa Luxembourg and Leo Jogiches, but even publicly and secretly protected them. The Executive Committee declares, before the workers of Germany and of the entire world, that the full responsibility for this disgraceful act of vengeance rests upon the Social Democratic party and the trade union leaders of both organisations which, during the March revolt, denounced the Communists as "gutter" proletarians and counter-revolutionary criminals, and without whose active co-operation or toleration the vindictive campaign against the March fighters would have been impossible. The Social Democratic party and the trade union leaders, as members of the government, not only bear the actual but also the full formal responsibility for all those acts of white justice.

The Executive Committee appeals to the independent and social-democratic workers to choose between the aiders and abettors of white justice, and all those who staked their lives for the protection of the working class against counter-revolutionary force, who courageously wielded revolutionary force against that of the counter-revolution.

The Executive Committee of the Communist International, Moscow, June, 1921.